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ABSTRACT 
 
The teaching of progressive patriotism, as an inclusive, open-ended and interpretive 
project, is needed in state schooling to counter significant threats to modern liberal 
democracies. This thesis argues that various forms of civic education, with a particular 
focus on England over recent decades, have not been adequate. It is argued here that 
these conceptions of civic education have all, in various ways, failed to provide enough 
vital force to engage the young in our increasingly complex and demanding plural 
democracies. An important affective dimension has been missing. Recent civic 
education has also failed to be sufficiently liberal by promoting an exclusive sense of 
national solidarity. It is argued here that these failures need to be addressed given the 
levels of informed, critical democratic engagement needed in our complex modern 
democracies and the real and growing threats they face. For example, our increasingly 
diverse and unequal liberal societies, operating within an era of globalisation, have 
spawned a rise in chauvinistic and emotionally potent conceptions of exclusive national 
identity. What is needed to counter this threat is a conception of patriotic education that 
adheres to liberal principles whilst developing affective affiliation to the country  
through a liberal, multicultural, democratic national building project. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Patriotism, as a topic in philosophy and political theory was relatively neglected until  
the 1980s. This decade saw a vibrant debate emerging about the moral and intellectual 
legitimacy of patriotism. Reasons for this flourishing within philosophy have been 
attributed to ‘the revival of communitarianism, which came in response to the 
individualistic, liberal political and moral philosophy epitomised by John  Rawls’  
Theory of Justice (1971) […]’ and Alasdair MacIntyre’s 1984 lecture Is Patriotism a 
Virtue? can be seen as the beginning of this sea change’ (Primoratz, 2007, p.1). Within 
the political sphere there was also a resurgence of nationalism in various parts of the 
world, not least the disintegration of the USSR and the wars in Former Yugoslavia. The 
rise of Scottish Nationalist Party and UK Independence Party, the vote to leave the 
European Union (June 2016) also serves to illustrate this phenomenon within Britain. 
Since the 1990s there has been a lively debate about the nature and extent to which 
liberal political theory can be compatible with some forms of patriotism and nationalism. 
Advocates for what might be called liberal nationalism have included, for example, 
Tamir, 1993; Miller, 1995; and Callan, 1997. And there has been lively debate about 
whether patriotism should be taught in schools (Archard, 1999; Ben-Porath, 2006; 
Brighouse, 2006; Callan, 1997, 2006; Galston, 1991; Hand, 2011; Kateb, 2006; Keller, 
2005; Soutphommasane, 2012; White, 1996, 2001) and, certainly in the UK, more 
politicians from both sides of the political spectrum suggesting, that is some form, it 
should (Brown, 2006; Gove, 2010). Pride in Britain’s heritage captures the Conservative 
proposals, whilst a redefined, unifying sense of ‘Britishness’ was Labour’s version of 
proposed content for part of citizenship education. 
!" 
 
Many plausible reasons have been put forward to explain the phenomenon of renewed 
interest in patriotism, namely: Britain’s declining global and economic power; terrorist 
threats from outside the UK; and terrorist attacks from within by alienated British 
citizens. Broadly, liberal democracy is perceived to be under significant threat (Taylor, 
1996; Callan, 2006; Gray, 2016) and it is a worldwide phenomenon. Whilst global 
dependency increases, it appears that national solidarity in the form of retrenchment or 
assertion increases with it. Where there is a perceived existential threat, either in time of 
war or heightened insecurity, the demand for national unity emerges in various forms 
(Ben-Porath, 2006). At the time of writing an illiberal, white supremacist has been 
elected as President of the USA (November 2016), populist parties of the far right (and 
left) across Europe have been gaining strength, and ‘anxiety about immigration and 
multiculturalism has increasingly been expressed as virulent nationalistic pride’ 
(Soutphommasane, 2012, p.2). According to Ruchir Sharma in his recent book The Rise 
and Fall of Nations (2016) the twenty largest democracies leaders are at their lowest 
popularity  and  anti-establishment  sentiment  is  sweeping  the  globe 1 .  Deepening 
 
inequalities globally, and within many liberal democratic states most  notably 
‘staggering levels’ in the UK and USA (Lagarde, 2015), have given rise to concerns 
about the relationship between growing inequality and subsequent declining political 
stability. 
 
 
The deregulation of national economics and freeing up of international trade, hallmarks 
of ‘neoliberal’ or laissez faire policies, have provided the context for these rising levels 
 
!"This lack of popularity has been used to explain (in part) Donald Trump’s election as President of the 
USA. Although it is important to note that he did not secure a majority of the popular vote. 
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of deep inequalities. Since the 1990s, ‘neoliberalism’ has been the world’s dominant 
economic paradigm, ‘stretching from the Anglo-American heartlands of capitalism to 
the former communist bloc all the way to the developing regions of the global South’ 
(Steger and Roy, 2010, p.xi). Its historical roots lie with such classical liberal 
economists as Adam Smith and Friedrich Hayek. However, many commentators, not 
only on the Left but also from more political liberal traditions (Helleiner, 2014) view 
‘neoliberalism’ as a significant threat to current liberal democracy as a result. It has 
come under severe scrutiny since the global financial crash of 2007, having, ‘been 
shaken to its core by the worst financial calamity since the 1930s’ (ibid.). It, arguably 
however, remains a significant threat to modern liberal democracies, in that, whilst the 
economic foundations may be disintegrating, its broader political and social influence 
remains powerful and tenacious (Hall et al, 2013). Global economic dependency, within 
an ideological context of free trade, has had inevitable consequences for national 
governments. Whilst they - currently - remain critically important institutions, they are 
not always perceived as such by all members of national populations. There are those 
who may question the relevance of national institutions – or indeed their own efficacy 
within this national context - given the power of global economic forces. Others argue 
that national institutions need strengthening and argue for more regulated trade 
agreements and protected border controls. Neo liberalism or market fundamentalism is a 
complex phenomenon and it is not the task of this thesis to examine it in depth. Others 
have done that admirably (see for example the bibliography, Steger and Roy, 2010). 
What is notable here is that, whatever the complexity of the causes, anti-globalisation 
movements have gathered force, political alienation has increased and democratic 
participation has decreased in many countries. Furthermore, many forms of nationalism, 
#" 
including a form of ethnic exclusionism and blind, distorted versions of patriotism have 
become stronger. 
 
As Ben-Porath suggests, many modern liberal democracies appear to be involved in 
various protracted conflicts and ‘unlike in World War Two, for example, the conflict is 
more blurry in goals and modus operandi and this creates unique challenges for civil 
society’ (Ben-Porath, 2006, p.13). The recent vote in Britain to leave the European 
Union (EU) has revealed some internal divisions in the country and also raised many 
questions about the state of liberal democracy in the UK. In relation to democratic 
processes, Professor Michael Dougan, (cited in Yeung, 2016) accused the organisers of 
the campaign to leave the EU of causing 'untold damage to our democracy’, suggesting 
that ‘whatever else happens, by normalising and legitimising dishonesty on an industrial 
scale as a tool for winning votes, Leave have inflicted untold damage upon the quality  
of our national democracy’. And in relation to more virulent forms of patriotic pride, at 
the time of writing (November 2016), the Institute of Race Relations record of ‘post 
Brexit2 racism’ shows that there has been a significant increase in reported racists ‘hate’ 
crimes; 76% of which have involved verbal abuse and 14% involved threatened or  
actual physical violence. The murder of Arkadiusz Jó$wik, a Polish man living in 
Harlow in Essex, is currently being investigated as a racist attack (Krupa, 2016), as is 
the murder of Jo Cox MP (June 2016), a prominent Remain campaigner in the European 
Union referendum. The suspect in Jo Cox’s murder will undergo a ‘terrorist trial’3 given 
his alleged associations with neo Nazi causes. The recent election of Donald Trump as 
 
 
 
2 ‘Brexit’ became the phrase coined to describe the British exit of the European Union 
3 Terrorist trials are deemed necessary where an act of terrorism has been involved where terrorism is 
defined as an action, threat or violent act “made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial 
or ideological cause” according to Section one of the Terrorism Act 2000 
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President of the USA (November 2016) has given rise to many fears that there is a 
global trend towards illiberalism including right wing nationalism and populist 
autocracy. Marine Le Pen, the leader of the National Front, a far right, national- 
conservative party in France has declared that she is poised to win the French  
presidency in 2017. As Kauffman stated (November 2016) ‘Just as a Trump candidacy, 
let alone a victory, was unthinkable a year ago, most French experts had dismissed the 
possibility of the far-right leader’s winning the Élysée Palace in 2017. Brexit and Mr. 
Trump have changed that’4. 
 
Given the unprecedented challenges facing many established liberal democracies the 
philosophical and political questions being wrestled with here appeared to be both 
interesting and important. And the need to equip the young with good citizenship 
education is pressing. My personal interest in this question arose when I moved to 
Croatia with my (Croatian) husband and two children in 2004. There were two sides to 
my growing personal and academic interest in the notion of promoting patriotism in 
schools. One the one hand I had never felt more English than when I no longer lived in 
England. My (initial) inability to participate in a cultural or political community pulled 
me ‘inwards’ and I experienced a sense of alienation, which felt, at times, like an 
existential threat. I felt detached. On the other hand, I was witnessing my children 
participating in a school curriculum that positively promoted national pride in the new 
post-communist, post-war Croatia. Given the horrors of the recent war, and the 
centuries-long struggles within the country under various forms of imperial and political 
occupation, it felt entirely reasonable for citizens of Croatia to engage in a nation- 
 
#"Since completing the thesis, Macron secured a victory in the French election with 66.1% of the vote. Le 
Pen secured 33.9% of the national vote. 
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building project. State schooling also felt like an appropriate place to start. This raised 
several questions. As someone who has been committed to liberal values within a social 
democracy and its educational aims some initially uncomfortable ideas were surfacing.   
Is the essential liberal value of autonomy a victim of this nation-building project? Was 
my narrowing sense of my own nationality unreasonable, petty and small-minded? How 
could I feel justified in ‘loving my country’ whilst denying its reasonableness elsewhere? 
But, how can the tension between the essential, constitutive element of education, truth, 
and imbuing loyalty to particular patriae, be resolved? Should  it?  Surely,  detached 
critical reasoning and the cultivation of autonomous persons, are the bedrocks of any 
good education?  But, what was especially interesting to me was that the usual recourse  
to traditional liberal arguments about the ‘telos’ of education being about truth failed to 
satisfy these strong feelings of my own and my observations of strong feelings in others. 
These responses seemed to be more reasonable then mere base desires or a defensive 
reaction to an existential threat. Upon our return to the UK in 2007, I became interested  
in the growing interest in patriotic education in Britain as articulated by Gordon Brown 
and  expressed  in  the  Ajegbo Report of 2007. It  seemed  that  the  need for patriotic 
education as part of national renewal was not confined to new democratic nations, like 
Croatia. And, furthermore, a progressive, noble, inclusive patriotism may be possible; 
necessary even. 
 
 
Why the need for patriotic education? 
 
This brings us to the central argument of this thesis, which is to explore the extent to 
which patriotic education is needed in state schools to support the continued flourishing 
of  modern  liberal  democracies.  The  thesis  examines  whether  progressive  patriotic 
(" 
education, that ensures that young people learn to love their essentially multicultural 
liberal democratic nation and are motivated and equipped to participate in its continuous 
national renewal through an open, interpretive, national dialogue, is necessary, desirable 
and possible. 
 
 
It is argued here that current civic education in state schools in liberal democracies 
limits individual children’s options, does not contribute sufficiently well to the 
continued flourishing of free national societies and limits liberal democratic influence at 
a global level. What is especially lacking is sufficient motivation for citizens, and 
especially those from minority sub national groups, to participate in liberal democratic 
processes and to feel a genuine sense of efficacy. There is urgency to the debate given 
the current, complex threats to liberal democracies and the inadequacies of educational 
responses to date. Adequately and appropriately nurturing children’s and young  
people’s affective affiliation at the national level, whilst retaining respect for truth, is   
the vital missing element of much civic education. 
 
 
Commonly the goals for civic education in many liberal democracies are to equip 
children with knowledge and understanding about the core principles and features of 
liberal democracy; to pass on liberal democratic values; to cultivate certain liberal 
democratic dispositions and to develop skills to participate in the nation’s political life. 
These are important goals and it is not the purpose of this thesis to condemn them. What 
the argument here sets out to do is to add an important dimension to civic education that 
overcomes the current limitations of this approach. Given the challenges facing modern, 
highly complex, plural, modern democracies – not least rising inequality, globalisation 
and populism, the rise of chauvinistic nationalism, as well as mass immigration in more 
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recent decades - modern democracies need a high number of citizens who understand 
and care deeply enough about issues at a national level to influence, co-develop and 
participate in continual liberal democratic nation building. Given the diverse nature of 
most modern democracies there are many strong cultural, religious, familial and 
institutional affiliative attachments at the sub national cultural level that a citizen may 
have that seem entirely legitimate and appropriate. It is also possible - even desirable - 
to cultivate and hold affective affiliations at the cross-national level, for example, for a 
religious group or an international organisation. What is being argued here is that 
sentiment, as well as knowledge, understanding, values and skills, needs to be cultivated 
at the national level to strengthen national level governance, which still remains all 
important. Critical decisions affecting both local communities, intra-national 
communities and the global community are taken at the national level. Liberal 
democracies need critical and affectively engaged citizens in order to ensure that 
decisions are reached that lead to good lives for individuals, help create just national 
societies and contribute to a more just world. It is argued here that cultivating national 
affiliation is instrumental in this. National communities need to be ‘imagined’, as 
Anderson argues (1991). They are not accessible directly in the way that many small 
communities might be. Providing knowledge and understanding of the value and 
importance of national institutions and developing skills for democratic participation are 
valuable. But what is lacking, it is argued here, is the sufficient emotional engagement 
at the national level to give this understanding and these skills vital force at the 
otherwise relatively remote national level. This emotional attachment at the national 
level needs to fuel motivation but it also needs to be subject to critical scrutiny and  
leave plenty of room for individual autonomy. This thesis aims to justify the need for 
progressive patriotism that takes the form of an open, interpretive, national dialogue 
*" 
where citizens care deeply about its outcomes and, as such, are motivated to participate 
within the many forms of democratic life. The scholarship of Eamonn Callan (1997), 
Sigal Ben-Porath (2006) and Tim Soutphommasane (2012) has greatly contributed to 
the final proposals made here. 
 
 
It is important to acknowledge that, whilst most stop short at explicitly ‘promoting 
patriotism’, most civic education systems try to foster the idea and practices of civic 
virtue that need to be diffused amongst the citizenry in order to sustain healthy levels of 
participation in modern democracies. Broadly there have been two categories of  
attempts at this important goal. Both fall short, it is argued here. The first involves the 
promotion of liberal civic friendship and the second involves promotion of national 
values or a common national identity. According to adherents of the ‘civic friendship’ 
approach, it is enough to teach children to know about and understand the history and 
key features of their country and its democratic institutions; to know why it is important 
as well as how to participate politically; to impart certain values and to try to cultivate 
dispositions of neighbourliness, volunteering, and skills of empathic deliberation, for 
example. This civic curriculum can be taught through the history curriculum, specific 
citizenship lessons and/or through whole school or extracurricular projects. Through  
this educational provision it is expected that children will, for example, acquire values, 
understand the rationales for their adoption, and therefore apply this understanding in 
their adult lives as good democratic citizens. Citizenship education of this kind that 
promotes ‘civic friendship’ through local volunteerism, cultivating behaviours  with 
peers and so on may succeed in cultivating a sense of responsibility and participation at 
the local level but it is not so clear, for example, how this kind of education leads to the 
acquisition of virtue or a sense of obligation to participate at the all-important national 
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level. There seems to be an assumption that children will acquire a sense of duty or  
virtue but how they acquire it and why they might have any sense of duty at the national 
level is not clear. The strong motivation to be involved seems to be lacking, especially 
when local communities may be the location of the extracurricular learning, for example, 
and local communities are not representative of the multicultural nation as a whole. 
Modern plural democracies are socially constructed national groups, or as Benedict 
Anderson (1991) describes them, ‘imagined communities’. Nations are imagined by the 
people who see themselves as members of that community. Children, and indeed adults, 
require some support for making this imaginative leap at the national level, especially 
when their sub national community bears little resemblance to other sub national 
communities or to their perception of the national community as a whole. What is 
needed, arguably, is some means of nurturing affective affiliation at this national level   
in order that future citizens care enough and feel that their participation – even at the 
level of casting a vote - genuinely counts. 
 
 
The second attempt at cultivating civic virtue or obligation to participate in national 
political life is to be explicit about strengthening the sense of national community 
through the promotion of a common national identity or shared set of national values. 
This approach can be divided into two distinct types of response. The first of these 
involves a rejection of what might be described as multiculturalism in favour of a 
narrower, ‘muscular’ version of national identity; a conservative nationalism. Given its 
tendency for a more aggressive assimilation of minorities, this approach is found 
wanting and is ultimately dismissed by arguments presented in this thesis. It lacks 
sufficient adherence to fundamental liberal principles of autonomy, fairness and 
tolerance. The second approach to strengthening national solidarity can be described as 
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liberal nationalism, as opposed to, conservative nationalism. This approach aims to 
develop a more inclusive sense of shared civic identity. It is argued here that this 
approach holds more promise but remains limited. Its promise lies in its response to the 
centrifugal pressure on modern democratic states; namely, that the emergence of plural 
societies heightens the potential for conflict between solidarity and diversity and that 
cultivating a shared civic identity seems a reasonable response to this. The cultivation of 
this shared civic identity, rather like the ‘civic friendship’ approach discussed above, 
involves elements of democratic deliberation and openness about the ends of this 
deliberation. And like the civic friendship approach, its limitations also lie in the fact 
that it is difficult to see why, for example, many members of minority or sub national 
groups - or currently those alienated from or sceptical about national politics - would be 
motivated to participate in a debate about shared identity if the chances of being able to 
genuinely shape any outcomes of this deliberation remain very small. If the purpose of a 
shared nation identity is to help secure the ends of a liberal democracy this approach, as 
Kymlicka argues, ‘seems to favour those who are unquestionably part of the liberal 
moral ontology and are viewed as individual members of a particular community for 
whom cultural membership is an important good […] Members of minority cultural 
communities may face particular kinds of disadvantages with respects to the good of 
cultural membership (Kymlicka, 1989, p.162). 
 
 
Given the fact that modern liberal democracies are increasingly diverse and many 
citizens have strong affiliations at sub national and/or transnational level or feel strongly 
that they have no voice in traditional democratic politics, it seems important to 
acknowledge these sentiments rather than subsume them. Appiah has recently argued 
(2016) that the mythology of the ‘romantic’ state was the idea of ‘one people’ and that 
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this idea is a simple ideal to coalesce diverse people. The modern liberal state has an 
equivalent mantra of ‘we shall work it out together’. This is harder to get passionate 
about. It is hard to gain affective commitment to the common liberal project given its 
complexity. What is being argued here is that it is very important to develop feelings of 
affection for the liberal nation. The suggestion is not to replace these sub or trans- 
national affective affiliations. And, indeed it is worth noting that not every citizen has - 
or indeed should have - affective affiliations for a specific sub national community 
either. The suggestion is to overcome feelings of alienation or cynicism, however, with  
a feeling of genuine efficacy. And what is being argued is that, currently, national level 
decisions are still highly important and where we exercise our democratic rights. 
Decisions taken at the national level are critically important and these national level 
decisions affect us all, and other nations around the world. Empirical evidence points to 
two worrying phenomena as discussed above. The first is the increase in emotionally 
potent forms of ethnic and exclusive national pride. The second points to a worrying 
disconnect between large numbers of citizens and their national community and its 
political institutions in many liberal democracies along with scepticism about citizens’ 
levels of genuine influence on political outcomes. What will be argued here is that 
caring deeply about one’s national community, as well as believing that one has efficacy 
in shaping decisions about its future, are two critical ingredients that civic education in 
most liberal education systems do not currently provide. 
 
 
This is not unproblematic of course. What, for example, is one being encouraged to love 
at the national level when the idea of a national community is not clear or 
straightforward in our increasingly diverse liberal democracies? How can one be taught 
to believe that one has efficacy at a national level, especially if one is a member of a 
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minority or economically disadvantaged group that believes it has not been well served 
by the national democratic institutions? And a critical question is how teaching children 
to love their country can remain an essentially liberal enterprise with outcomes that 
serve the future of liberal democracy? 
 
 
These questions are at the heart of this philosophical inquiry. The aim is to step back 
from the currently non-ideal situation and to examine concepts at more abstract level in 
order to arrive at some principles for effective citizenship education in liberal 
democracies. These principles are developed and discussed in relation to some historical 
context, contemporary education policy and school conditions, especially in developed 
liberal democracies and especially England at that. There is also discussion of education 
policy and schooling in contexts where liberal democracy is under threat or is being 
newly established in challenging conditions in order to test the universality of the 
principles being proposed. My aim is normative; I am interested in drawing up a case 
for how we ought to act and what sorts of education systems we ought to develop when 
we live in liberal democracies whose flourishing is under threat or could be enhanced. 
The thesis arrives at a proposal for patriotic education that highlights our shared fate in  
a common project that really matters to us as individuals and for our smaller 
communities, our national community and at a global level. This patriotic education 
does not replace education that encourages citizens to be cosmopolitan, ethical members 
of a global community. It does, however, explicitly, develop knowledge and 
understanding of the importance of our essentially diverse national community and 
nurtures a love of that national community which involve citizens in understanding, 
valuing and upholding the very best of liberal democratic principles and practices within 
the context of a shared, interpretative national project. Liberal national sentiment should 
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be engendered that finds expression in enhanced commitment to democratic 
participation, accountability and deliberation. This patriotism should also find 
expression in a national project that reflects the content and character of the national 
community itself and sees this process as a collective act involving interpretation in an 
open ended, generous, imaginative and critical way. The advocacy of this national- 
cultural dialogue is explicit about the fact that any liberal democratic nation’s cultures 
and identities are inevitably and necessarily forged through deliberation, dissent, 
compromise, rejection of some practices, assimilation of minority groups and  
integration of ethnic groups. It is also explicit that, over time, there will be adoption of 
some immigrant values, practices and influences on the national language and culture. 
Modern English, for example, owes much of its substance to the influence of Germanic 
tribes, the Angles and Saxons, migrating to England in the 5th and 7th centuries. The 
Huguenots were part of an 18th century wave of French Protestant immigration that 
‘transformed London’ (Tonkin, 2015). And, of course, there are many more examples of 
this kind. Human migration began over two million years ago and is unlikely to stop  
any time soon. 
 
 
In this nuanced version of liberal patriotism as a national dialogue, migration and 
diversity are understood as a welcome inevitabilities and are to be critically embraced in 
the shaping of the nation’s shared fate. Citizens’ feelings towards and interests in the 
outcomes of democratic deliberation and dialogue will give this project some vital force. 
 
            How I address the argument 
The argument is developed incrementally, chapter by chapter. In the first chapter, it is 
established that there is a case to be made for more patriotic education in state education 
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within the UK5 given the limitations of previous citizenship curricula. This initial 
chapter focuses in some substantial detail on previous and recent attempts to develop a 
national citizenship programme in state schooling in the UK through an examination of 
education policy over the last 25 years. The UK approach to democratic citizenship 
education  is  contrasted  to  some  other  established  liberal  democratic  contexts.  The 
 
chapter concludes that successive British governments, from each side of the political 
spectrum, have missed an opportunity to develop the most efficacious citizenship 
programme and that an explicit patriotic, interpretative dimension to national identity 
would enhance state education – and engage previously alienated sub national or 
minority groups, for example. There is a case to be made for improved citizenship 
education in the UK and it is proposed that a more explicit progressive patriotic 
dimension to it will enhance this provision. 
 
 
Next, a number of key definitional and conceptual terms are clarified and various 
arguments tested for their validity before outlining the normative case for progressive 
patriotic education. Patriotism is defined in the second chapter given the fact that 
patriotic education is being advocated in liberal democratic schooling, it is important to 
clarify what is meant by the term. This chapter explores the core definition of ‘love of 
country’ to assess its relevance for the purposes of this thesis. Alternative and more 
qualified definitions of patriotism are examined. The chapter concludes that the core 
definition - love of country - is adequate for the purposes here. Chapter Three tests the 
5 As it relates to England in particular for the purpose of this analysis 
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claim that a more patriotic citizenry will better support the maintenance and flourishing 
of liberal democracy. The chapter concludes that national affiliation has always 
bolstered liberal democracy and that there is a strong instrumental argument that can be 
made for further enhancing national sentiment. Patriotism, when harnessed to self- 
governing virtues, can invigorate liberal democratic states and it is concluded that, 
thriving liberal democracies depend upon a patriotic citizenry. 
 
 
Chapter Four explores the particular kind of patriotism that contributes best to liberal 
democratic flourishing. A version of patriotism is defended that encourages different 
groups to give expression to their distinctiveness and takes the form of a practice: a 
public dialogue of deliberation. This national dialogue is essentially and necessarily 
informed by liberal principles. Citizens of liberal democracies, au fond, share 
membership of a political community defined by liberal civic values and practices. The 
patriotic dimension of this national interpretive project ensures that citizens are deeply 
committed to maintaining and shaping, the national context of their shared fate. Chapter 
Five defines liberal education and examines a number of claims that suggest it is 
incompatible with patriotic education. The claims that patriotic education is necessarily 
indoctrinatory, distorted, and anti-cosmopolitan are examined and defeated. The 
suggestion that, given the reasonable, contested value of patriotism it should be taught  
as a controversial subject is also found wanting. This chapter concludes by defeating 
these arguments and affirming its compatibility with liberal education. Thus far, the 
compatibility of liberal democracy and patriotism is established, as is the compatibility 
of liberal and patriotic education. It is concluded that there is a case for enhancing 
patriotic education within liberal democracies, and in fact, there is some necessity for 
doing so. 
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Given that the instrumental case is the strongest argument for enhancing patriotic 
education, there is an examination of patriotic education in more urgent liberal 
democratic national contexts. The claim that patriotic education may be more suitable or 
appropriate in post conflict or otherwise fragile democratic contexts is examined. The 
assumption behind this claim is that it may be necessary to strengthen national solidarity 
as a precursor to achieving the desired liberal ends in nascent or fragile contexts. 
Nation-building education policies are examined in a number of post-conflict, emerging 
liberal democracies, namely, in Croatia, Lithuania and Lebanon. The conclusion of this 
examination is that patriotic education in fragile liberal democracies is best conceived of 
as a deliberative, open-ended democratic project where national identity is construed as 
sharing national fate rather than a more singular cultural or ethnic identity. Even though 
the case for strengthening national solidarity in these contexts may be urgent, there are 
no grounds upon which short term, and arguably illiberal, patriotic means serve this 
context better. In fact, it is concluded, that this approach may inflict long-term damage 
on emergent democracies, as well as in more established liberal democracies (the UK 
and USA) seen as under various threats. Chapter Seven sets out a normative case for 
patriotic education in liberal democracies. Its necessity is reiterated and a series of 
recommendations at level of principle and practice are made. This chapter provides a 
defence of patriotic education within established liberal democratic contexts, outlining 
how affective national affiliation can be engendered through an expansive cultural 
dialogue, which enhances liberal democratic virtues, deliberative abilities and is 
simultaneously critical, imaginative and generous. It concludes by making the case that 
this nuanced version of progressive patriotic education is necessary and worthwhile in 
all liberal democratic contexts. 
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The thesis concludes with a proposal for patriotic education that highlights our shared 
national fate in a common project that really matters to us. Rather than replacing 
education that encourages citizens to be cosmopolitan, ethical members of a global 
community, this proposal enhances the likelihood of more just national, as well as sub 
and cross national, communities. Progressive patriotic education explicitly develops 
knowledge and understanding of the importance of our essentially diverse national 
community and nurtures a love of that national community which involves citizens in 
understanding, valuing and upholding the very best of liberal democratic principles and 
practices within the context of a shared, interpretative national project. Liberal national 
sentiment should be engendered that finds expression in enhanced commitment to 
democratic participation, accountability and deliberation. This patriotism should also 
find expression in a national project that reflects the content and character of  the 
national community itself and sees this process as a collective act involving 
interpretation in an open ended, generous, imaginative and critical way. The advocacy  
of this national-cultural dialogue is explicit about the fact that any liberal democratic 
nation’s cultures and identities are inevitably and necessarily forged through 
deliberation, dissent, compromise, rejection of some practices, assimilation of minority 
groups, integration of ethnic groups and - over time - the wholesale adoption of some 
immigrant values and practices. In this nuanced version of liberal patriotism as a 
national dialogue, diversity is understood as a welcome inevitability and is to be 
critically embraced in the shaping of the nation’s shared fate. Citizens’ deep feelings 
towards and interests in the outcomes of democratic deliberation and dialogue will give 
this project vital force. 
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CHAPTER 1: A REVIEW OF UK6 GOVERNMENT POLICY 
FOR  CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 
In recent decades in the UK Citizenship education policy has stopped short of explicitly 
promoting patriotism. Since 2010 the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition 
government issued guidance to schools requiring British values be respected but no 
suggestion that they needed to be explicitly encouraged. Within the last two years, 
however, it has become a requirement that all schools in Britain actively promote  
British values. The stronger obligation to foster British values came from the, then, 
Education Secretary Michael Gove. It was partly due to his concerns about allegations 
that some Birmingham schools, who had recently become academies and therefore freed 
from some governmental scrutiny and accountability, had been infiltrated by 
‘ideologues and zealots aiming to promote a strand of Sunni Islam and who were 
antipathetic to the beliefs of anyone outside their circle’ (Muir, 2014). This became an 
infamous and controversial case known as the Trojan Horse affair and the Education 
Secretary came under considerable criticism for his handling of it. An inquiry did, 
nonetheless, find that there was some cause for concern whilst the more extreme 
allegations were disproven. Peter Clarke, the inquiry report’s author suggested that the 
investigation found there to be: 
 
No evidence to suggest that there is a problem with 
governance generally nor any evidence of terrorism, 
radicalisation or violent extremism in the schools of 
concern in Birmingham, but there was evidence that 
there are a number of people, associated with each  
other and in positions of influence in schools and 
governing bodies, who espouse, sympathise with or fail 
to challenge extremist views (Clarke, 2014). 
 
 
 
6 As it relates to England in particular for the purpose of this analysis 
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A more recent study, (Mogra, 2016) set out to investigate the frequency. This study 
shows evidence of some aspects of the affair being exploited for political purposes and 
a certain amount of distorted targeting of a segment of the Muslim community for 
political purposes. Mogra’s conclusions do however echo those of Clarke above; as he 
says here: 
 
The findings show an absence of a systematic and 
coordinated plot to take over these schools and of any 
concerted and deliberate plot to promote radicalisation 
and violent extremism of Muslim children in these schools 
or elsewhere. However, the reports did find a coordinated, 
deliberate and sustained action, carried out by a few 
associated individuals, to introduce an intolerant and 
aggressive Islamic ethos into a few schools in Birmingham 
[…] Importantly, if nothing else, the affair has highlighted 
the imperative of providing a broad and balanced 
curriculum – however this is conceptualised – which is 
rich, imaginative and gives a wide range of experiences 
both inside and outside of school to young Muslims (p.462). 
As a result of this affair, along with wider concerns about countering extremism in 
British schools7, and wider concern about decline in societal cohesion, there have been 
additions to the Spiritual, Moral, Social and Cultural (SMSC) development standard set 
out in the Education Regulations. These are intended to ensure that schools: ‘encourage 
pupils to respect specified fundamental British values; do not promote extremist views, 
or partisan political views, through their curriculum and/or teaching, and offer pupils a 
balanced presentation of views when political issues are brought to their attention.’ 
 
(DfE, 2014, p.4). 
 
 
Wider concern about societal cohesion and, in the words of David Cameron the UK 
Prime Minister (2010-2016), ‘a slow-motion moral collapse’ led to developments in 
 
$ As evidenced in the HM Government’s report ‘Countering Extremism Strategy’, October 2015"
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what has been termed character education (Arthur et al, 2015 p.8). The call for  
character building in UK schools increased in 2011 as riots took place in many parts of 
the country. David Cameron claimed that people ‘showing indifference to right and 
wrong’ and having ‘a twisted moral code’ caused the riots. He mentioned schools as  
part of a solution to counter this ‘slow-motion moral collapse’ (ibid.). Cameron’s former 
Director of Policy, James O’Shaughnessy, drew on the work of the newly formed 
Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, at Birmingham University, for policy  
guidance on curriculum guidance for schools on character education. The Jubilee Centre 
was formed in 2012 by Professor James Arthur, who aimed to set up an interdisciplinary 
research centre with a focus on practical impact in relation to promoting a healthier 
society. As he says here: 
 
A key conviction underlying the existence of the Centre 
is that the virtues that make up good character can be 
learnt and taught. We believe these have largely been 
neglected in schools and in the professions. It is also a 
key conviction that the more people exhibit good 
character and virtues, the healthier our society. As such, 
the Centre undertakes development projects seeking to 
promote the practical applications of its research 
evidence (Arthur et al, 2015 p.2). 
 
Its inauguration, and name, was linked to the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Elizabeth II, 
thereby giving it clear association with notions of national unity and patriotism. The 
substance of its research, policy and curriculum recommendations, however, has so far 
stopped short of promoting patriotism explicitly. The focus was clearly on reviving  
good character understood in Aristotelian terms as: ‘moral virtues such as honesty and 
kindness, civic virtues such as community service, intellectual virtues such as curiosity 
and creativity, and performance virtues such as diligence and perseverance’ (ibid. p.4). 
The  promotion  of  these  virtues  were  echoed  by  James  O’Shaughnessy, Cameron’s 
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Director of Policy, when he participated in a round table discussion on developing 
character education in the UK. He described it as, ‘a set of strengths or virtues that 
individuals can develop which contribute to leading a happy and successful life with  
four component sets of virtues namely intellectual, performance, moral and civic’ (EIF, 
2014, p.1). And by 2014, there was a broad cross-party consensus on the inclusion of 
character education in schools. The then Labour Shadow Education Secretary Tristram 
Hunt commented that character can and should be taught in schools (2014). He argued 
that character and resilience are vital components of a rounded education and good 
preparation for a career. In the summer of 2014, the Conservative Secretary of State for 
Education Nicky Morgan said that ‘for too long there has been a false choice between 
academic standards and activities that build character and resilience’, which she said, 
‘should go hand in hand’ (cited in Arthur et al, 2015 p.8). The cross party consensus 
welcomed character education, understood as including a broad range of educational 
approaches such as whole child education, social-emotional learning, and civic 
education, as a response to perceived threats to societal values and cohesion. 
 
Citizenship education8 policy in England, over recent decades, has responded in various 
ways to the perceived threats and challenges to liberal democratic values and practices. 
Successive Conservative, Labour and Coalition governments have introduced education 
policy that has both reflected their respective political views and responded to a number 
of external demands by increasingly emphasising a shared British identity or adherence 
to British values of some sort, along with an education that teaches the principles and 
practices of good character within democratic societies. This chapter provides an 
overview  of  a  number  of  government  reports  and  subsequent  policies  aimed  at 
% Citizenship education is a term used throughout the thesis to include civic and relevant aspects of 
character education"
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educating future English citizens. It shows that policies took various forms in the light  
of the circumstances each government worked within and reflected ideological 
differences in relation to the extent or nature of state intervention in crafting future 
citizens in liberal democracies. All policies wrestled with the challenges of how to 
encourage healthy levels of public participation in an increasingly diverse society, 
alongside the evidence of growing levels of alienation from many forms of public life. 
Responses have tended towards the traditionally minimalist view whilst others have  
been more interventionist in terms of promoting a common civic morality. And some 
have been a mix of the two. 
 
None of these policies, it is argued here, has responded adequately to the needs of  
liberal democracy in modern Britain. The recent publication (DfE, 2010) of an extensive 
eight-year longitudinal study on the nature and impact of citizenship education in 
England and Wales reported that, despite more than ten years of mandatory citizenship 
education in state schools, some potentially disturbing attitudes are reported, for 
example: 
 
Attitudes towards equality and society have hardened 
with age: over time, the cohort have become less liberal 
and more conservative particularly in their attitudes 
towards refugees and immigrants, but also in their 
attitudes towards jail sentences, benefit payments, and 
some environmental policies. […] Citizenship 
attachments have weakened with age: there has been a 
gradual and steady weakening of the cohort’s 
attachment to their communities (be they local or 
national or European) […] and distrust in politicians 
has increased (p.8). 
 
And whilst the evidence from this is not entirely negative, for example the cohort has 
reported that it has become markedly more supportive about human rights and women’s 
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rights, it is evident that ‘as these youngsters approached adulthood they were still only 
moderately likely to feel that they, as individuals, could influence the political and  
social institutions that shape their lives’ (ibid.). Levels of alienation from national 
democratic life are still high. The recent European Union referendum (June 2016) voter 
turnout reflected moderately healthy levels of political participation amongst the young 
but they still lagged behind older age groups. As a London School of Economics study 
revealed: 
 
The results found that 64% of those young people who 
were registered did vote, rising to 65% among 25-to-39- 
year-olds and 66% among those aged between 40 and 54. 
It increased to 74% among the 55-to-64 age group and 
90% for those aged 65 and over (Bruter et al, 2016). 
 
Current citizenship education in the UK has not adequately equipped the young for 
participation in their evolving and complex modern liberal democracy. The chapter 
concludes that the recent focus on promoting common national values, which has been 
coupled with an emphasis on character education and enhancing political literacy, is an 
inadequate response to both the needs of individuals and the needs of liberal democratic 
societies in the current world. It also determines that, whilst previous policies came 
much closer to a full and adequate approach to citizenship education, none has 
harnessed the important dimension of nourishing affective affiliations to the national 
community. This factor, it is argued throughout the thesis, is what is needed to give vital 
force to liberal democracies as they continue to evolve. 
 
Citizenship education: a contingent concept and contested terrain 
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There is a strong, and complex, relationship between the notion of citizenship, civic education, 
government policy and the wider socio-political context. As Kerr (2003, p.2) states: 
 
Citizenship is a contested concept. Indeed, Davies (1999) 
has counted over 300 known definitions of democracy 
associated with citizenship education. At the heart of   
the contest are differing views about the function and 
organisation of society. The periodic redefinition of 
citizenship education is a by-product of a much larger, 
wide-ranging debate concerning the changing nature of 
citizenship in modern society and the role of education 
within that society. 
 
The political responses to what citizenship education should comprise in England are no 
exception. Although there is a broad agreement that citizenship education should be part 
of young peoples’ schooling, there is no such agreement about its purpose. As Wolmuth 
argues: ‘The aims of citizenship education are essentially contested because the concept 
of citizenship is definitively bound up with our vision of society and individuals’ 
relationships with it’ (2007, p.1). At one end of the spectrum there are some 
Conservatives who believe that ‘Liberalism is a theory about the rightful limits of state 
power, not about content of education for children’ (Feinberg, 1990, p.88) and at the 
other end of this spectrum, in some Labour policy, those who believe that citizenship 
education should involve a comprehensive doctrine outlining an agreed civic morality. 
And, some aspects of Labour policy aimed to create a critically engaged citizenry that 
would actively reshape society and notions of Britishness. The debates about civic 
education have been vigorous throughout recent decades and especially after the 
introduction of the National Curriculum for England and Wales in 1988. 
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McLaughlin (1992) distinguishes between a ‘minimal’ and ‘maximal’ conception of 
citizenship somewhat along the lines outlined above. On the ‘minimal’ view, citizenship 
education is focused on providing information, for example, about the legal and political 
system and the ‘development of virtues of local and immediate focus’ – such as those 
relating to voluntary activity (ibid. p.237). In contrast, the ‘maximal’ interpretation of 
citizenship education ‘requires the development of a critical understanding of societal 
structures and processes, in order that they might be questioned, and ‘virtues’ that   
would empower students to change them’ (ibid. p.238). These maximal and minimal 
conceptions do not, however, map neatly on to the differing political ideologies and 
philosophical traditions. It might be expected, for example, that the  various 
Conservative governments would align more readily to the minimal conception of 
citizenship education. Culturally, in this country there has been ‘a strong conviction that 
government-run civic education would be a dangerous threat to the freedom of the 
individual and here the Protestant tradition of dissenting was no doubt strongly 
influential’ (Citizenship Foundation, p.1). This Protestant tradition of limiting state 
intervention has been reflected in state education policies since it began in England and 
arguably some nervousness about the wide scope or central control of civic values 
remains intact. However, Conservative governments from 1979-1997, for example, 
oversaw the introduction of the highest levels of centralising education policy in the UK, 
with the introduction of the National Curriculum and much more centralised testing 
regimes. And, arguably, the statutory requirement to promote British values introduced 
in 2014, shows high levels of state intervention in education. These cannot be described 
as ‘maximal’ in the way McLaughlin defines this above. They are better categorised as 
highly interventionist. And likewise, where one might expect a Labour government,  
with its traditions in communitarianism and the core values of collective responsibility 
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within the English socialist, democratic tradition, to oversee more maximal versions of 
citizenship education, in fact, they too could be described as interventionist, rather than 
maximal in the way McLaughlin intends it. Maximal citizenship education involves 
explicitly enabling the young to question current institutional power structures and it is 
not clear that Labour’s education policy was designed to achieve this. 
 
 
Several commentators argue that the 1997 citizenship agenda remains firmly in 
McLaughlin’s minimalist citizenship category and does not advocate a more radical 
transformative agenda. Although, importantly, McLaughlin himself, whilst 
acknowledging that the official curriculum documents relating to earlier attempts to 
introduce citizenship education in schools (1991) tended to interpret citizenship in 
‘minimalist ways’ stated that the Crick Report ‘does contain evidence of ‘maximal’ or 
‘active’ elements’ (McLaughlin, 2000, p.550). This combination of minimal and (some) 
maximal elements was partly a result of a new set of principles adopted by the Labour 
leadership. The Labour government of 1997, under Tony Blair’s leadership, loosened its 
ties with its socialist past and claimed to be carving a new ideology. New Labour, as it 
described itself, characterised the relation between citizens and the state in what became 
commonly referred to as the 'Third Way' (Giddens, 1998). The citizenship agenda was 
characterised by the importance of the civic responsibilities of the individual in 
partnership with the state. The new Labour Government urged individuals to act as 
caring people aware of the needs and views of others and motivated to contribute 
positively to wider society. This new approach has been criticised by some 
commentators (e.g. Ball, 2007; Cunningham and Lavalette, 2004) suggesting that the 
‘Third Way’ political discourse leaves the structure of society uninterrogated and is 
thereby  devoid  of  important,  critical  maximal  elements  of  citizenship  education. 
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Overall, then, the policy responses of recent decades have contained elements of both 
minimal and interventionist (rather than strictly maximal) features and some aspects of 
civic education policy has contained evidence of what McLaughlin describes as the 
maximal critical dimensions of citizenship education. 
 
What all governments have in common is that each has explicitly aimed to define or 
redefine citizenship given the challenges in modern liberal democracies. These 
challenges arise from the fact that we live in increasingly socially and culturally diverse 
communities given the era of mass immigration and a global economy, which 
encourages new international or transnational kinds of citizenship. An increasingly 
interdependent world gives rise to new forms of economic social rights which may cross 
national borders and has enlarged aspects of democratic participation and legal 
accountability, for example, the European Union9, too. There is evidence from many 
established liberal democracies that there is an increasing breakdown of political trust 
and the traditional respect for representative democracy. There has been a rise of 
populism and anti-establishment movement as a response to growing inequalities and a 
real sense of disempowerment from large sectors of the population. 
 
 
Starkey and Osler (2006, p.5) set out a broad framework for the context of the 
citizenship debate and include the fact that ‘there is, internationally, a broad recognition 
of a need to address through education the challenges presented by continuing injustice 
and inequalities in the word expressed, for example, in the initiative to set up the UN 
Decade for Human Rights Education (UN, 1994)’. On a more local scale a study into 
 
&"At the time of writing, whilst Article 50 has since been triggered post the EU referendum the UK 
remains legally a member of the EU at this point (September 2017) 
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the state of democracy in Britain over the last decade (The Guardian, 2012) warns it is 
in ‘long-term terminal decline’ due to rise in corporate power and as such politicians 
become less representative of their constituencies. The changing nature of work and 
ways in which families live have loosened and changed the nature of more traditional 
family bonds. Growing forms of social media are changing the way we interact and 
participate in communities. The list could go on. Social fragmentation has many root 
causes and is changing the way we interact and participate – or do not participate - 
politically. As Starkey and Osler suggest (op. cit. p.2): 
 
In both established democracies and newly established 
democratic states, such as those of Eastern and Central 
Europe and Latin America, there is a recognition that 
democracy is essentially fragile and that it depends on 
the active engagement of citizens, not just in voting, but 
in developing and participating in sustainable and 
cohesive communities. 
 
And, David Kerr agrees suggesting that at the national, political level much of the 
concern about declining forms of stable citizenship focuses on concerns that national 
societies are threatened by the ‘decline in traditional forms of civic cohesion: which has 
been termed a democratic deficit’ (2000, p.4). And he adds: 
 
This was supported by increasing calls for action to 
address the worrying signs of alienation and cynicism 
among young people about public life and participation, 
leading to their possible disconnection and 
disengagement with it. Such signs are apparent in a 
number of industrialised nations across the world (ibid. 
p. 3). 
 
It is worth noting here that whilst the facts of some declining participation in the formal 
aspects of public life are indisputable, there are those who question its extent and nature, 
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as well as the fact it is used to justify certain citizenship agenda. Cunningham and 
Lavalette (2004), for example, suggest that reports of declining participation casts the 
young as alienated rather than society as in need of reform. And, Stephen Ball (2007)   
for example, questioned some of the evidence presented to justify the approach to 
citizenship education, post 1998, suggesting that it had was selected to suit the ‘Third 
Way’ political discourse which leaves society’s main structures unquestioned. Recent 
high levels of participation in demonstrations across Britain attest to fairly high levels of 
youth  engagement  in  demonstrating  against  aspects  of  government  policy  past and 
present (for example, the rise of Momentum, demonstrations post EU referendum results; 
demonstrations post publication of Chilcott Inquiry10). 
 
But, what is clearly indisputable is that liberal democratic citizens and governments are 
facing a number of real challenges and that commentators debating aspects of 
citizenship education are suggesting that some are in need of review. And, as was 
suggested at the outset of this chapter, citizenship education will always be contingent, 
contested and evolving. This has been the case since the thinking of those who have 
pioneered mass public education in the UK. In the nineteenth century, before the 1870 
Education Act, ‘education reformers establishing local schools for the children of the 
working classes were generally clear that part of their aim was to instil a moral sense of 
responsibility as well as to teach basic skills. The Bible was often used as a basic 
literacy  reader  for  this  reason.’  (The  Citizenship  Foundation,  Birkbeck,  2010, p.1). 
 
10 ‘Momentum’ was formed as the successor to the campaign to get Jeremy Corbyn elected as leader of 
the Labour Party. It aims to transform Labour into a more ‘membership-led’ party 
(http://www.peoplesmomentum.com): July 2nd 2016, mass protest in London at the referendum result. 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/live/2016/jul/02/brexit-news-live-thousands-march-for-europe-in- 
post-referendum-protest: July 6th 2016 after the publication of the Chilcott Inquiry into the Iraq War there 
were protests, blockades and walk outs (http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/stop-the-war-bliar- 
protest-chilcot-report_uk_577cd697e4b0c9460801b6ea) 
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Political traditions dating back to Greek and Roman conceptions of citizenship as 
‘involvement in public affairs’ have had some influence on curriculum developments  
and education policy for at least two centuries in this country (QCA, 1998, p.10). And, 
whilst the Victorian stress on educating the majority of the population for servile 
obedience to its leaders has been replaced by a ‘thoroughly modern discourse based on 
full legal and political equality for all’ (The Citizenship Foundation, Birkbeck, 2010, p.1) 
there remain live debates about the purpose, nature and scope of citizenship education. 
Kerr relatively recently identified four themes in need of stronger emphasis in modern 
civic education emerging from an international  review, namely: ‘rights  and 
responsibilities; access; belonging and other identities’ (2000, p.3). These four 
dimensions are clearly inextricably linked and have been dubbed by some 
commentators as the 'new dimensions' of citizenship, which are in most need of 
redefinition (ibid.). It is not a straightforward enterprise and it is not the intention of this 
thesis to imply that it is easy. Clearly there are tensions in marrying the demands of 
liberal principles with the need to educate the young in relation to these principles. 
Liberal societies need good outcomes of citizenship education, whatever form it takes; 
but good liberal societies cannot dictate these outcomes. Eamonn Callan describes the 
challenges facing liberal democratic education policy makers well: 
 
A necessary feature of free societies is the extension of a 
particular set of rights to all citizens, including rights to 
liberty, association, and political participation. But so 
far as citizens use their rights to protect or advance the 
different ways of life they cherish, any such society is 
also pluralistic in ways that may pose a threat to liberal 
democracy. If the role of state education is to keep faith 
with its constitutive morality, a path must be found 
between the horns of this dilemma (1997, p.9). 
%!" 
The rest of this chapter continues by providing some historical context for civic 
education policy from the 1960s onwards, including commentary on the significance of 
racial rejectionism and Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech, the rise of the New 
Right with its one nation agenda built on ‘colour-blindness’, the response of the Left in 
proposing alternative narratives of English nationalism and a discussion of the role of 
the popular press in defining ‘common sense’ notions of patriotism. The chapter then 
proceeds by exploring the ways in which citizenship education policy over the last three 
decades in England has managed the dilemma Callan articulates and the twin goals of 
promoting universal liberal virtues with an adequately robust conception of national 
civic membership. 
 
Some historical context to the civic education agenda 
 
The rise of ‘racial rejectionism’ of the 1960s 
 
Britain’s population has included many settlers from around the world across the 
centuries and recent decades. For example, before the Second World War, there were 
significant communities of migrant Irish and Jewish settlers. After the war, people from 
the Caribbean and Indian sub continent became the largest groups of settlers, invited as 
they were by the government given the pressing needs of the labour market in the UK. 
For the first time in UK history, being ‘non-white’ became a marker of one’s immigrant 
status (Bonnet, 1993, p.17). The non-white skin marker of one’s immigrant status 
arguably heightened problems associated with immigrant integration, for both locals  
and the new arrivals themselves. As William Deedes, Minister in the Conservative 
government that introduced the Commonwealth Immigrants Act in 1962 stated many 
years after the Act became law: 
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The Bill’s real purpose was to restrict the influx of coloured 
immigrants. We were reluctant to say as much openly. So   
the restrictions were applied to coloured and white citizens  
in all Commonwealth countries – though everybody 
recognised that immigration from Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand formed no part of the problem (Deedes, 1968, 
p.10). 
 
Alastair Bonnet (1993) argues that an ideology of ‘racial rejectionism’ in Britain was on 
the rise in the 1960s and was given coherent expression by the Conservative Member of 
Parliament Enoch Powell. Powell’s infamous Rivers of Blood speech at a meeting of the 
Conservative Political Centre in Birmingham, UK, 1968, caused some political uproar 
and led to his dismissal from the Shadow Cabinet by the Conservative leader, Edward 
Heath and ultimately led to Powell’s marginalisation from mainstream politics. 
However, his ideas took hold in popularising the ‘anti-Black’ stance to immigration in 
parts of the population as Powell positioned himself as ‘he, and he alone, was speaking 
for, and to, an objective, coherent subject; the ordinary Briton’ (Bonnet, 1993, p.21). 
This extract gives the essence of his message: 
In this country in fifteen or twenty years’ time the black man 
will have the whip hand over the white man. I can already 
hear the chorus of execration. How dare I say such a horrible 
thing? How dare I stir up trouble and inflame feelings by 
repeating such a conversation? […] We must be mad,  
literally mad, as a nation to be permitting the annual inflow 
of some 50,000 dependents, who are for the most part the 
material of the future growth of the immigrant-descended 
population. It is like watching a nation busily engaged in 
heaping up its own funeral pyre […] As I look ahead, I am 
filled with foreboding. Like the Roman, I seem to see “the 
River Tiber foaming with much blood” (Powell, 1968). 
 
Powell’s ‘racial rejectionist’ themes were not especially original and articulated well- 
established nationalistic and racial themes within a reasonably recognisable vision of a 
so-called authentic British/white experience. His contribution, as Bonnet (1993) argues 
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however, was to set this construction of the British white against the ‘equally well-worn 
notion of immorality and disorderliness of the ‘non-British’ and the ‘non-white’ (p.21). 
Powell became a defining politician of the Right after 1968 and the theme of racial 
rejectionism in relation to the immigrant population found expression, not least in the 
popular press, and in the form of government policy after 1970 when Heath became 
Prime Minister. A new immigrant act in 1971, for example, reduced primary 
immigration from India, Pakistan and the Caribbean to ‘a trickle’ (Bonnet, 1993, p.16) 
and government immigration policy was disguised, if only thinly, behind what has been 
described as a façade of ‘colour-blindness’. (We shall return to a more nuanced version 
of colour-blindness below). Echoes of Powell’s racial rejectionism live on – as does the 
mobilising myth of the white British bloodline. A recent Daily Mail article (Cohen, 
2016) stated that ‘in 2014 Nigel Farage said that the basic principle behind Enoch 
Powell’s notorious speech was right’. 
 
The rise of the New Right 
 
Enoch Powell was one of the first politicians on the New Right, as it came to be called. 
The rise of the New Right was characterised by the replacement of the Conservative’s 
traditional ‘one nation’ ideology with an ideology characterised by individualism, belief 
in a free economy with a strong state and some traditional sources of authority, for 
example, traditional family, traditional approaches to morality and support for a national 
culture rather than multiculturalism. New Right thinking grew in significance within the 
Conservative party under Margaret Thatcher after her election victory in 1979 and 
became consolidated after her second election victory in 1983, coming as it did just  
after the Falkland’s War in 1982. Its significance for the civic education context is the 
way in which the post war consensus over Britain as a One Nation community with (a 
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broadly) shared commitment to the expansion of the welfare state, full employment and 
improvements in health and housing as responsibilities of the state came to an end11. 
Thatcher in 1978 argued that there was something ‘natural’ about the British way of life 
in stark contrast to being ‘swamped’ by immigrant peoples who were set to destabilise 
the existing commonalities between British people (Nayak, 2003, p.156). The national 
agenda was defined more along lines of a strong market economy alongside more, 
arguably, backward-looking notions of British culture and nationhood defined in terms 
of its imperial past and with foundations on a definition of Britishness based on an 
appreciation of common historical roots and ‘natural’ bonds (Sherman 1979). These 
ideas were prevalent and promoted by New Right think tanks such as the Institute of 
Economic Affairs, The Adam Smith Institute and The Centre for Policy Studies and their 
significance grew throughout the 1970s. 
 
 
However, it was the Falklands War of 1982 that significantly paved the way for 
Margaret Thatcher to enact the New Right ideological reforms. Some commentators 
have categorised Thatcher’s handling of the Falklands war as a ‘lucky gamble’ (Badsey 
et al, 2005 and Jenkins, 2012) and even Thatcher herself admits in her memoirs that she 
would not have been re-elected for a second term without it (Jenkins, 2013). Her first 
administration was in some trouble after only three years in office. As Jenkins states 
here:  
After fewer than three years in office, Thatcher had achieved 
little beyond tax cuts for the rich and spending cuts for the 
poor. Cabinet colleagues were in open revolt and the new 
 
 
 
!! There has been some debate about the extent of this consensus and there were clearly important policy 
differences between the parties. However, for the purposes of comparison with what followed, it is a 
useful description of the Conservative party thinking as part of the post war consensus that prevailed 
largely up to the late 1960s. 
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Social Democrats were experiencing the strongest third  party 
surge in half a century (2012, p.1). 
 
Many of her closest advisers, including her then Secretary of State, John Nott, counselled 
caution about invasion to recapture the Falkland Islands after the new Argentinian 
junta’s forces, under General Galtieri, had captured them in April 1982, However, it  was 
the last minute and strategic intervention by the head of navy, Admiral Sir Henry Leach, 
that changed her mind. He suggested that he could recapture the islands in a very ‘gung-
ho way, which appealed to Thatcher’ (Jenkins, 2012, p.2). The sub text was that Leach 
was apparently determined to fight navy cuts being imposed by John Nott. 
 
 
After the victory, a much more confident Thatcher felt licensed to implement the new 
right ideology that became known as Thatcherism. She would often invoke the Falklands 
spirit as she did this. As she states here at a Conservative rally (Thatcher, 1982a): 
We have ceased to be a nation in retreat. We have instead a 
new found confidence - born in the economic battles at home 
and tested and found true 8,000 miles away … And so today 
we can rejoice at our success in the Falklands and take pride 
in the achievement of our task force. But we do so, not as at 
some flickering flame which might soon be dead. No – we 
rejoice that Britain has rekindled that spirit which has fired 
her for generations past and which today has begun to burn 
as brightly as before. 
 
 
Her speech at the Conservative party conference in the same year included the phrase: ‘It 
has been said that we surprised the world, that British patriotism was rediscovered in 
those spring days’ (Thatcher 1982b). It was a particular kind of patriotism, arguably built 
on - and ‘stalling’ - the end of a long period of post imperial decline in Britain. Arguably,  
the  Falklands  war  contributed  to  the  fact  that  British  governments have become 
much more ready to intervene globally and are often ‘ready to punch above  their weight’ 
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(Jenkins, 2012). A narrative of a plucky island reunited with its mighty imperial past was 
reignited. There was an emboldened sense of restoring a more traditional nation of 
national culture and a relatively explicit notion of Britishness as defined by what could 
be described as racial rejectionists. A Conservative election  poster in 1983 raised a very 
interesting issue in relation to what it meant to be British and a member of a racial 
minority in post-1982 Britain. The poster shows a picture of a well-dressed, suited, 
young Afro-British male with the main caption “Labour Say He’s Black. Tories Say 
He’s British’.  As Bonnet (1993) observes: 
The admission of the suited youth to Britishness is made on 
the understanding that he has accepted and internalised the 
kind of cultural clichés of what it is to be an authentic, 
ordinary Briton constructed by rejectionists. The law-abiding, 
decent, everyday kind of Britishness that was developed as a 
national image by Powell is offered both as a role model and 
the price of white tolerance (p.27). 
 
However, this is something of a departure from the extremes of Powell’s mobilisation  
of the ‘race as defined by bloodline’ view. It implies that a kind of British colour-blind 
nationalism is possible so long as minority groups are prepared to become culturally 
British. Norman Tebbit’s ‘cricket test’ (1990)12 implies the same conditions. This 
colour-blindness though, strips way important notions, such as, narratives of oppression 
and important aspects of culture. 
 
 
The kind of populist patriotism that Thatcherism invoked led to some responses from 
those on the Left of British politics. As Paul Rich notes: 
 
 
!' Norman Tebbit’s (a Conservative MP) cricket test was simply ‘which side do you cheer for?’. Only if 
fans cheered for the English cricket team – and not, for example, India or the West Indies – were they 
‘proper’ Britons 
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For historians on the Left, there has been an additional task 
of trying to explain the unforeseen success of the Thatcher 
government in mobilising a populist patriotism, which many 
radicals educated at universities in the 1960s believed to be  
a dying phenomenon in British politics (1989, p.1). 
 
Raphael Samuel, a socialist historian and founder of the History Workshop13, produced 
three volumes on patriotism (Samuel, 1989) deriving from a History Workshop 
symposia and were, as Samuel himself says, ‘born out of anger at the Falklands War, 
and consternation at the apparent failure of the anti War half … to assert itself’ (Vol. 1, 
preface). What was notable about Samuel’s interest in patriotism is that he rejected the 
notion that British, and more especially English, patriotism ‘is a pure invention of the 
ruling class as a part of a wider strategy of social control’ (Rich, 1989, p.2). The many 
essays within the three volumes create a picture of the making and unmaking of British 
identity (the subtitle of the volumes) and affirm the continuity of diversity of experience 
and identity within the British polity. The collection offers an image of England (there 
are limited essays on other parts of the UK) as a rich tapestry; a country made up of a 
wide range of different experience and sentiments. The volumes came under some 
criticism for not offering any theoretical analysis of patriotism or addressing the  
patriotic sentiment and phenomena explored in the extensive volumes in any way that 
was at all generalizable. However, what the volumes do – and did at the time – is to 
affirm patriotism as a legitimate subject of interest on the Left and offer a challenge to 
the limited notion of patriotism as constructed by the New Right and Thatcher’s 
government (with echoes that are alive and well today). And whilst Samuel et al do not 
 
 
 
 
!( The History Workshop was founded in 1976 to bring the boundaries of history closer to people’s lives 
and make history a more democratic activity 
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espouse an abstract model of national identity, they do challenge the following view of 
national identity espoused by Thatcher as described by Smith (1994) here: 
 
Instead of proposing an abstract model of British society, the 
Thatcherites responded directly to popular concerns – 
including anxiety about race and sexuality – and constructed  
a new and yet already partially normalized common sense 
(p.28). 
 
As noted above, references to British national identity and patriotism mask a distinction 
that is worth highlighting. Tom Nairn, for example, who has been described as ‘the 
intellectual godfather of modern Scottish nationalism’ (Maxwell, 2016) defends some 
kinds of nationalism against those who associate it with the Right but challenges the 
view that the English conception of nation is akin to the Scottish one. Nairn describes 
Scottish national as internationalist but definitely anti imperial, whereas English 
nationalism has always been associated with Empire (Nairn, 2016). (See Chapter 2 on 
further discussion of differences between English and Scottish nationalism). As the 
journalist Neal Ascherson writes in 2000: ‘The perception that Great Britain was a 
multinational state and not a united nation has never quite been lost over the centuries. 
But it was [Tom] who almost single-handedly hammered this truth into the skulls of 
British intellectuals and campaigners until it became - and is today – practically 
uncontested by the political class’ (Ascherson, 2000). In a recent interview on the 
implications of the British vote to exit European Union (Brexit) in June 2016, he gave 
his views on ‘Brexit as symptomatic of a deeper struggle about England’s place in the 
world, its national purpose and its identity’ (Maxwell, 2016). Nairn (2001) describes it 
thus: 
 
 
England has always been the problem in that sense. It has 
been too big for its boots since the day before it was born, 
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and now it faced with the problem of becoming just another 
nation, and assuming some kind of local, limited identity, 
which ends at the Scots Dyke, among other places, and they 
don’t know what to do about it. […] Whole generations, one 
generation after another, have been brought up to believe 
that externally directed growth – The Empire! – was always 
the answer (p.2). 
 
In an article entitled ‘Farewell Britannia’ written in 2001, Nairn comments on the 
growing recognition of Britain as a multi national state and those who hark back to 
notions of ‘Enoch Powell’s inscrutable mystery of Englishness that belongs is a 
museum of Social Anthropology’ (p.65) by suggesting that ‘Any new or negotiated 
Britain … has nothing to do with ethnicity. It is entirely a matter of politics and the 
altering character of statehood in the new post-Cold War world. To put it another way:  
it is entirely a matter of civic and constitutional nationalism, and not of ethnic, pseudo- 
ethnic, fake ethnic or (frankly) non-existent-ethnic national identify’ (ibid.). 
 
The popular press and its contribution to ‘common sense’ notion of patriotism 
 
The popular ‘common sense’ notion of patriotism that Nairn is railing against for its 
falsehood around ethnicity and its assumption that British denotes what is ultimately a 
very different phenomenon in Scotland (or indeed Wales and Northern Ireland), has 
undoubtedly been fuelled by the popular press over the years. The ‘naturalisation’ of 
certain forms of popular patriotism, and the explicit attempt to characterise immigrants 
as ‘the other’ and to be feared, that characterised the Thatcherite era, is a message that 
has certainly been promulgated in certain parts of the popular press. The most notable 
examples of newspapers communicating this message are, for example, The Daily Mail 
and The Daily Express. This sample of Daily Mail headlines gives a flavour of a typical 
message about immigration for example: 
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‘Asylum: you’re right to worry’ (7/2/2005] […] ‘There are 
too many immigrants’ (14/12/14) […] ‘The swarm on our 
streets’ (31/7/15) […] ‘Enemies of the people’ (4/11/16 [the 
picture of the judges that was very similar to one from 
Nazi Germany] […] ‘Britain’s broken borders’ [21/1/16]. 
 
The Daily Express has similar headlines, for example; ‘Immigrants bring more crime’ 
(17/4/2008) and ‘We must stop the immigrant invasion’ (9/6/13). Columnists such as 
Roger Scruton, Richard Littlejohn and Peter Hitchens have contributed to the 
newspapers above and articulated what can be described as a particular kind of narrow 
British (essentially English) patriotism. As Hitchens writes in the Daily Mail (2016): 
All Britain needs is patriotic leaders. […] The only way 
out of the EU was to replace the Tories with a genuinely 
patriotic Conservative party that could win an election. 
 
And Littlejohn in the Mail adds to these sentiments: 
 
The way patriotism is sneered at makes you ashamed to be 
British!’…According to a new survey, just one-third of people 
say they are ‘very proud’ to be British. Whether or not that 
figure is accurate, or simply made up like most of the other 
‘surveys’ which masquerade as news stories these days, it 
certainly speaks volumes about the prevailing mood. Even if 
people are patriotic, they are afraid to say so publicly for fear 
they will be howled down as ‘racists’ or ‘xenophobes’ or ‘Little 
Englanders’. The offensive smear ‘Little Englanders’ is 
especially relevant in this context. While Scottish, Welsh and 
Irish nationalism is revered in fashionable circles, any 
indication of English patriotism is considered conclusive 
evidence of head-banging BNP sympathies (Littlejohn, 2014). 
 
 
 
The anti-Muslin sentiment of many of these papers’ headlines is notorious too. They are, 
however, popular reads14 and whilst it difficult to ascertain the impact of their ideology 
 
14 According to recent statistics (March 2017) The Daily Mail has the second widest readership in the 
UK. The Sun has the largest. 
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and messages on popular votes, it is fair to say that they need to be taken into account in 
formulating any civic education programme - and in particular one that advocates 
progressive patriotism. Many existing civic education programmes (as outlined below) 
include the notion that the media should be scrutinised alongside a discussion of the  
idea that there should be freedom on the press, as well as alongside an understanding 
that there are laws prohibiting racism and so on. 
 
 
Concluding the historical contextual discussion 
 
 
The popular press and paper discussed above have certainly commented on the recent 
refugee crisis of 2015, which forms a new and significant backdrop to discussion of 
nation identity, patriotism and civic education. David Miller has recently published an 
important work entitled ‘Strangers in our Midst’ (2016) where he defends a just 
immigration policy whilst making an increasingly, needed, clear distinction between 
economic migrants and refugees. This recent book builds on his previous arguments 
(Miller, 1995 for example). He posits the view that being received into a country as a 
potential citizen does more than bestow benefits: it also imposes responsibilities. This 
view certainly echoes many of the sentiments of this thesis with some important 
differences in relation to a version of progressive patriotism proposed in Chapter Seven. 
This brief historical overview has set out some of the important contextual factors at 
work that shaped and informed the various manifestations of civic education over the 
last few decades. 
 
Civic education 1970s to 1997 
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Global pressure on the economy exerted considerable influence over government policy 
in the 1970s and there was a marked shift to the right of the political spectrum. As 
George Monbiot argues in a recent article (The Guardian, April, 2016): 
 
Keynesian policies began to fall apart and economic 
crises struck on both sides of the Atlantic, neoliberal 
ideas began to enter the mainstream. As Friedman 
remarked, “when the time came that you had  to  
change ... there was an alternative ready there to be 
picked up”. With the help of  sympathetic  journalists 
and political advisers, elements of neoliberalism, 
especially its prescriptions for monetary policy, were 
adopted by Jimmy Carter’s administration in the US 
and Jim Callaghan’s government in Britain. 
 
And, whilst this shift to the right of the political spectrum in education policy is most 
often associated with Thatcherism, James Callaghan, the Labour Prime Minster from 
1976-1979 had already launched a policy discussion, which prompted far greater 
governmental interest and intervention in education. As Sheldon, (2011, p.1) says here: 
 
The ‘Great Debate’ launched by Callaghan originated in 
global economic shifts which were by the late 1970s 
challenging the British economy and putting pressure 
on government revenues at a time when education was 
requiring considerable investment (the school leaving 
age had been raised in 1973 and university education 
had been expanded). As Callaghan made clear, ‘Public 
interest is strong and legitimate and will be satisfied. 
[…] Callaghan proposed a ‘core curriculum’ and 
‘national standard of performance by schools in their 
use of public money’. Thus the era of public 
accountability in education was launched. 
 
Once the Conservative government was elected in 1979, this era of public  
accountability became a reality. The government presided over the greatest levels of 
curriculum  control  ever  seen  in  British  state  schooling.  The  National  Curriculum 
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brought in by this same government in 1988, prescribed content and assessment 
procedures for most subjects at unprecedented levels of centralisation. But, in line with 
much neoliberal policy, the government simultaneously introduced policies reflecting 
the wider neoliberal agenda, which encouraged the primacy of market forces, greater 
private ownership and the privacy of consumer rights in all areas of life, including 
within education. So, greater individual choice, freedoms and privacy were framed 
within very high levels of accountability to the government. 
 
 
In relation to civic education, the emphasis on was on ‘championing the individualism  
of the free market and placing the emphasis on the importance of civic obligation or 
active citizenship’ (Kerr, 2000, p.3). Given Thatcher’s famous remark that there is ‘no 
such thing as society’ it is unsurprising that the civic dimension of the curriculum was 
informed by the Conservative ideological emphasis on urging individuals to take up 
their civic responsibilities rather than leave it to the government to carry them out. As 
Margaret Thatcher said in an interview with Woman’s Own magazine in 1987: 
 
[People] are casting their problems at society. And, you 
know, there's no such thing as society. There are 
individual men and women and there are families. And 
no government can do anything except through people, 
and people must look after themselves first. It is our 
duty to look after ourselves and then, also, to look after 
our neighbours. 
 
In contrast to the high levels of prescription in relation to other subjects, citizenship 
education remained at the level of a cross-curricular theme and its outcomes were 
integrated within wider aims or other subjects (HMSO, 1988). But this belied a fairly 
strong national identity-forming agenda through the History curriculum. In England it 
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can be safely argued that the Conservative political agenda has been pretty consistent in 
advocating a curriculum that, amongst many other things, instils pride in Britain’s 
heritage and achievements. As Sheldon (2011) argues: 
 
Since 1988 the citizenship agenda was mostly confined 
to the History curriculum. The changing nature of 
Britain as a plural democracy has always been 
acknowledged within these Conservative curriculum 
prescriptions. However it would be accurate to say that 
the emphasis has remained on a core British identity 
that immigrants, as well as everyone else, have a 
responsibility to acknowledge and respect. 
 
History from 5 to 16, published in 1988, argued for history in schools on the basis of its 
role in the ‘transmission of heritage and an appreciation of human achievements and 
aspirations’ (HMSO, 1988, pp.1-3). It also stressed the need to ensure students 
understood ‘the values of our society’ as well as learning about ‘the major issues and 
events in the history of their own country and of the world’ (ibid.). 
 
 
There are much fuller accounts of this fascinating period in British history than can be 
offered here (see for example, Slater, 1989, Lee, 1992). These discussions cover the fact 
that despite Margaret Thatcher’s efforts for a much more ideological ‘lionising Britain’ 
version of the history curriculum, in fact, a much more nuanced version came into being 
which preserved some elements of historical interpretation and, whilst British history 
dominated provision there were still considerable elements of world and European 
history that were also mandated. This compromise was not achieved easily but 
represented what might be described as a somewhat typically British pragmatic 
approach. The acknowledgement of this more moderate solution to the content and 
purposes of the history curriculum does not detract from characterising this period as 
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promoting a minimalist version of civic education, which was framed by a broad, 
interventionist agenda to instil pride in Britain. And whilst there are high levels of 
governmental intervention in the Conservative policy of this period, it cannot be 
described as a maximal approach to civic education in the sense that McLaughlin 
intended it. Certain things, including the nature of British identity, were not up for 
discussion. Overall, in this period, 1970-1997, schools were required to provide 
opportunities for civic education through ‘citizenship’ as a cross curricular theme but 
the subject did not have statutory status and was not formally assessed. History teaching 
was the main means by which a strengthened sense of common British identity was to 
be nurtured. 
 
 
New Labour and citizenship education: 1997-2005 
 
The Labour Government, when it came to power in 1997, fostered a different approach 
to citizenship itself and citizenship education with a much more significant emphasis on 
what might be described as civic morality. It was under the leadership of the Secretary 
of State for Education under Labour, David Blunkett that the citizenship education 
agenda was raised to new prominence in this period. He commissioned Bernard Crick to 
conduct a review and to set out new proposals for a renewed citizenship curriculum in 
state schools across England and Wales. The resulting report, commonly known as The 
Crick Report of 1998 (QCA, 1998), remains an important landmark in citizenship 
education in this country. From 2002, Citizenship became a compulsory subject in the 
National Curriculum to age 16. And this addition was one amongst many additions to 
the national education agenda, which Sheldon (2011) describes as, 
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the products of a ‘social’ education agenda. For 
instance, Every Child Matters was  superimposed  on 
the National Curriculum with an obligation that 
schools focus on five key broader aims for children (‘be 
healthy, stay safe, enjoy and achieve’, etc.) as well as 
delivering the curriculum. 
 
The Labour government took the National Curriculum in the direction of various social 
purposes and increasingly responded to issues in society (such as declines in voting 
participation and youth crime) by locating new priorities within the school curriculum. 
However, it did so within the ‘Third Way’ ideology, which aimed to reframe the 
relationship between citizens and the state, by assuming an enhanced responsibility for 
citizens themselves, whilst retaining a progressive social democratic agenda.  There  
were echoes of the previous Conservative agenda in so far as, (as Callan describes the 
1980s’ government agenda) a ‘spirit of public service was needed to be invoked to   
offset some of the suffering and social dislocation that followed in the wake of the 
shrinking welfare state (1997, p.7). The relationship with the state as characterised by 
socialism was rejected. However, the government was explicit about addressing wider 
societal concerns with a social democratic approach located within an updated, coherent, 
rational ideal of modern citizenship within a liberal democracy. This approach was 
located within the civic republican approach to citizenship and citizenship education   
and aimed to carve a ‘Third Way’ between liberal individualism and communitarianism. 
 
 
Bernard Crick, the academic chosen by David Blunkett to lead this review of citizenship 
education, was a self-declared civic republican. In a recent publication (Crick and 
Lockyer, 2010) Crick describes how civic republicanism is a strong alternative to more 
traditional liberal approaches to citizenship, and is a ‘corrective to what it sees as the 
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overly individualistic, litigious and inactive nature of contemporary life’ (op. cit. p.1). 
Civic republicanism, it was argued (Kerr, 2003, p.4), was the best choice for New 
Labour’s citizenship approach, as it placed some reasonable restraints on both  
individual and collective behaviour but allowed a fairly high degree of individual 
autonomy within that framework, and claimed to be capable of organising individual 
human endeavours in constructive ways to advance the public good. It differed from 
communitarianism, which contends that individuality is a product of community 
relationships rather than individual traits. It differs from some forms of orthodox 
liberalism in which individual autonomy is both the source and desired outcomes of 
human flourishing and that the state should remain as neutral and non-interventionist as 
possible wherever possible. Civic republicanism aimed to justify a new paradigm that 
remains essentially liberal but which acknowledges the importance of collective identity 
and behaviour. As David Kerr states: 
 
The Group's final working definition was deliberately 
founded on the best of past approaches updated to meet 
the needs of modern democratic society The definition 
was centred on 'civic participation' and based on the 
'civic republican' concept of citizenship. It provided a 
workable 'third way' between the competing 'liberal- 
individualist' and 'communitarian' concepts of 
citizenship. It was based on the three elements of 
citizenship - namely the civil, the political and the social 
- contained in T.H. Marshall's classic definition 
(Marshall 1950). […] It also placed considerable 
emphasis on the values and community action 
approaches, in line with the thrust of 'civic morality'. 
The Crick Group agreed that 'effective education for 
citizenship' consists of three strands interrelated but 
also distinct, which combine to make up such an 
education (op. cit. p.4). 
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The commission agreed on the civic republican understanding of citizenship but added 
some contemporary features to Marshall’s three elements: the civil, the political and the 
social. As Kerr continues: ‘Discussing the first element, the commission put greater 
stress on the reciprocity between rights and duties; and more than Marshall, on welfare 
being not just provision by the state but also what people can do for each other in 
voluntary groups and organisations, whether local or national’ (ibid.). The Crick Report 
recommendations combined traditional calls for active individual participation along 
with idea that citizenship education must give people ‘confidence to claim their rights 
and to challenge the status quo while, at the same time, make plain that with rights  
come obligations. It should foster respect for law, justice and democracy. It should 
nurture concern for the common good at the same time as it encourages independence of 
thought’ (Lord Chancellor (Presentation to the Law Society, 27th January 1998). 
 
And in the words of the Crick Report itself (1998, p.1): 
 
 
We aim at no less than a change in the political culture 
of this country both nationally and locally: for people to 
think of themselves as active citizens, willing, able and 
equipped to have an influence in public life and with the 
critical capacities to weigh evidence before speaking and 
acting; to build on and to extend radically to young 
people the best in existing traditions of community 
involvement and public service, and to make them 
individually confident in finding new forms of 
involvement and action among themselves.
 
The Crick Report – an ideological and pragmatic response 
 
The Crick Report was commissioned in light of concerns about declining quality of 
citizenship in England. In September 1997 a Citizenship 2000 group was formed, 
following  initial  discussions  by  representatives  of  the  Citizenship  Foundation,  the 
&+" 
Association for the Teaching of the Social Sciences, the Secondary Heads Association 
and the Hansard Society. This group put out an agreed statement that expressed concern 
about ‘rapidly changing relationships between the individual and government; the 
decline in traditional forms of civic cohesion; the new political context of Britain in 
Europe; and rapid social, economic and technological change in a global context’. The 
statement argued that Citizenship education in schools and colleges was too important  
to be left to chance in the light of recent research that has underlined the weakness of 
civic discourse in this country. It concluded: 
 
Citizenship education is urgently needed to address this 
historic deficit if we are to avoid a further decline in the 
quality of our public life and if we are to prepare all 
young people for informed participation, not only in a 
more open United Kingdom, but also in Europe and the 
wider world, as we move into the next century. This will 
not happen unless there is a firm political and 
professional commitment to education for citizenship 
(cited in QCA, 1998, p.14). 
 
The Crick Report (1998) reported that, in light of the evidence examined, there were 
worrying implications for the health of democracy in Britain. It drew on a number of 
research studies, including a DEMOS study by Wilkinson and Mulgan, 1995. These 
authors concluded that ‘The overwhelming story emerging from our research, both 
quantitative and qualitative, is of an historic political disconnection. In effect, an entire 
generation has opted out of party politics’ and they found evidence of ignorance and 
political apathy which led to their conclusion that there is a ‘powerful case that there 
should be a legal obligation to teach civic education alongside personal and social 
education and for some central responsibility for civic and political education, as in 
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Australia and Canada’ (p.85). And as Crick himself added: ‘They could also have cited 
all other countries in the EU’ (QCA, 1998, p.15). 
 
 
The Crick Report of 1998 also acknowledged the importance of fostering national 
identity in the light of what was perceived as a loss of social cohesion. As it reported 
here: 
 
There are less tangible but wider social questions that 
constitute a broader aim for citizenship education. The 
Citizenship Foundation put the case to the National 
Commission on Education of 1992 in terms of: ‘the 
increasingly complex nature of our society, the greater 
cultural diversity and the apparent loss of a value 
consensus, combined with the collapse of traditional 
support mechanisms such as extended families...’. 
‘Cultural diversity’ raises the issue of national identity. 
(p.17). 
 
The Report argued for a restoration of common citizenship but also to ‘find or restore an 
inclusive national identity that is secure enough to find a place for the plurality of 
nations, cultures, ethnic identities and religions long found in the United Kingdom. 
Citizenship education creates common ground between different ethnic and religious 
identities’. It continued: ‘Majorities must respect, understand and tolerate minorities and 
minorities must learn and respect the laws, codes and conventions as much as the 
majority – not merely because it is useful to do so, but because this process helps foster 
common citizenship’ (p.17). The importance of citizenship education’s part in fostering 
this national identity is acknowledged, as is the complexity of the task within plural 
societies. A national survey conducted in 1997 and cited within the Crick Report 
recommended that ‘an explicit idea of multi-cultural citizenship needs to be formulated 
for Britain’ and that ‘a more plural approach to racial disadvantage requires forms of 
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citizenship which are sensitive to ethnic diversity and offer respect both to individuals 
and to the social groups to which they feel they belong’. The Report’s response was 
non-committal on the idea of a distinct multi-cultural citizenship idea per se but 
reinforced that: 
 
We all need to learn more about each other. This should 
entail learning not only about the United Kingdom – 
including all four of its component parts – but  also 
about the European, Commonwealth and global 
dimensions of citizenship, with due regard being given 
to the homelands of our minority communities and to 
the main countries of British emigration (p.18). 
 
This clearly stops short of fostering an explicitly multicultural British identity through 
citizenship education or addressing the issue of racial disadvantage explicitly either. 
What it does do is place the issue of renewing national identity within its European, 
Commonwealth and global context. 
 
 
Crick’s Recommendations 
 
The Report’s recommendations included making Citizenship a compulsory national 
curriculum subject in its own right. The commission authors suggested that: ‘It can no 
longer sensibly be left as uncoordinated local initiatives which vary greatly in number, 
content and method. This is an inadequate basis for animating the idea of a common 
citizenship with democratic values’ (QCA, 1998, p.9). This was a radical departure from 
the more minimalist (or mixed) approaches in the past. The benefits of citizenship 
education were laid out too. For pupils there was to be ‘an entitlement in schools that 
will empower them to participate in society effectively as active, informed, critical and 
responsible citizens’ (ibid. p.9). Teachers would benefit from ‘advice and guidance in 
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making existing citizenship provision coherent, both in intellectual and curriculum 
terms, as part of stronger, coordinated approaches to citizenship education in schools’ 
(ibid.). Schools would gain ‘a firm base to coordinate existing teaching and activities, to 
relate positively to the local community and to develop effective citizenship education  
in the curriculum for all pupils’. And society as a whole would benefit from ‘an active 
and politically-literate citizenry convinced that they can influence government and 
community affairs at all levels’ (ibid.). 
 
 
The Report sums up the three-pronged approach thus: 
 
 
So our understanding of citizenship education in a 
parliamentary democracy finds three heads on one body: 
social and moral responsibility, community involvement 
and political literacy. ‘Responsibility’ is an essential 
political as well as moral virtue, for it implies (a) care  
for others; (b) premeditation and calculation about what 
effect actions are likely to have on others; and (c) 
understanding and care for the consequences (ibid.  
p.13). 
 
The aim and purpose of the new curriculum was summarised as follows:  ‘The purpose  
of citizenship education in schools and colleges is to make secure and to increase the 
knowledge, skills and values relevant to the nature and practices of participative 
democracy; also to enhance the awareness of rights and duties, and the sense of 
responsibilities needed for the development of pupils into active citizens; and in so  
doing to establish the value to individuals, schools and society of involvement in the 
local and wider community’. And further: ‘Democratic institutions, practices and 
purposes must be understood, both local and national, including the work of parliaments, 
councils, parties, pressure groups and voluntary bodies; to show how formal political 
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activity relates to civil society in the context of the United Kingdom and Europe, and to 
cultivate awareness and concern for world affairs and global issues. Some 
understanding of the realities of economic life is needed including how taxation and 
public expenditure work together’ (ibid. p.41). 
 
 
Evidence of the ‘Third Way’ civic republican was clear in the thrust of the three strands 
as they were expanded upon (ibid. p.41): 
 
Social and moral responsibility - Children learning 
from the very beginning self-confidence and socially and 
morally responsible behaviour both in and beyond the 
classroom, both towards those in authority and towards 
each other (this is an essential pre-condition for 
citizenship). Community involvement - Pupils 
learning about and becoming helpfully involved in the 
life and concerns of their communities, including 
learning through community involvement and service to 
the community. Political literacy - Pupils learning 
about and how to make themselves effective in public 
life through knowledge, skills and values. 
 
There was recognition of the responsibility for understanding and action remaining with 
the individual; a kind of spontaneous voluntarism as outlined above in  the  phrase 
‘Pupils […] becoming helpfully involved in the life and concerns of their communities’. 
And simultaneously there was a clear message about individual responsibilities towards 
the whole community, to those in positions of authority as well as to each other. There 
was an expectation that greater respect and care for each other at the community level 
would enhance collective action and therefore the quality of our lives as active 
responsible citizens. (And presumably take some pressure off the welfare state too in 
line with other ‘Third Way’ or New Labour policy). There was also explicitness about 
the fact that this was a curriculum that aimed to educate for citizenship as well as  about 
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citizenship. The values and skills, as well as knowledge and understanding that young 
people were expected to acquire, were spelled out. Values and skills were to be taught, 
not simply acquired. There was less explicitness around the ways on which value 
acquisition would be measured as such. However the learning outcomes relating to  
skills and aptitudes and knowledge and understanding respectively were detailed and 
explicit. For examples, at Key Stage 2, pupils were expected to ‘participate in a 
questions and answers session in which a member of the local community offers an 
expert opinion and answers questions prepared in advance by pupils’ (p.47). 
 
 
The commission’s members were aware that the statutory requirement to inculcate 
values might be vulnerable to indoctrinatory practices as well as to accusations of 
indoctrination in the citizenship education proposals. As such they included a section on 
‘teaching controversial issues’, which stopped short of claiming that the curriculum 
itself was controversial but that gave advice to teachers on ways of handling  
controversy in the classroom. The commission also recommended the establishment of 
an independent monitoring body to oversee the work of citizenship education. As the 
authors state: ‘Because of the novelty of the venture and its political sensitivity, there 
should be a standing Commission on Citizenship Education to monitor its progress and 
when necessary to recommends amendments to the entitlements, learning outcomes, 
methods of inspection and teacher training as appropriate’ (p.24). The recommendation 
was that, although the Secretary of State for Education should appoint the Commission, 
it should have cross party representation. 
 
 
In summary then, the Citizenship Education curriculum as outlined by the Labour 
Government’s commission, aimed to respond to some of the needs of the UK’s modern 
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liberal democracy by taking a more proactive and interventionist approach to state 
education including unprecedented levels of government accountability in relation to 
citizenship education. They also aimed to produce a curriculum that would create 
knowledgeable and caring citizens who would be confident in their individuality and 
individual efficacy as well as sensitive and caring towards and responsible for members 
of their wider communities whether they be local, national or global. Individual 
responsibilities and social participation were given rather more emphasis than individual 
or collective national rights and entitlements. 
 
 
Critical responses after implementation of Crick’s recommendations 
 
Criticism, both at the time and after the report’s findings had been implemented for 
some time, fell into two broad camps. The first group of critics suggested that that the 
recommendations were too pro establishment and did not allow any criticism of societal 
structures. The second argued that there was an insufficiently explicit nation-building, 
patriotic element to the report. 
 
 
Critics within the first group argued that the report’s recommendations located  
problems of liberal democracy within the young themselves or that problems fell at the 
feet of monitory groups, rather than locating them in structural inequalities. For these 
critics the statutory curriculum that followed Crick’s recommendations remained too 
light touch and minimalist both in practice and in ideological terms. The ideology of the 
‘Third Way’, according to some critics, failed to adequately satisfy either liberal or 
communitarian traditions, by restricting autonomy to question and challenge society’s 
structures or by failing to locate responsibility for societal development within these 
structures.  Wolmuth  (2007),  for  example,  argued  for  a  more  maximal  approach to 
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citizenship education and suggested that the Crick Report is essentially a pro 
establishment, conservative and remedial response to the alleged sense of alienation 
amongst the young. The report, according to Wolmuth, failed to develop a real sense of 
agency in students and its recommendations, in effect, worked to integrate the younger 
generation into the system and bring about conformity to it. She argues that there was a 
missed opportunity to develop citizenship as ‘the practice of freedom in order  to 
develop young people’s ability to deal critically and creatively with the system’ (2007, 
p.4). 
 
 
Osler and Starkey (2006, p.8) also draw attention to what they describe as the deficit 
model of citizenship inherent in The Crick Report in relation to what they describe as 
‘the youth and minorities deficit’: 
 
The emphasis on citizenship education is closely linked 
to a tendency, in many countries, to blame youth for the 
problems and challenges facing society as  whole  […] 
and to assume that migrants to Europe are likely to be 
ignorant of democratic practice and procedures […] 
Indeed, the government-commissioned Crick report 
implies that minorities are in greater need of  
citizenship education than the majority population. 
 
The second group of critics focused on what they saw as the report’s inadequacies in 
building national cohesion. Dina Kiwan (2007, p.7) argues that Crick’s 
recommendations did not respond adequately to the needs and entitlements of 
marginalised groups and therefore failed to harness participation from minority groups 
thereby failing to develop adequate social cohesion. As she says here: 
 
Whilst diversity is inherent to Crick’s conceptualisation 
of   a   participatory   democracy,   […]   unequal   power 
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relations, or unequal access to resources and 
information, and its implications for motivation remain 
unquestioned’. She continues: The focus of the original 
Crick Report (QCA, 1998) and subsequent Programmes 
of Study and Schemes of Work (QCA, 2000; QCA, 2001) 
on the accessibility to information and developing 
participatory skills is certainly necessary, but it is not 
sufficient, as it does not address the impact of 
differential power between groups’ (ibid.). 
 
This, she argues, would lead to disempowerment and lack of motivation to participate 
for those historically marginalised groups. Unless there is explicit engagement with 
these issues, what may result is a failure of citizenship education to achieve a more 
substantive participation of young people of different ethnic and religious identities. 
 
 
One of the Labour government’s significant priorities, at the time of the Crick Report’s 
commission, was ‘community cohesion’. Critics have suggested that this aspect of the 
new citizenship agenda failed in two ways. First, that whilst the underlying rationale for 
the commission and subsequent curriculum lay in need to rejuvenate participation by 
strengthening national civic ties, the actual content and learning outcomes themselves 
represent a rather a weak cosmopolitan stance. The curriculum content fell short of 
explicitness around the values that were to be inculcated and how the success  of 
learning these values were to be measured. In the report’s introductory section much is 
made of the urgency of becoming a ‘nation of engaged citizens’ but the actual 
prescriptions and curriculum guidance takes a relatively indirect route to this. National 
identity inculcation sits firmly alongside the local and global context: ‘[The purpose of 
citizenship education is …] to show how formal political activity relates to civil society 
in the context of the UK and Europe, and to cultivate awareness and concern for world 
affairs and global issues’ (p.40). It could almost be said on a close reading of this phrase 
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that care and concern are primarily assigned to the global context whilst knowledge and 
understanding will suffice at the national level. Callan and Taylor (2007, 2002 
respectively) claim that this explicitly cosmopolitan stance of the report is weakened by 
the absence of a more explicit patriotic dimension. 
 
 
Charles Taylor argued for a more explicit liberal patriotism agenda within the 
citizenship agenda but one that combined it with cosmopolitanism to make it better and 
more robust in order to combat racism. Taylor argues that: 
 
The most important is this: the societies that we are 
striving to create; free, democratic, willing to some 
degree to share equally, require strong identification on 
the part of their citizens. It has always been noted in  
the civic humanist tradition that free societies, relying 
as they must on the spontaneous supportive action of 
their members, need that strong sense of  allegiance 
that Montesquieu called "vertu". This is if anything 
even truer of modern representative democracies, […] 
(2002, p.1). 
 
And, he continues by suggesting that it is not only a sufficient condition of a thriving 
democracy, but a necessary one too: 
 
Indeed, the requirement is stronger just because they  
are also "liberal" societies, which cherish negative liberty 
and individual rights. A citizen democracy can only work 
if most of its members are convinced that their political 
society is a common venture of  considerable  moment, 
and believe it to be of vital importance that they 
participate in the ways they must to keep it functioning 
as a democracy. This means not only a commitment to 
the common project, but also a special sense of bonding 
among people working together in this project (ibid.). 
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Taylor indicates that there is a sense of urgency to this by suggesting that liberal 
democracies are ‘highly vulnerable to the alienation which arises from deep inequalities, 
and the sense of neglect and indifference that easily arises among abandoned minorities’. 
He suggests that robust democratic societies cannot be too unequal if they are to survive 
and that this means ‘that they must be capable of adopting policies with redistributive 
effect (and to some extent also with redistributive intent). And such policies require a 
high degree of mutual commitment’ (Taylor, 2002, p.2). There is the suggestion here  
that liberal democracies require a great deal from their members and that this demands a 
greater bond or sense of solidarity with fellow nationals or compatriots than with wider 
humanity. Taylor also imports a sense of urgency in that the albeit imperfect political 
system of liberal democracy is better than all the alternatives so there is an added 
urgency to make a patriotic and cosmopolitan citizenship agenda work. Some of  
Taylor’s concerns about the need for a greater nation-building agenda in citizenship 
education were explicitly incorporated into the Ajegbo Review, which was  
commissioned by the Labour government under the leadership of Gordon Brown who 
succeeded Tony Blair in 2007. It is to this period we now turn. 
 
 
Citizenship education 2005 - 2010: a greater emphasis on nation building 
 
There remained some internal divisions about citizenship education within the Labour 
Party. According to some sources the Labour Prime Minster, Tony Blair, was personally 
unconvinced about citizenship’s statutory status and ambivalent about some of the 
content. There were ideological grounds for some of the coolness. Blunkett was more of 
a self-confessed interventionist on these matters, whereas Blair was a stronger advocate 
of limiting state responsibility along the lines of the ‘Third Way’. One of the central 
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premises of the ‘Third Way’, he has argued in his book of that title, is that the state is 
relatively impotent in the economic sphere in these globalised times (Blair, 1998, p.14). 
This is where the role for the enabling, rather than the providing or the guaranteeing, 
state comes in. The state helps people ‘improve their own performance’ and 
responsibility for economic renewal is thus shifted away from the state in the same way 
that some responsibility for social renewal is (ibid.). 
 
 
It was arguably a wider political crisis that convinced Blair of citizenship’s more central 
place in the curriculum. As the Citizenship Foundation, Birkbeck (2010, p.4) states: 
 
Tony Blair himself was reportedly cool towards the 
proposed new subject fearing that schools might be 
distracted from the renewed emphasis on  ‘standards’ 
but Blunkett won the day and it would be not until 
much later, in 2006, (after the London bombings) that 
Tony Blair would finally declare citizenship to be a 
central part of the curriculum ‘given the current debate 
about integration and social responsibility’ (Guardian 
Unlimited, 19th October, 2006). 
 
This bears out the view that; ‘attempts to redefine citizenship and per se citizenship 
education, are often borne out of perceived crises in society at large’ (Kerr, 2000, p.2). 
And there is no doubt that there has been a growing impetus for what has  been 
described as a more muscular political approach to citizenship across much of the  
liberal democratic world. This political impetus seems to be fuelled by concerns of 
several democratic governments worldwide that the recent decades of unprecedented 
change is putting some of the traditional boundaries and expectations of citizenship 
under intolerable strain. Some academic commentators too have suggested that a 
watershed  had  been  reached  namely  the  redefining  of  traditional  forms  of  liberal 
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democratic society in the light of the onset of a less certain world and that citizenship 
and citizenship education has similarly reached a point of urgent redefinition (Callan, 
1997, Crick, 2000, Kymlicka, 1995, Soutphommasane, 2012). 
 
The increase in terrorist attacks on liberal democracies had a significant bearing on 
developments on the subsequent citizenship curriculum developments. Since the 9/11 
attacks in the USA the political agenda for citizenship education in many liberal 
democracies had acquired an increased impetus. And in the UK this sense of urgency 
increased significantly after July 7th 2005, when self-proclaimed Islamists, who were 
British citizens, attacked the London underground killing fifty-two people. Partly, in 
response to this, Gordon Brown, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, called for the 
development of a stronger sense of common patriotic purpose in a speech to the Fabian 
Society. He argued that: 
 
 
And just as in war time a sense of common patriotic 
purpose inspired people to do what is necessary, so in 
peace time a strong modern sense of patriotism and 
patriotic purpose which binds people together can 
motivate and inspire… [W]e should not recoil from our 
national history – rather we should make it more 
central to our education. I propose that British history 
should be given much more prominence in the 
curriculum – not just dates, places and names, nor just  
a set of unconnected facts, but a narrative that 
encompasses our history (2006). 
 
The subsequent changes to the citizenship curriculum (QCA, 2007) took on this idea 
and incorporated it within a revised National Curriculum for Citizenship programme. 
The new History National Curriculum (Key Stage 3 only was revised at the end of 2007 
by a committee of history specialists) included a new concept called ‘Cultural, ethnic 
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and religious diversity’ which had to be delivered within the topics of study between 
ages 11-14. The curriculum was also amended to give more prominence to topics such 
as ‘the impact through time of the movement and settlement of diverse peoples to, from 
and within the British Isles’ (ibid.). These changes were as a result of a review of 
citizenship education commissioned by the Labour government and conducted by Keith 
Ajegbo. The Ajegbo Review, as it became known, introduced a fourth strand to the 
citizenship curriculum in addition to Crick’s original three strands outlined above. This 
fourth strand was entitled: Identity and Diversity: Living Together in the UK and was 
explicitly directed at cultivating a greater sense of belonging for all UK citizens. 
 
 
The Ajegbo Review 2007 
 
As Sir Keith Ajegbo, the chair of the review says here: ‘Motivation for citizens to 
participate in society is logically predicated on a sense of belonging to, or identification 
with, the context where they are participating’ (Ajegbo et al, 2007, p.95). The Review’s 
authors also acknowledged Gordon Brown’s call for more prominence of an inclusive 
but strengthened national story through studying British history. The fourth  strand 
aimed to develop the ‘use of contemporary history in teachers’ pedagogy to illuminate 
thinking about contemporary issues relating to citizenship’. This emphasis on national 
history included ‘critical thinking about ethnicity, religion and ‘race’ […] and an 
explicit link to political issues and values’ (ibid. p.12). Features of the national history 
included the following: a contextualised understanding that the UK is a ‘multinational’ 
state, made up of England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales; Immigration; 
Commonwealth and the legacy of Empire; The European Union; Extending the 
franchise e.g. the legacy of slavery, universal suffrage and equal opportunities  
legislation (ibid.). 
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The Report acknowledged a cosmopolitan version of citizenship, for example, stating 
that ‘Fundamental to their ability to fulfil these outcomes is pupils’ exploration and 
understanding of the whole range of their own identities: personal, local, national and 
global; and those of the wider community’ (ibid. p.24). However, there was also a much 
more explicit focus on citizenship education’s responsibility to strengthen national 
cohesion. As the authors argue: 
 
The changing nature of the UK and potential for tension 
to arise now makes it ever more pressing for us to work 
towards community cohesion, fostering mutual 
understanding within schools so that valuing difference 
and understanding what binds us together become part 
of the way pupils think and behave (ibid. p.16 emphasis 
added). 
 
The authors acknowledged that the influence of ‘major international events, such as 11 
September 2001 and the London bombings in July 2005, have contributed to the debate 
on community cohesion and shared values, particularly because the latter were 
perpetrated by British-born Muslims’ (ibid.). The report also acknowledged that 
community cohesion has become a major focus for Government. As it outlines: 
 
Since November 2006, for example, a new statutory 
requirement, the Education and Inspections Act 2006, 
has been introduced, imposing a duty on schools to 
promote community cohesion. The notion of citizenship 
has also been brought to the fore. Home Office 
initiatives have seen the Nationality, Immigration and 
Asylum Act 2002 and the new naturalisation 
requirements incorporating language and citizenship 
classes and a citizenship test. (p.18). 
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The Ajegbo Report authors acknowledged that there were some problems with the 
abstract notion of Britishness and advocate an approach that emphasises experience of 
living in the UK, contextualised in relation to recent history, rather than abstract notions 
of ‘Britishness (ibid. p.93). They also stated some wariness about the notion of 
inculcating shared British values. The authors acknowledge that ‘There is considerable 
debate about what ‘shared values’ are, as well as whether they are indeed specific to the 
UK – and whether it matters if they are also shared by other nations. We must also be 
wary of using ‘shared values’ to somehow challenge or question the acceptability of the 
expression of diversity’ (ibid.). Lord Parekh is cited within the report stating that: ‘we 
can refer to British shared values only in so far as we can say that the UK has decided to 
commit to these values and in this sense takes ownership of them’. He also suggests that 
‘it is not the role of education to try and ‘inculcate’ these values in the abstract, but 
rather that debates about values only become interesting to pupils when they consider 
real examples where values are in tension with each other’ (ibid.). 
 
 
There is acknowledgment, within the Report’s recommendations, that integrating the 
teaching of values within the explicit outcomes of ‘skills and attributes’, in the way the 
Crick Report outlined initially, is an appropriate way of dealing with this controversial 
aspect of any state curriculum. However, there is some more explicit emphasis on 
critical literacy than the Crick Report prescribed. The Ajegbo Review states that: 
 
Our vision defines one aspect of education for diversity 
as focusing on critical literacy, which allows pupils to 
reflect on their own cultural traditions and those of 
others. Pupils need to develop an understanding of how 
language constructs reality and the different 
perspectives they use to make sense of the world around 
them. It is crucial for education for diversity that pupils 
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are given the skills to challenge their own assumptions 
and those of others. There needs first to be development 
and discussion about pedagogical approaches if such 
skills are to be developed so that education for diversity 
can be effective. 
 
There is however a bit more explicit acknowledgement of the need to empower young 
people through engagement with a more critical dimension to any dominant narrative in 
the Ajegbo Report than was evident in the Crick Report. As one contributor states: ‘The 
character of Citizenship must retain its critical and practical focus. Citizenship is about 
grey areas. It’s not about whether I’m right or wrong, it’s about me trying to understand 
my own explanations and explain those to others.’ (ibid. p.95 emphasis added).  And  
(not unlike the Crick Report) the Ajegbo review argues: ‘We are certain that the process 
of dialogue and communication must be central to pedagogical strategies for Citizenship. 
Professor John Annette (2007) emphasises the importance of developing ‘civic listening’ 
in citizenship in order that we all learn to listen to and evaluate the views and arguments 
of others. It is important not to marginalise or silence voices if we aim for an inclusive, 
democratic and participative citizenry’ (ibid.).   Arguably, the Crick commission was   
less explicit about those on the margins and the ‘silent voices’ referred to here. 
 
 
The Ajegbo Report does make more explicit commitment to actively solving society’s 
problems and some distancing from what might be described as the ‘Third Way’ 
minimal interventionist approach. As the Ajegbo authors say here in relation to learning 
to evaluate the views of others: This is not to say that we bend to a ‘woolly liberalism’, 
nor is it ‘relativism gone mad’; there clearly must be ground rules about the process of 
discussing important issues and as a means to solve society’s problems’ (ibid. p.96). 
This more interventionist stance is echoed throughout the Ajegbo Report in its critique 
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of the ‘light touch’ dimension to Crick’s recommendations. The light touch approach is 
praised as a first stage in the implementation of a new national citizenship curriculum 
but, it is argued, the more mature system needs something a little more firm. As is stated 
here: 
 
We acknowledge that a ‘light touch’ was initially helpful 
for providing flexibility within the curriculum. But as 
the subject matures – and to ensure its future 
development and credibility – there needs to be a more 
concrete approach, with content, standards and links 
between curriculum subjects delineated in more detail. 
(ibid. p.82). 
 
Many of the Ajegbo Report recommendations were adopted and the fourth strand was 
adopted and incorporated within the National Curriculum for Citizenship in 2007 (QCA, 
2007). 
 
 
Critiques of the Ajegbo Review 
 
Commentator on and critics of the Ajegbo recommendations came from all sides of the 
political spectrum. At the extreme end of party politics, the British National Party used  
the Report to emphasis the alienation of indigenous white working class pupils (quoted  
in Osler, 2008, p.13). A critical view from The Times newspaper (26th January 2007) 
emphasised the need for essentially so-called British values to be made more paramount: 
 
We have to be clearer about what it means to be British, 
what it means to be part of this British nation of 
nations and, crucially, to be resolute in making the 
point that what comes with that is a set of values. Yes, 
there is room for multiple and different identities, but 
those have to be accepted alongside an agreement that 
none of these identities can take precedence over the 
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core democratic values of freedom, fairness, tolerance 
and plurality that define what it means to be British. 
 
 
And The Daily Telegraph (26th January 2007) adopted a similar line whilst emphasising 
the role of History in the curriculum and questioning the need for citizenship education 
at all: 
 
The teaching of history in our schools is, unaccountably, 
not compulsory after the age of 14. If it were, there 
would be no need for extra instruction in citizenship. It 
is through the teaching of history that citizens of this 
country learn about the society in which they are now 
living. It is arguable that, without the foundation of 
decent historical knowledge, citizenship lessons will in 
any event be built on sand…Even the schools minister, 
Lord Adonis, has admitted that comprehensive 
education has been a mistake. Rectifying that will take 
an immense effort, but a start could be made not by 
introducing nebulous new courses on citizenship but by 
ensuring that all school pupils spend their whole 
classroom careers learning about this country and what 
made it — and them. 
 
 
Anti-racist commentators also found the Report’s recommendations wanting. Trevor 
Phillips from the Commission on Racial Equality argued that the report placed too 
much emphasis on multiculturalism, which, as commonly understood, is not always 
helpful because it privileges cultural difference and underplays structural inequalities.  
In his words, albeit from an earlier critique of multiculturalism, (Phillips, 2004): 
 
Integration only works if it both recognizes newcomers' 
differences and extends complete equality. Celebrating 
diversity, but ignoring inequality, inevitably  leads  to 
the nightmare of entrenched segregation.   There can   
be no true integration without true equality. But the 
reverse is also true. The equality of the ghetto is no 
equality   at   all.   Multiculturalism   is   in   danger   of 
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becoming a sleight of hand in which ethnic minorities 
are distracted by tokens of recognition, while being 
excluded from the real business. 
 
 
Osler takes a similar line in arguing that Ajegbo did not go far enough in tackling 
inequalities and underlying institutional racism and suggesting that while the report 
‘gives impetus to teaching about diversity, it fails to adopt a critical perspective on race 
or multiculturalism or adequately engage with young people’s lived experiences of 
citizenship within a globalised world’.  She adds (2008, p.14): 
 
My fear is that the Ajegbo report and the addition of a 
fourth strand on ‘identity and diversity’ may prove to be 
a new placebo. If schools promote a depoliticised 
multiculturalism which does not encourage political 
literacy or critical analysis there is a real danger that 
this will leave unchallenged (and possibly disguise) the 
considerable inequalities within schools, while allowing 
individual institutions to assert they are fulfilling their 
duty to promote community cohesion. Equally 
worryingly, students may be left vulnerable to the 
propaganda of ethno-nationalist and xenophobic parties. 
[…] Ironically, a government concerned with violent 
extremism appears to have overlooked the vulnerability 
of some young people to racist extremism and violence. 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to see the truth in Phillips and Osler’s  
insights and warnings. At the time of writing (October 2016) there has been plenty of 
evidence of continued alienation of some minority groups in Britain and, arguably, 
evidence that some citizens fell for the propaganda propagated by an ethno nationalist, 
xenophobic campaign by the UK Independence Party (UKIP) during the EU referendum. 
But, to be fair, the new curriculum was implemented for a few short years before the 
new Coalition government was elected and secondly, one cannot lay the blame for 
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citizens’ behaviour at its door especially given that a limited number of students who 
would have experienced its provision. 
 
 
There were, however, many laudable elements to the Ajegbo Review and 
recommendations. Of all the citizenship curricula discussed so far it, arguably, comes 
closest to aligning liberal democratic values with a specifically liberal democratic nation 
building agenda. It did this by construing the British national community as located in a 
sense of shared fate, as opposed to a common national identity agenda, and explicitly 
incorporated educational goals aimed at developing students’ critical faculties. 
 
 
Goldsmith 2008 
However, whilst the implementation of these recommendations represented a shift 
towards a more potentially effective kind of citizenship curriculum they clearly did not 
go far enough for some critics and importantly for some members of the government at 
the time, albeit for rather different reasons. In 2008, only a year after Ajegbo’s Review, 
a further review was commissioned by the Labour Government and The Goldsmith 
Report: Citizenship: Our Common Bond was commissioned and published.  The 
Report’s title conveyed its emphasis, that is, an even greater explicitness regarding 
national cohesion and identity. The Goldsmith Report recommendations took the idea of 
developing a modern sense of Britishness much further than its predecessors. Lord 
Goldsmith said his proposals would ‘make it clearer what it means to be a citizen’ and 
would set up ‘practical measures that may help enhance a sense of shared belonging’ 
(The Guardian, March 11th 2008). The plans included making pupils participate in 
citizenship ceremonies and there were proposals for a new public holiday to celebrate 
‘Britishness’.  This  evidently  more  robust  approach  to  integration  also  included 
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recommendations for ‘council tax discounts for volunteer work, changes to current 
categories of citizenship, language loans for new immigrants to learn English, a type of 
community service to enhance "citizen education" and special ceremonies for school- 
leavers’ (ibid.). In his own words, Lord Goldsmith stated: 
I do not assume that there is a crisis about our sense of 
shared citizenship. Levels of pride and belonging in the 
UK are high. However, we are experiencing changes in 
our society, which may have an impact on the bond that 
we feel we share as citizens. I propose a range of 
measures that may help to promote a shared sense of 
belonging and may encourage citizens to participate 
more in society. […] There is no doubt that we have a 
rich suite of national symbols in this country. So the 
question is not to change what we have but to consider 
ways in which to add to it. I propose that further 
consideration should be given to a narrative, non- 
legalistic statement of the rights and responsibilities of 
citizenship; and a national day – introduced to coincide 
with the Olympics and Diamond Jubilee – which would 
provide an annual focus for our national narrative 
(Goldsmith, 2008, p.7). 
 
These recommendations represented a significant shift away from anything experienced 
before in the UK, and indeed a shift from the thrust of both Crick and Ajegbo’s more 
nuanced recommendations. Goldsmith drew heavily on the Australian model of 
citizenship as a model of good practice in tackling the growing challenges of social 
fragmentation (Goldsmith, p.94). Whilst the Goldsmith recommendations seemed to 
chime with the rhetoric of leading government figures at the time (for example, Gordon 
Brown, Lord Adonis) those recommendations relating to education in particular were 
not implemented. The public and media reaction was very critical. The Goldsmith 
Review seemed to go too far for most and yet not far enough for some who viewed this 
report  as  a  bridge  too  far  away  from  a  more  cosmopolitan  and  global  notion  of 
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citizenship. Its narrow patriotic purpose seemed to alienate the public and politicians 
from both sides of the political spectrum. Darcus Howe of The New Statesman sums up 
the reaction well: ‘If there is something called Britishness, it is the tendency to resist   
this interference by the State. (The New Statesmen, 19th March 2008). This resistance  
did not last, however, or perhaps the tendency to resist it was overstated by Howe above. 
The current civic education agenda includes the requirement that all schools in Britain 
‘actively promote’ British values (DfE, 2014) and the direction of this policy was set by 
the Coalition Government comprising a majority Conservative Party with Liberal 
Democratic support who were elected in May 2010. 
 
 
Before moving on to look at the Coalition and Conservative citizenship agenda, it is 
worth taking stock of the shifting requirements for schools over the course of the  
Labour Government’s terms in office since 1997. Labour education policy consistently 
required schools to give greater emphasis to a shared sense of civic morality and 
promotion of a ‘social’ education agenda and citizenship education became a statutory 
requirement for the first time in 2002. After 2005, there was also a strengthening of the 
idea of a shared national identity - albeit an inclusive identity - included in 
recommendations to schools. By 2007 the History curriculum had been revised to 
include a strengthened element of the national story through an additional citizenship 
strand. It was entitled: Identity and Diversity: Living Together in the UK and was 
explicitly directed at cultivating a greater sense of belonging for all UK citizens. Further 
attempts to strengthen the explicit national identity agenda, through the Goldsmith 
Report after 2008, were not incorporated into formal education policy. 
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Coalition and Conservative approaches to civic education 2010 – 2016 
 
With the change of UK Government in 2010 to a Conservative - Liberal Democratic 
coalition there was, perhaps, an unsurprising return to the policy direction and rhetoric 
of the previous Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s. Citizenship was to 
remain a discrete subject, with the emphasis on developing knowledge and 
understanding of core liberal values. This was accompanied by a return to a narrower 
definition of Britishness as Michael Gove, Secretary of State for Education outlined in a 
party conferences speech entitled: ‘All pupils will learn our island story’ (2010). 
Significantly however, the scope of the curriculum changed. The Coalition Government 
aimed to make the vast majority of school academy schools in the future and these 
schools would be independent of any national curriculum prescriptions. So whilst the 
curriculum contained much that anyone would expect a modern democratic state 
curriculum to include, for example (DfE, 2013, p.1): 
 
Political, legal and human rights, and responsibilities of 
citizens; the roles of the law and the justice system and 
how they relate to young people; key features of 
parliamentary democracy and government in the 
constituent parts of the UK and at local level, including 
voting and elections; freedom of speech and diversity of 
views, and the role of the media in informing and 
influencing public opinion and holding those in power to 
account; […] The changing nature of UK society, 
including the diversity of ideas, beliefs, cultures, 
identities, traditions, perspectives and values that are 
shared; migration to, from and within the UK and the 
reasons for this; the UK’s relations with the European 
Union and the rest of Europe, the Commonwealth, the 
United Nations and the world as a global community. 
 
 
However, there was no legal obligation on most schools to follow this curriculum. And 
whilst there was some explicit acknowledgment of diversity and inclusion, for example, 
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‘pupils should explore the diversity of groups and communities and examine the 
changes that occur. They should also explore things that unify us, including the shared 
values that UK society is committed to, and what groups and communities have in 
common as we live together in society’, the vast majority of students would not be 
subject to these prescriptions. The Coalition agenda returned to arguably a more neo 
liberal approach and aimed to introduce greater market freedoms within education. 
Although the plans to make every school in England an academy have faltered, and the 
expected expansion of Free schools has not been as widespread as initially forecast, 
there has been legislation introduced that makes all schools (maintained, free, 
academies, private schools) accountable for their provision of Spiritual, Moral, Social 
and Cultural (SMSC) development. This is now the locus of citizenship education. 
Through their provision of SMSC, schools should (DfE, 2014, p.5): 
 
• enable students to develop their self-knowledge,  self-esteem 
and self-confidence; 
• enable students to distinguish right from wrong and to respect 
the civil and criminal law of England; 
• encourage students to accept responsibility for their behaviour, 
show initiative, and to understand how they can contribute 
positively to the lives of those living and working in the locality 
of the school and to society more widely; 
• enable students to acquire a broad general knowledge of and 
respect for public institutions and services in England; 
• further tolerance and harmony between different cultural 
traditions by enabling students to acquire an appreciation of 
and respect for their own and other cultures; 
• encourage respect for other people; and 
• encourage respect for democracy and support for participation 
in the democratic processes, including respect for the basis on 
which the law is made and applied in England. 
 
And since 2014 the words ‘respect for’, for example, the basis upon which law is made 
and applied in England (see above) has been replaced by a requirement for schools to 
promote  British  values.  As  a  recent  government  directive  states:  ‘Schools  should 
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promote the fundamental British values of democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, 
and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs’ (DfE, 2014, 
p.5). 
 
The list below describes the understanding and knowledge expected of pupils as a result 
of schools promoting fundamental British values (DfE, 2014, p.6.) 
 
An understanding of how citizens can influence 
decision-making through the democratic process; an 
appreciation that living under the rule of law protects 
individual citizens and is essential for their wellbeing 
and safety; an understanding that there is a separation 
of power between the executive and the judiciary, and 
that while some public bodies such as the police and the 
army can be held to account through Parliament, others 
such as the courts maintain independence; an 
understanding that the freedom to choose and hold 
other faiths and beliefs is protected in law; an 
acceptance that other people having different faiths or 
beliefs to oneself (or having none) should be accepted 
and tolerated, and should not be the cause of prejudicial 
or discriminatory behaviour; and an understanding of 
the importance of identifying and combatting 
discrimination. 
 
 
Michael Gove, Secretary of State for education, justified this shift of emphasis saying 
that, ‘It is critical that we ensure that our traditions of liberty and tolerance are protected 
so that everyone, whatever their background, can feel that sense of pride in this nation 
and allegiance to other citizens, which all of us would want to celebrate as the best of 
British’ (2010). And as the official guidance outlines: ‘Actively promoting the values 
means challenging opinions or behaviours in school that are contrary to fundamental 
British values. Attempts to promote systems that undermine fundamental British values 
would be completely at odds with schools’ duty to provide SMSC’ (DfE, 2014, p.6). 
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According to Ofsted (op. cit. p.7), 'Fundamental British values are democracy; the rule 
of law and individual liberty’. 
 
Critiques of promoting British Values 
 
 
There has been some disquiet about the directive to promote British values. Those 
within and outside education have expressed disquiet. Chris Husbands, director of the 
Institute of Education and professor of education, said these debates are all too familiar. 
He reminded readers that we had been here before in 1989 with the Speaker’s 
Commission and in 1999 with the Citizenship report, which both attempted to describe 
British values. He stated: ‘No politician of whatever party should assume a monopoly of 
the civic values of the education system. It needs to be done in an open and wide 
consultation’ (Husbands, 2014). And, many teachers fear political interference in this 
area, as John D. Clare explained: 
 
Many of the people who want us to teach national 
identity have a hidden agenda that they want to teach 
Englishness, which they see as being under siege from 
an influx of immigrants, and I think they see 
Englishness as something which is dying, and they  
want to use history to protect it, to get across a certain 
political agenda with the children. And if that is the 
thing, then I instinctively revolt against that; that is  
not my job as a teacher (2010, p.2). 
 
Mark Easton, a BBC journalist, has argued that demands on schools to promote British 
values could damage the ability of young people to understand a multi-cultural 
democracy (2014, p.2): 
 
 
The phrase is fraught with ambiguities and seems 
almost designed to bring home the UKIP cheerleaders 
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rather than clarify its own purpose. Is that what 
teachers should do? We may hold these values dearly. 
We may believe they offer the best chance for a stable 
and happy society. We may regard them as superior to 
all others. But should children be told that as a matter 
of fact? […] Would a teacher who drew pupils' attention 
to the weaknesses of democracy be in breach of his duty 
to promote it? Would promoting the rule of law make it 
more difficult for schools to teach about civil 
disobedience? […] And when it comes to mutual respect 
and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs, 
how respectful and tolerant should one be? 
 
Whilst in the policy it is consistent, in a wider sense the phrase ‘British values’ is open 
to multiple interpretations. For some, it might denote British as opposed to foreign 
values, reflecting more traditional conservative dispositions of the population. For 
others, it is about shared values of tolerance and broadmindedness within a multicultural 
society, a progressive ideal. These two definitions are not compatible. One is a singular 
fixed identity; the other is an evolving concept. Arguably, you cannot have both at the 
same time. And, Andy Thornton (Head of the Citizenship Foundation of the UK) is 
critical of what he deems an oversimplified conception of current civic education. As he 
argues here: 
 
Instead of introducing the coming generation to the 
necessary knowledge of their democracy; instead of 
introducing critical thinking around public life; instead 
of helping students prepare for the responsibility of 
running this country in the face of the most uncertain 
future we might possibly imagine, we have near-silence. 
We need another racket in the silence. The growing roar 
of disbelief from those like you [Gove] who know how 
hard it is to make a complex modern multi-cultural 
democracy work. Of people getting to their feet and 
demanding that British values are systematically and 
intelligently integrated into our children’s education 
rather than remaining a catchphrase to berate a 
minority (Thornton, 2014). 
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Cross party consensus on character education 2014 
 
As discussed above in the introduction to this section, there has been resurgence in 
academic and political interest in character education in the UK in recent years, and 
certainly since 2011 in political terms. Character education has not created the divisions 
described above that relate to the introduction of British Values in UK schools. There 
has been a considerable amount of cross-party support for the idea and practice. And, 
notably, although certainly not universally, character education has been known for its 
alleged uncritical conformism and conservatism (Kristjánsson, 2010, p.397) This was 
partly as a result of the appointment of Nicky Morgan as Secretary of State for 
Education in 2014 replacing Gove who was moved to the position of Chief Whip. In her 
short time in the post, Morgan replaced Gove’s emphasis on academic subjects with 
more ‘whole child’ approach and gave significant amounts to schools to fund character 
education. The Jubilee Centre, at Birmingham University, who developed a Framework 
for Character Education in Schools (2013) and has produced substantial curriculum 
guidance, supported this policy drive. Character education was characterised by four 
distinct virtues: moral, intellectual, civic and performance. Research into the state of 
character education in UK schools carried out by The Jubilee Centre (Arthur et al, 2015) 
found that, whilst it was broadly welcomed by teachers and parents, the emphasis to  
date had been more on the performance virtues (for example, resilience, being goal 
oriented) rather than more substantial moral, intellectual and civic virtues and makes 
recommendations to remedy what it describes as the overemphasis on performance  
goals to the detriment of other virtues (p.10). 
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Conclusion 
 
Since the 1970s, citizenship education in England has remained high on the policy 
agenda but has not yet arrived at an adequate approach to meet the considerable 
challenges facing modern liberal democracies and their citizens. This chapter has 
provided an overview of UK government civic education policy and has found that it  
has taken on various curricular forms in relation to societal needs and pressure and has 
reflected the various ideological positions of each government. The Conservative 
approach to citizenship education has been broadly ‘minimal’ in relation to an explicit 
‘civic morality’ and a limited role for the state in taking responsibility for individuals’ 
lives, but has remained highly interventionist in relation to promoting a strong version  
of shared British Identity. This promotion of shared values has been high at the level of 
exhortation to accept these shared values but has stopped short of an explicitly patriotic 
agenda. There has been no explicit exhortation for children or young people to learn to 
love their country. Under various Labour governments, a broadly civic republican 
approach has been evident in civic education policy. The state has been deemed to have 
significant responsibility for individual and societal welfare, and citizens have been seen 
to have entitlements and rights. However, these rights have been coupled with a strong 
promotion of individual and community responsibility. The civic republican approach 
has promoted the idea, and devised policy to ensure that, citizens are educated and 
supported - and sanctioned when they fail - to take greater responsibility for their own 
welfare. 
 
 
It is argued here that neither of these approaches yet meets the needs of either individual 
citizens or modern liberal democratic society. The challenge for liberal democracies and 
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civic education is a tough one. It is worth citing Callan again here to capture this 
dilemma: 
 
A necessary feature of free societies is the extension of a 
particular set of rights to all citizens, including rights to 
liberty, association, and political participation. But so 
far as citizens use their rights to protect or advance the 
different ways of life they cherish, any such society is 
also pluralistic in ways that may pose a threat to liberal 
democracy. If the role of state education is to keep faith 
with its constitutive morality, a path must be found 
between the horns of this dilemma (1997, p.9). 
 
Promoting the ‘liberal way of life’ could, in principle, breach its own values. But, this is 
a dilemma that needs to be overcome. Too much is at stake, as has been argued above, 
and a way through needs to be found that both preserves fundamental liberal values and 
creates enough of a ‘common’ project that motivates citizens enough to participate and 
continue to shape and renew modern plural liberal societies. It has been argued here that 
the imposition of a shared identity in the manner promoted by Conservative policy fails 
to satisfy the liberal principles of autonomy, tolerance and fairness. And, furthermore, 
this approach does not work adequately in practice given that it is likely to alienate - or 
at least fail to engage - many minority or alienated groups. It has been argued here that 
the important sense of national solidarity should come from the concept of ‘shared fate’ 
rather than ‘common identity’. The Ajegbo proposals, implemented by the Labour 
government in 2007, came close to integrating a sense of shared fate within a plural, 
multi-cultural national community whilst retaining the essentially liberal virtues of 
cultivating critical rationality. But, as argued above, even this approach did not 
adequately describe why young people would engage with their national community. 
What is needed, in order to develop a more fitting and effective civic education policy is 
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a more explicitly patriotic dimension to the curriculum. This would provide the 
necessary affective motivation for young people to engage with liberal democratic 
processes. Patriotic education could, if done appropriately, ‘systematically and 
intelligently’, to borrow the words of Thornton above, provide vital force to the 
preservation of plural liberal democratic communities. It could educate the young to 
view their national community as necessarily diverse, loveable as such and theirs to 
shape and it could provide the motivation to engage with liberal democratic processes.  
If it is conceived of as an open-ended project with liberal principles at its core, it goes a 
long way to providing the way though the challenge of reconciling the need to keep  
faith with liberal democracy’s essential morality and safe guarding – perhaps improving 
– its future prospects. It is the task of the following chapters to outline how progressive 
patriotic civic education could overcome the shortcomings of existing policies and  
create the path ‘between the horns of this dilemma’. 
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CHAPTER 2: WHAT IS  PATRIOTISM? 
Patriotism, according to common definition, is love of one’s country. The purpose of  
this chapter is simply to establish agreement on the term itself and to test the traditional 
definition ‘love of one’s country’ for its adequacy. The core question is: do each of   
these components, ‘love’, ‘country’ and ‘one’s’ amount to the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of the term patriotism? Different views on the definition of patriotism will be 
examined and each will be discussed in relation to each of these core components (‘love, 
'country’ and ‘one’s’). In arriving at a defensible definition of patriotism it is important 
to consider the meaning of the constituent terms. As Soutphommasane states: 
 
 
After all, what must such a ‘love’ involve? And what 
precisely must ‘country’ mean? Whether patriotism is 
merely an emotion or more similar to a reasoned 
attitude; whether it is a product of the authoritative 
demands of tradition or of considered reflection; 
whether it should be directed at one’s physical 
homeland, fellow citizens, republic or nation; whether it 
is oriented towards improving one’s country or 
expressed against people outside it – not all such 
questions can be answered by declaring ‘pro patria’ 
(2012, p.19). 
 
Patriotism can take many forms as this quotation implies. The enactment of its meaning 
can involve a noble, generous civic pride or equally a belligerent, narrow chauvinism. It 
can be used to serve progressive social democratic ends by motivating citizens to vote 
for tax policy to support a thriving public sector in spite of personal financial loss.  
There are also many contemporary examples of love of country being used to justify 
limiting individual liberties or to fuel racism. But clearly it would be a mistake to 
simply conflate patriotism with racism. A liberal democrat may love her country as 
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much as a fascist. Whilst it is important to consider the various forms patriotism takes in 
defence of its place within liberal democratic education, this chapter restricts itself to 
arriving at an agreeable definition only. Subsequent chapters will explore the various 
forms of patriotism and their desirability or compatibility with liberal social 
democracies. 
 
 
Three views on the definition of patriotism will be explored here. The first view can be 
described as the wide, traditional dictionary definition of patriotism, that is, love of  
one’s country’. Proponents of this view (for example, Callan, 2006, Hand, 2010, 
Sparrow, 2007) argue that no further qualification or adaption is needed to the most 
common dictionary definition. The second view is defined here as the ‘narrower, 
qualified dictionary view’. This view suggests that the traditional definition is too open 
and vague. Proponents of this view suggest, for example, that the term ‘love of country’ 
does not adequately communicate special concern for compatriots (for example, 
Primoratz, 2006, Soutphommasane, 2012). The third view can be described as the 
‘adapted view’. Here, proponents (for example, Kleinig, 2007) suggest that there is a 
need to replace the phrase ‘love of’ with ‘loyalty towards’. Each of these views on the 
definition of patriotism will be assessed in relation to an exploration of the many and 
various interpretations of what it means to love, what the object of that love is and what 
it means for the object of love to be a person or entity comprising persons. In the 
discussion of the object of patriotic love, the differences between patriotism and 
nationalism are also explored. The chapter concludes with a defence of the  wide, 
original definition, ‘love of one’s country’, as an adequate definition of the term 
patriotism for the purposes of this thesis. 
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An overview of three views on the definition of patriotism 
 
Igor Primoratz (2007) and Tim Soutphommasane (2012) are proponents of the 
‘narrower, qualified dictionary view’ of patriotism and argue that, while love is a 
necessary term within the definition of patriotism, it is not sufficient. Here, Primoratz 
suggests that patriotism is: 
 
Love of one’s country, identification with it and a  
special concern for its wellbeing and that of compatriots 
(2007, p.18). 
 
Here, Primoratz appears to see the need for qualifications of what patriotic love for a 
country may entail: that is ‘identification with it’ and ‘special concern’ for it. 
Furthermore, he indicates the need to make explicit that this ‘special concern’ includes a 
special concern for compatriots as well as the country itself. Primoratz also worries 
about the potential vagueness of the phrase ‘the country’ and suggests that ‘if one is to 
be a patriot of a country, the country must be his in some significant sense; and that may 
be best captured by speaking of one’s identification with it’ (ibid.). This identification 
can be expressed in pride and shame for achievements and lapses, which, by definition, 
involves others who also identify with it, that is, compatriots15. Love of country is too 
broad a definition of patriotism for Primoratz. He argues that love within any definition 
of patriotism requires further explanation. To love a country in a patriotic way means 
developing or possessing a special concern for it and identifying with it beyond simple 
membership by birth or citizenship. Furthermore, for Primoratz the term  ‘country’ 
within patriotism does not necessarily entail the idea of compatriots. Loving a country - 
without  his  qualifications  -  could  involve  having  strong  sentiments  in  terms  of its 
!) Andrew Mason (1997) makes a case that there should be special concern for long-term residents and 
fellow citizen - not just compatriots. 
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geography, landscape and history without any necessary emotional feeling towards 
fellow inhabitants. Primoratz finds this to be unacceptable as an understanding of 
patriotism and therefore adds the idea of compatriots within his narrower and more 
qualified definition. Tim Soutphommasane argues along similar lines by stating the 
following: ‘Patriotism refers to an identification with one’s political community, and a 
special concern for its welfare and the welfare of one’s fellow citizens 
(Soutphommasane, 2012, p.19). As such, Soutphommasane is suggesting that the term 
‘country’ itself does not necessarily connote the political community of that country. He 
continues with qualifications of the notion of patriotism by suggesting that patriotism 
can be understood as having three dimensions: ‘as a mode of loyalty, as a moral stance 
and as an expression of citizenship’ (op. cit. p.20). 
 
 
John Kleinig (2007) captures the ‘adapted view’ of patriotism. He concurs with 
Soutphommasane in relation to the idea of loyalty but argues that the common 
characterisation of patriotism as love of one’s country is not only inadequate but 
potentially misleading (2007, p.43). He argues thus: 
 
It is frequently said that patriotism is ‘love of one’s 
country’. I am not altogether comfortable with that as a 
general account, even though patriots frequently do love 
their countries. Some part of my hesitation stems from 
the multiple ambiguities of ‘love’. […] Although  love 
may be critical/tough, the informal or popular focus on 
love as expressive of devotion and positive emotional 
support too easily allows for a misleading exploitation  
of patriotic identification when characterised as love of 
country. […] […] it seems less misleading to construe 
patriotism as a form of loyalty (toward country) than 
love for country (ibid.). 
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Hand provides us with a defence of the traditional or dictionary view. He suggests that 
the core definition of patriotism as ‘love of country’ will suffice. He states that it is 
therefore ‘a certain kind of emotional attachment to a certain kind of object’ (2010, p.2). 
The ‘certain kind of object’, that is, a country ‘comprises a national community and the 
land on which it resides’. Hand provides a description of what unites the idea of a 
national community and its land: 
 
The unity of these elements lies in the fact that nations 
are conceptually connected to their homelands: a 
constitutive and distinguishing feature of national 
communities is a shared sense of belonging to a 
particular geographical place (ibid.). 
 
Eamonn Callan (2006) also accepts the wide, traditional dictionary definition of 
patriotism as love of one’s country. Whilst Callan clarifies what is meant by each term 
within this definition, he is satisfied with this broad understanding that patriotism mean 
loving one’s country. His explanation of each of the terms within the phrase ‘love of 
one’s country’ serves to defend its adequacy for the job. Callan’s definition of the term 
‘country’ in relation to patriotism includes the ideal of belonging to and concern for  
both the place and the people within it – past, present and future. As he suggests: 
‘[Country is] a certain kind of territorially concentrated, intergenerational community to 
which the patriot belongs and whose survival and prosperity she values deeply’ (2006, 
p.533). Callan’s choice of language in this explication of the term ‘country’ suggests 
that love of it should in some way motivate a person towards certain kinds of action,  
that is, to enact the value of caring about one’s country’s towards maintaining its 
survival and contributing to its prosperity in some way. It would be contradictory to 
value the survival and prosperity of something and not, in some way, actively support 
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its continuance and flourishing. Hand, on the contrary, argues for more minimal 
connotations in suggesting that a patriot can love her country for the sense of belonging 
to a national community and shared geographical space it engenders. This love of 
country may engender certain behavioural responses but does not necessarily connote 
behaviours to actively promote its flourishing. But both Callan and Hand would agree 
that, regardless of how this love in enacted, and towards what object precisely, the core 
definition will suffice. 
 
 
The different interpretations and definitions of patriotism between these scholars 
suggest that there is further examination and explication required of the definition and 
the constituent terms within it. For example, as a retort to Primoratz and 
Soutphommasane’s narrower definition of patriotism, it could be argued, as Hand 
implies, that if we love a place we feel we belong to, does this not in itself imply an 
identification of sorts with it and a care for it and by definition an amount of loyalty 
towards it? And Callan’s notion of valuing deeply the survival and prosperity of one’s 
country defined as ‘an intergenerational community’ also implies that there is also some 
special concern for compatriots, as well as loyalty towards country, built in to the 
definition. However, it may be that what Hand or Callan mean by the term ‘belonging’  
is not akin to the phrase ‘identification with’ that Primoratz and Soutphommasane use. 
Does their use of phrase ‘identification with’ mean that something is partly constitutive 
of my identity in that, for example, I would not really be me if I were not English? The 
terms ‘belonging’, ‘attachment to’ and ‘identification with’ need further conceptual 
clarity. Furthermore, the notion of ‘country’ as the object of patriotic love or loyalty  
also requires further explanation. Does it refer to the geographical space, the national 
community and/or the political community and/or the state? 
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Primoratz and Soutphommasane, from the narrower, qualified dictionary view, suggest 
that the solution to this complexity is to restrict and qualify the definition to explain not 
only what this love comprises (special concern) but to whom - or towards what - it 
should be directed (country as nation and state institutions as well as compatriots). 
Kleinig’s response is to do away with the notion of love, as it is too complex to be 
useful within the idea of patriotism – and to propose an adaptation to the definition. 
Hand and Callan, on the other hand, are satisfied with the essential definition of 
patriotism as love of country. They argue that there are variations in types of patriotism 
but that the essential definition remains fit for purpose. The task ahead, therefore, is to 
take each component of the common definition of patriotism and to assess its meaning 
and in turn its necessity and sufficiency within a defensible definition of patriotism. 
 
 
What kind of love is patriotic love? 
 
Let us start with love. Hand, amongst others, above clearly argues that there is a clear 
enough definition of love that should suffice in defining patriotism a love of country 
without further explanation. Proponents of the ‘narrower qualified’ or ‘adapted’ 
definition of patriotism imply that the different types of love and that its many 
ambiguities render it problematic for this purpose. There is clearly some conceptual 
work to be done given the everyday language use of the term. It is quite reasonable for a 
person to state that she loves chocolate, red wine, her dog, her children, her spouse and 
her country. It is also quite plausible for a person to state that, as a Christian for 
example, she loves her neighbour. As such it seems sensible to organise these kinds of 
love into different categories as, for example C. S. Lewis does in his book The Four 
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Loves (1960). He identifies the following four different kinds of love: storge (affection 
through familiarity or brotherly love); philia (love between friends); eros (romantic love) 
and agape (charitable, unconditional love). 
 
 
John Wilson agrees that it is possible to identify different logical constituents of  
different kinds of love. As he states here: 
 
[…] there are indeed different kinds of love – eros,  
philia, agape, ‘passion’, ‘affection’ , ‘charity’ and so forth. 
[And] we may then happily go on to identify different 
logical constituents of each (1995, p.13). 
 
However, he suggests that it is also quite possible to defend an overarching core concept 
of love. And he goes on to suggest that it is worth attempting to define love in terms of 
its core concept (if there is one) before looking at different categories. He continues: 
 
I think there is a basic concept, which appears in the 
English verb ‘love’ and which parallels in many other 
languages (aimer, lieben, amare, etc.). One may be 
indifferent to an object, quite like it, like it a lot, and 
love it; and one can love it du tout, un peu, 
passionément, or à la folie. The fundamental and simple 
idea is that one finds pleasure in the object and gets 
pleasure out of it; and hence (since one cannot do that 
all the time in an immediate and practical way) one is 
strongly attached to it in one’s mind and heart, seeks it 
out, and wishes to preserve it’. […] to love something is 
just to have a fairly permanent kind of intensity of 
desire for it and attachment to it (ibid. p.14). 
 
To love something means that a person derives pleasure from the object of love and that 
there is a strong feeling of attachment to it. Furthermore, that declaring love for 
something requires more than fleeting feeling and thereby there is an implication of a 
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certain level of steadfastness involved. Love is more than a passing fancy or casual 
whim.  Here love can be differentiated with mere ‘want’. As Wilson explains: 
 
I may want food when I am hungry at a particular time 
(perhaps quite a long time); but if I say that I love food, 
that suggests a more permanent disposition – a 
permanency of desire or want is directed towards food  
in general; I am greedy, or perhaps a gourmet. And 
furthermore, I may want food for a special purpose (I  
am hungry or I am about to have a dinner party) but if I 
love food and am asked what do you love food for? I 
could reply ‘Well I just love it’ (op. cit. p.20). 
 
If we can give a reasonable answer to the question ‘Why do you love x?’ as ‘Well I just 
do’, as Wilson does above, it follows that that love is not entirely dependent on the 
merits of the beloved object or entity. As Callan says (2006, p.525) ‘We unashamedly 
love unremarkable cats and dogs’. And he argues that love cannot be determined by 
some kind of neutral assessment of the object of love. If that were the case, we would 
have to withdraw love or give more love depending on the changing merits of the 
beloved. As Callan suggests: the very existence of love seems to require a certain 
emotional generosity toward its object independent of what any dispassionate evaluation 
of the object’s merits could warrant’ (ibid.). 
 
 
Hand is in agreement here and argues that it is right ‘to reject the cognitive theory that 
requires all emotions to have constitutive thoughts. Most emotions […] are constituted 
in part by thought about their objects, but a few are not; and love is an instance of the 
latter. There is nothing that could be true of any of the things I love in the world that 
would make my love for them representationally inappropriate’ (2012, p.11). More 
knowledge of the beloved object does not, according to Hand here, necessarily affect 
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one’s love for it. In fact, he suggests that cognitive understanding of the beloved is a  
side issue. 
 
 
In arriving at an understanding of love within the definition of patriotism, the object of 
love may be significant – and clearly is significant for Primoratz and Soutphommasane. 
Could it be argued that loving chocolate or football does not convey the same meaning  
of love itself when we use the word to describe loving one’s children or loving your 
neighbour? Wilson suggests that there may be further light shed on the idea of love   
itself when one looks further at the object of love. As he states here: ‘Any moralising or 
indeed any conceptual analysis should start with the basic concept of love in relation to 
its object.’  For example, in relation to love towards a person or people: ‘here we have   
to ask what is involved in loving a person, as well as what is involved in loving a person’ 
(op. cit. p.15). Callan takes this idea forward in arguing that there are ‘species of love’ 
(2006, p.527): moralised love as opposed to ethically neutral kinds of love. For Callan 
loving a person or persons, or indeed patriotic love, is a species of love that is 
‘moralised’ as opposed to ‘ethically passive’ and he describes the difference between 
them thus: 
 
It is not the same kind of love as, say, love of Beethoven 
which is an ‘ethically passive’ kind of love and could be 
abandoned relatively easily for a new love, say, Mozart. 
Patriotic love - or love of a spouse or child - requires 
devotion or at least some general willingness to incur 
significant cost for the sake of the beloved (2006. p.528). 
 
This does not imply that a person’s love of Beethoven is not felt deeply at the time of 
loving or intended to be long lasting, according to Callan. Rather, it is the fact that 
moralised  love  may  involve  the  kind  of  devotion  and  self-sacrifice  to  someone or 
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something that continues through challenging times and despite a variety of similar and 
potentially lovable alternatives. We can love other people’s children but it is virtually 
unthinkable, for example, to most of us to transfer our parental love for our own child  
to someone else’s. Arguably one could transfer love of red wine to love of some other 
drink over time. And it is difficult to imagine what sacrifices one would make for red 
wine or chocolate. It may be possible to consider what I would sacrifice to obtain some 
red wine or to buy chocolate, for example, giving up an important activity in order to 
buy before the shops close. This is not making a sacrifice for the object of love. It is 
merely sacrificing something to obtain the object of love. These objects of love do not 
have their own interests. But we may consider making considerable sacrifices at some 
cost to us for children we love and many parents would consider making the ultimate 
sacrifice of giving their lives for their own children. 
 
 
On the other hand, one can imagine a scenario where lovers of Beethoven or wine or 
chocolate would make considerable sacrifices if the object of their love were in some 
way fundamentally under threat. There have been cases where certain kinds of music  
are deemed politically inappropriate (local folk songs or songs in a native language 
which is being eradicated) or where consuming alcohol has been illegal (prohibition for 
example). People have gone to the ultimate lengths to preserve certain aspects of culture 
that they love in these cases. Kleinig in arguing for the replacement of love with loyalty 
argues that love can indeed animate us in ways that are beyond our control. I have some 
sympathy with this view as I think I would be very likely to jump in a dangerous, fast 
moving river after my dog without giving my actions much thought – and may as a 
result deprive my very beloved children of a mother. Furthermore, Kleinig argues, love 
is too vulnerable to distortion as it can lead to otherwise reasonable people being over 
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generous about their beloved. Its emotional nature, he argues, makes it vulnerable to this 
kind of manipulation. A better definition of patriotism would be to replace the notion of 
love with something more akin to a reasoned attitude or a learnable virtue like loyalty 
according to Kleinig (2007, p.52). Virtues can be developed and manifest themselves in 
excellence of character rather than as emotional preferences, it is argued. And, 
furthermore, there is a potentially troubling element of emotions that associates them 
with hot bloodedness as opposed to cool headedness. As Adlai Stevenson, a Democratic 
politician, says here in relation to the kind of patriotism that needs to be cultivated in 
1950s USA: 
 
A patriotism which is not short, frenzied outbursts of 
emotion, but the tranquil and steady dedication of a 
lifetime (1952, cited in Davis, 1967). 
 
George Kateb agrees with some of Kleinig’s concerns and likens patriotic love to the 
worship of a false god (2006). Patriotic love, according to Kateb, inevitably leads to an 
act of bad faith as our love blinds us to reason and the exercise of objective judgement 
(op. cit. p.901). In effect it robs us of our autonomy. Whilst this may be acceptable in 
loving individual persons it is not, according to these commentators, acceptable in 
loving countries. The implication here is that patriotic love is an emotion that is difficult 
to subject to reason or the will. Many ordinary language definitions contribute to this 
understanding of the emotions as beyond reasonable control. Here is one definition of 
emotion from the Oxford English Dictionary: ‘A strong feeling deriving from one’s 
circumstances, mood, or relationships with others’ followed by this sample sentence 
‘she was attempting to control her emotions’. A further example confirms this: 
‘Instinctive or intuitive feeling as distinguished from reasoning or knowledge’  with  the 
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sample sentence, ‘responses have to be based on historical insight, not simply on 
emotion’ (OED, 2016). 
 
 
There is considerable debate about the nature of emotion and, on the face of it, the range 
of emotions do appear to defy easy categorisation. What, for example, does a mood (for 
example a free-floating feeling of despair or ennui) have in common with indignation 
that is accompanied by plenty of supporting evidence to justify the anger? This is not 
the place for a comprehensive analysis of emotions here. It is enough to state the fact 
that emotions are, by definition, passionate, but not to the point of being beyond 
subjugation to the will. We can - and should - often exercise control over these strong 
feelings. Furthermore, some scholars (see for example, Sartre, 1948; Kenny, 1963; 
Nussbaum, 2001) suggest that it is a fallacy to suggest that emotions have no place in 
critical reason and that they can be steady, long-lived feelings. A person can feel 
sustained justified anger or understandable guilt and so on, according to this view. 
Furthermore, the suggestion here is that the cultivation of emotion may not necessarily 
be subject to abuse. Indeed, surely, some emotions - joy, shame, love - should be 
cultivated by parents, for example. Aspects of a curriculum may involve children 
learning to manage their emotions, for example, anger or jealousy; others should be 
experienced whilst at school, such as joy. And so on. 
 
 
Love, understood as an emotion, can of course be prone to pathological distortion. But, 
surely, so too can loyalty, understood as a virtue. It is quite easy to imagine a loyal Nazi 
running an effective death camp or an abused wife who remains loyal to her murderous 
husband. But like loyalty, love can also be the product of calm deliberation and the 
exercise of choice. It can also be nurtured and learned. And, like loyalty, it can be 
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withdrawn. Love, like loyalty, also involves judgement. It might diminish if the beloved 
is deemed to be, say cowardly or selfish. And indeed it might not diminish if the lover 
can exercise some imagination about future possibilities for the beloved and the beloved 
is open to change. And it may continue despite flaws and imperfections in the beloved. 
 
 
Where does this leave us in relation to the three definitions of patriotism, ‘wider 
traditional’, ‘narrower qualified’ and ‘adapted’, and the use of the concept of ‘love’ 
within each? Is it necessary, as for example Kleinig suggests, to replace love with 
loyalty? Or to expand the notion of love to include its responsibilities (special concern) 
and its objects (compatriots) as Primoratz suggests? It has been argued above that whilst 
there are many different kinds of love there are some common constituents of it that 
render the concept meaningful within the definition of patriotism. To repeat John 
Wilson’s words (op. cit. p.25): ‘to love something is just to have a fairly permanent kind 
of intensity of desire for it and attachment to it’. Other common features of love suggest 
that love is non-instrumental and emotionally generous - which is not to say it is blind.  
It has also been argued here that love is an emotion that can be subjected to reason and 
the will. Therefore, in the light of this examination, we can safely dismiss the idea that 
love should be replaced with loyalty because of the vulnerability of emotions to 
distortion. Furthermore, it has been argued that the concept of love includes a 
steadfastness and intended longevity that contains the notion of loyalty within it. Whilst 
it is possible to imagine that loyalty can be - and often is - accompanied by love it is not 
necessarily so. I am a loyal member of the Labour Party but I cannot honestly say that I 
love it. I defend my childhood hometown vehemently when it is criticised but, again, I 
cannot say I love it. I left it as soon as I could. On these grounds then we need not  
accept the ‘adapted definition’ of patriotism suggested by Kleinig. 
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We have argued that love can be distorted, it can be steadfast, it can be learned, lost, and 
subject to judgement. Love can motivate us to actions that may feel beyond our control. 
It can also motivate us to conscious acts of self-sacrifice. As we stated above: to love 
something means that a person derives pleasure from the object of love and that there is  
a strong feeling of attachment to it. The important issue for our definition of patriotism   
is to ascertain whether we need to be explicit that love in the term ‘love of one’s country’ 
requires qualification in the ways that Primoratz and Soutphommasane suggest. Two 
issues arise here. First, Primoratz and Soutphommasane appear to suggest that loving a 
country is a moralised kind of love rather than an ethically neutral kind of love, to use 
Callan’s phrase. As such they perceive the need to add the qualification to the definition 
that ensures this is understood. Love, in the case of patriotism, involves ‘special concern 
for compatriots’, for example. Here they imply that the term ‘love’ alone does not 
necessarily involve special concern for the object of love. It would not make sense to  
say, for example, that I have ‘special concern for chocolate’ even though I love it but it 
might make sense to add the qualification in the case of a country. Furthermore, the 
aspect of love that connotes a strong feeling of attachment to the beloved requires 
spelling out further according to Primoratz and Soutphommasane. This strong feeling of 
attachment (love) requires ‘identification with country and compatriots’ suggesting that 
the special concern is more likely to arise if it is accompanied by some kind of bond  
with one’s homeland and with those who also, in some way, belong to it – and are 
connected to the patriot. 
 
 
The second issue that arises here is whether the narrower, qualified definition that these 
scholars offer is a definition of what it means to be a good - as opposed to a weak or bad 
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- patriot, rather than simply arriving at a core definition of patriotism regardless of the 
form it takes. Is the distinction between moralised notion of love as opposed to the love 
that is associated with an ethically neutral great interest or pleasure in something helpful 
to our definition of patriotism as love of country? Arguably not. Some people may call 
themselves patriots and may take great pleasure in aspects of national life and take a 
keen interest in them but do not see any burden of responsibility falling upon them and 
do not in any meaningful way identify with the country or compatriots. Paying required 
taxes may be deemed sufficient to this patriot, as opposed to any significant self- 
sacrifice, let alone the more historical notion of making the ultimate patriotic sacrifice 
for one’s country as captured in the well-known phrase, dolce et decorum est pro patria 
mori. The former group may not be the noblest patriots but they are surely, nonetheless, 
patriots. There are many different kinds of patriots and it is arguably not the job of the 
core definition to narrow its description in order to exclude all but the acceptable forms. 
This is what Primoratz and Soutphommasane seem to be doing here. As such, we can 
also dismiss the ‘narrower qualified dictionary’ view in relation to the concept of ‘love’ 
within our definition of patriotism. 
 
 
So far it has been argued that narrowing, qualifying or adapting the term love in the core 
definition of patriotism, suggested by Primoratz, Soutphommasane and Kleinig 
respectively, is not needed. The wider, traditional dictionary view remains intact. We 
shall now turn our attention to the object of patriotic love: one’s country. 
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What is the object of patriotic love? 
 
Simply declaring pro patria does not easily address the question of what one’s patriotic 
love should be directed towards. Should it, for example, be directed to ‘one’s physical 
homeland, fellow citizens, republic or nation?’ as Soutphommasane asks (2012, p.18). 
One ontological argument dismisses the possibility of loving an abstract entity such as a 
county or nation. Countries do not exist as objects and therefore cannot be objects of 
love. Benedict Anderson (1991) describes countries as ‘imagined communities’ not in 
an ontological way, but in the sense that the relationships and interactions go beyond the 
interpersonal and face-to-face and require an act of imagination on the part of the 
participants. One’s country can arguably be understood as the landscape and familiar 
scenes or features of one’s homeland. In relation to England one may conjure up images 
of the countryside, cricket, marmalade and so on. Or as John Major says: ‘long shadows 
on the county grounds, warm beer, invincible green suburbs, dog lovers and … old 
maids cycling to Holy Communion in the morning mist’ (cited in Paxman, 1999, p.142). 
 
 
However, according to Soutphommasane, a person who only cares for the landscape or 
lifestyle associated with her country, could not rightly be considered a patriot: ‘to talk of 
one’s country is not simply to refer to the spot on earth where one is born or lives, but 
also that polity of which one is a member’ (op. cit. p.19). And Primoratz concurs: ‘ […] 
in modern usage, the patriot’s love of his country is not restricted to the land and those 
living within it, but also encompasses the state and its citizens. Patria is not merely a 
geographical term but also a political term’ (2007, p.18). In the distant past, even when 
the patria was clearly associated with a city on a hill, say, a love of country was ‘tied 
less to the specific locale of the city and more to an idea, whether it was the polis of  the 
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Athenian city state or the laws of the Roman Republic (Dietz, 2002, p.202). According  
to Soutphommasane patriotism is the love attached to the political form of one’s country. 
As he states here: 
 
 
That patriotism is political in character may sometimes 
be obscured. Patriotism derives from the etymological 
root, patria – the native city or fatherland – but its 
meaning can often take on a naturalistic flavour (2012, 
p.19). 
 
Whilst Welsh patriots may rightly disagree with the inclusion of the state in any notion 
of patriotism as described by Primoratz above, and Palestinians may find the notion of 
country and state problematic, we can acknowledge that the etymology of the word 
patriotism suggests that there is some merit in the argument that the notion of country 
can include its political institutions. However, if we limit patriotic love only to certain 
political forms of the country alone (and we should acknowledge that neither scholar 
above is in fact doing this) we could find ourselves being reduced to a Habermasian 
version of ‘constitutional’ patriotism (2001). Here it is the constitution of a country that 
is the object of love. Superficially this, for example, denies the British or New 
Zealanders any rights to be patriots, as Great Britain and New Zealand do not have a 
formal constitution. It would also enable someone to love a similar constitution in a 
country other than his or her own and be called (nonsensically) a patriot. 
 
 
Similarly, it would not be adequate to define the object of patriotic love as the 
government of a country. It is quite possible to love and defend your country against a 
particular government. Government does not define a country. Arguably expanding the 
definition  of  government  to  include  the  institutions  of  the  state  may  go somewhat 
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further in defining the object of patriotic love. The state is a wider concept than 
government. State institutions can be the result of historical traditions and outlive 
individual governments and can be used to displace governments or government leaders. 
For example, the US congress investigated claims made against President Nixon  
between 1972 and 1974, which led to his resignation in the face  of  impeachment 
charges. Anarchists may object to this definition of country as ‘the state’ or indeed the 
expanded notion of state institutions. For anarchists, social (national) life is possible in 
the absence of the state, and further, that justice is best served by the abolition of the 
state. But politics does not begin and end with the state and as Robert Sparrow argues: 
‘The anarchist objection to patriotism collapses if love can be directed towards a non- 
state political community’ (2007, p.212). 
 
 
Arguably though the approach that suggests the patria as the political form of a country 
misses the point at a more fundamental level and denies patriotism its roots in, or  
reliance on, pre-political cultural ties at the national level. If we deny patriotism any 
grounding in nationhood we may be left with a rather limited notion of patriotism 
grounded only in loving the polity as defined as the political constitution. Our ‘sense of 
belonging’ stems from our belonging to the polity, rather than to each other, in this case. 
This, however, may not constitute patriotism in any commonly understood sense, in that, 
if a patriot loves the polity as defined by the constitution then it would be quite easy to 
transfer or expand that same love for any similar constitution. Something significant 
about the ties to each other as part of belonging to a country has been lost in this version 
of patriotic love. And, as Soutphommasane argues, these ties are essentially national   
and cultural, rather than purely political (op. cit. p.5). Welsh patriots love their country  
in the absence of a Welsh state. Welsh nationalists, whilst they may well be patriotic, 
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want more political independence from the UK. This is not the same thing. Palestinian 
patriots love the idea (past and future) of their country in the absence of a nation or state. 
 
 
It may be useful at this point to distinguish between nationalism and patriotism in the 
interest of clarity for arriving at a core definition of the latter. There have been several 
descriptions of the differences between nationalism and patriotism. Lord Acton has 
suggested that nationalism is merely physical and patriotism is more moral (1972). 
Richard Aldington, the English poet concurs (1950): ‘Patriotism is a lively sense of 
collective responsibility. Nationalism is a silly cock crowing on its dunghill’. And 
George Orwell agrees that they are not the same phenomenon too, albeit in different 
ways: 
 
Nationalism is not to be confused with patriotism. Both 
words are normally used in so vague a way that any 
definition is liable to be challenged, but one must draw  
a distinction between them, since two different and  
even opposing ideas are involved. By ‘patriotism’ I mean 
devotion to a particular place and a particular way of 
life, which one believes to be the best in the world but 
has no wish to force on other people. Patriotism is of its 
nature defensive, both militarily and culturally. 
Nationalism, on the other hand, is inseparable from the 
desire for power. The abiding purpose of every 
nationalist is to secure more power and more prestige, 
not for himself but for the nation or other unit in which 
he has chosen to sink his own individuality (1968, 
p.362). 
 
Whereas Elie Kedourie (1993) argues the opposite and suggests that nationalism has 
greater moral credentials than patriotism, which is based on a superficial sentimentality. 
He argues that patriotism is a mere emotional underpinning of nationalism, which is 
$+!" 
understood as a political ideology or theory. And aside from these commentators, 
Soutphommasane presents another perspective here: 
 
Many consider the two terms as belonging to two 
distinct historical traditions of political thought, and as 
expressing very different ideas about membership. It is 
argued that the language of patriotism is drawn from 
republican thought, and concerns the love of common 
liberty and the practice of good government, while the 
language of nationalism descends from the spiritualist 
romanticism and is used to justify cultural homogeneity 
(2012, p.5). 
 
One other way of resolving this debate and distinguishing between nationalism and 
patriotism is to distinguish between what the object of love is in each case. Arguably, 
both nationalism and patriotism involve love of and attachment to a certain entity. What 
we could do is to separate out the entities, namely nation and patria. As Primoratz 
suggests: In the case of patriotism the entity is the patria, one’s country; in the case of 
nationalism that entity is natio, one’s nation in the ethnic/cultural sense of the term 
(2007, p.18). In this way nationalism and patriotism are not distinguished by the 
strength or the nature of the beliefs associated with them, but are more usefully, 
distinguished in terms of their objects. 
 
 
However, a more useful distinction may be that nationalism is quite different to 
patriotism in its nature. Nationalism is a political cause as opposed to patriotism, which 
is an emotional attachment to one’s country. It seems quite plausible, as argued above 
with regard to Wales, that one could be a Scottish patriot without being a Scottish 
nationalist. Nationalism is a political movement; patriotism is not. And as Billy Bragg 
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argues whilst nationalism is clearly a political movement there are different kinds of 
beliefs associated with this nationalist cause (2006, p.6): 
 
There are clearly two different strains of nationalism. 
How else do you account for the diametrically opposed 
policies of the far-right British National Party and the 
left-of-centre Scottish National Party? While the BNP 
campaign vociferously for an end to immigration, the 
SNP are currently calling for an increase in migration  
to Scotland to help reverse the country’s alarming 
declining population. The BNP declares on its website 
that it exists to ‘secure a future for the indigenous 
peoples of these islands in the North Atlantic which 
have been our homeland for millennia’. The SNP’s 
stamen of values on its website could not be more 
different. It begins: ‘No one country and no human  
being is worth more or less than any other’. 
 
These strains of nationalism are clearly different but they are both recognisably strains  
of the same phenomenon, that is nationalism which is a political movement for self- 
determination. Nationalism can be understood as the actions that the members of a  
nation take when seeking to achieve (or sustain) self-determination. Nationalism aims to 
lead to the creation and maintenance of a fully sovereign state. Patriotism does not. 
Patriotism is love of one’s country rather than a political movement towards sovereignty. 
Archard (1999) concurs: 
 
Patriotism is love of country or nation, and this love is, 
in terms of the ideal, prescribed to act in certain, often 
self-denying and self-sacrificial ways, on behalf of one’s 
country. Nationalism is, as a political theory, a 
normative claim about the proper sovereign statehood 
and that states are political communities, which should 
be bound together by a single national identity: states 
should be nations and nations should be states (p.159). 
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Where does this get us to in term of how we define the term country in any common 
understanding of patriotism? The argument above has attempted to show that the term 
‘country’ in any definition of patriotism quite evidently refers to more than landscape or 
lifestyle. The term patria is political as well as geographical. It should also be clear 
from the discussion above that loving a country is more than merely loving a 
constitution but that national and cultural dimensions are crucial to it too. Let us return 
to Callan’s definition of country as ‘a certain kind of territorially concentrated, 
intergenerational community to which the patriot belongs and whose survival and 
prosperity she values deeply’ (2006, p.533). This definition of country seems to satisfy 
all the conditions - geographical, cultural, historical and political - outlined above. 
Furthermore, it allows for the fact that there is something continuous or constructed 
about the idea of a country as a nation. Callan’s definition is not just about national 
preservation. He allows for an intergenerational community working together to  
actively value a nation’s ongoing prosperity. This is important. Nation building is by 
definition a construction but nonetheless important or significant for that (John White, 
1993). We may love a country for what it is, or was or could be. We can also love the 
ideal of a country. Contemporary Palestinian patriots and anti-apartheid South African 
patriots during the apartheid era (1948 – 1994) come to mind here. 
 
 
One’s country 
 
Loving any country is not patriotism. I may love Denmark more than the UK in many 
ways but I could never describe myself as a Danish patriot because, quite simply, I am 
not Danish. So what do we mean by loving one’s country? In what sense is the country 
mine? The core ideas of membership and belonging are important here. At its most 
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minimal there is something about automatic membership by dint of being born 
somewhere or a default position of belonging somewhere through parent’s nationality or 
citizenship. I was born in Nairobi, Kenya but both my parents are British. Although I  
can honestly say that I love Kenya I have never thought of myself as Kenyan in any 
serious way, especially as we left when I was nine years old. I have no sense of having a 
Kenyan national identity. I am a British citizen. For example, I know that if I am 
working overseas temporarily and I die, my body would be repatriated to the United 
Kingdom. No choice is being exercised here. 
 
 
Both Primoratz and Soutphommasane, want a narrower, qualified definition of 
patriotism, and see the need to be explicit about ‘identification with’ one’s country is a 
fuller sense than the view that the country is simply ‘one’s’ through membership of it. 
The phrase ‘loving one’s country’ is too open and vague for these scholars. In their 
qualified definition of patriotism, both imply an element of declared membership or 
conscious belonging involved in being patriotic; in other words, a patriot would actively 
defend her membership of a country or declare her belonging publicly (clearly not the 
same thing as political activism). And stronger still, a patriot would surely be content to 
be associated with her national community in some way. She may even want this. 
 
 
Whether her love of her country constitutes a fundamental part of her identity, however, 
is quite another matter altogether. Charles Taylor, along with Primoratz and 
Soutphommasane, argues that patriotism involves ‘an identification with’ one’s political 
community (Taylor, 2002, p.2). What does it mean to identify with something? Does it 
mean that as patriots we have a shared identity? Ben-Porath (2006) argues that while 
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there are some advantages to it there are also significant problems with the idea of the 
formulation of any citizenship as identity: 
 
Regarding oneself as a member of a nation by identity, 
and not by virtue of interest or choice, is conducive to 
political cooperation among members of the national 
community. […] [However] democratic societies are 
better served by a public and educational focus on what 
citizenry shares as related to individuals’ fate rather 
than to their personal or communal identities (p.27). 
 
She argues that we are in a unique set of circumstances and place that bind us together. 
The shared fate notion does not ‘describe membership as evident but rather as an 
individual and communal, interpretive project that is a central aspect of civic life’ (2006, 
p.29). The assumption here is that these national affiliations are necessarily provisional 
rather than rigid and that patriotism understood as ‘identity’ implies something more 
rigid. 
 
 
Arguably though, Taylor, Primoratz and Soutphommasane are suggesting the terms 
‘identification with’ in compatible ways to the idea of shared fate. They are not arguing 
for identification as something that is essentially constitutive of my identity, in the sense 
that I may identify with England in the sense that I think that I could not really be me if  
I were not English. They are arguing that patriotism involves a strong identification with 
the fate of that community. Whatever happens politically or nationally affect me too. As 
Taylor puts it: 
 
Patriotic love means more than an adherence to a 
converging set of moral principles; it is about a common 
allegiance to an historical community (op. cit. p.3). 
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However, whilst this may be convincing as one view of patriotism, it is quite plausible 
that someone could love her country whilst maintaining a very weak identification with 
an historical community or having very little connection or compassion for her 
compatriots. Furthermore, a patriot’s love may not involve adhering to a set of 
converging moral principles as Taylor states above. The minimal patriot we described 
above falls into this category. This patriot pays her required taxes and takes great 
pleasure in aspects of national life but does not see any burden of responsibility falling 
upon her and does not in any meaningful way identify with the country or her 
compatriots. It seems quite reasonable to suggest that this patriot’s country is hers 
through membership and belonging alone. Primoratz and Soutphommasane, as well as 
Taylor in this instance, are narrowing the definition of patriotism in order to arrive at a 
definition of acceptable patriotism in their view. However, for the purposes at arriving 
at a core definition of patriotism itself the notions of identification and allegiance that 
have been added to refine the definition are superfluous. Thus we can be satisfied with 
the notion of a country simply being ‘one’s’ for the purposes of our core definition. 
 
 
A defence of the traditional definition: love of one’s country 
 
Having examined each of the components of an understanding of patriotism, it seems 
that there is no case for qualifying and narrowing the most common definition, love of 
one’s country. The traditional dictionary view stands. It has been argued here that love 
can be distorted, steadfast, learned, lost, and subject to will and judgement. It can also 
motivate us to actions that may feel beyond our control as well as to conscious acts of 
self-sacrifice. However, as we stated above: to love something means that a person 
derives pleasure from the object of love and that there is a strong feeling of attachment 
$+)" 
to it and, as such, the broad concept of love is adequate to cover patriotic love. And by 
accepting Callan’s definition of ‘country’ we have an idea of country that needs no 
further qualification in relation to patriotic love either. If a country is ‘a certain kind of 
territorially concentrated, intergenerational community to which the patriot belongs and 
whose survival and prosperity she values deeply’ (2006, p.533), this seems to satisfy all 
the necessary conditions; geographical, cultural, historical and political. There does not 
seem to be any need to add any qualification about the fact that the term country 
comprises compatriots too. Furthermore, the minimal sense of what is means for a 
country to be ‘one’s’ will suffice for our core definition of patriotism. The idea of 
membership of a country, in the sense of officially belonging to that country, is enough 
to convey the sense that patriotic love is not love of any country but one’s own country. 
The qualifications and adaptation of the definition of patriotism that some important 
scholars have undertaken do not serve us in arriving at this core definition. Their work 
does however, provide important contributions to the question: what does it mean to 
love your country well and in the context of liberal democracy (Callan, 2006). This is 
the issue to which we shall now turn. 
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CHAPTER 3: WHY DOES LIBERAL DEMOCRACY NEED 
PATRIOTISM? 
If we are to develop a case for patriotic education in state schools in liberal democracies 
it is an important step to examine the value of a patriotic citizenry to liberal democratic 
nations’ flourishing. Therefore, the claim that liberal democracies need patriotism in 
order to survive and flourish in the modern world will be examined and defended in this 
chapter. It will be argued that patriotism does not have intrinsic value but that patriotism, 
when well conceived, contributes necessary instrumental value to modern liberal 
democracies. The arguments suggesting that patriotism is essentially an anti-liberal 
concept are set out and defeated. The chapter concludes with the view that thriving 
liberal democracies depend on a patriotic citizenry. 
 
 
The starting point of this chapter is to explore the qualities of liberal democratic 
citizenry in order to judge what patriotic belief and behaviour may or may not add to 
these. The chapter will then examine some arguments questioning whether patriotism 
and liberal democracy are indeed compatible in any way. This is followed by an 
examination of the different kinds of relationships between liberal democracy and 
patriotism. These include: patriotism as an urgent remedial means to securing the future 
of increasingly threatened liberal democracies; patriotism as a tolerable feature of 
healthy democracies; and patriotism as essentially compatible with liberal democracy. 
Patriotism as a foundational concept in liberal democracy is also explored, as are the 
ways in which patriotism might enhance modern liberal democracies. Arguments 
propounding patriotism as an instrumental means for securing the ends of healthy 
democracy are examined in the light of those suggesting that patriotic liberal 
democracies  are  ends  in  themselves.  The  conclusion  of  the  chapter  will  defend 
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patriotism’s value to the survival as well as the continued flourishing of modern liberal 
democracies. 
 
 
What are the qualities of liberal democratic citizens? 
 
Freedom of speech, thought, conscience, private property and due process of law would 
be recognisable features of any liberal society. Protecting and enhancing the freedom of 
the individual is one of the central features of liberal governance. In the Gettysburg 
Address of 1863, Abraham Lincoln used the phrase summarising liberal democracy as 
‘government of the people by the people for the people’. This phrase still contains the 
essential features of modern democracy and therefore informs the characteristics of 
contemporary liberal citizens. Liberal democratic governments are elected and funded 
by the people. As such there are high levels of responsibility and accountability in both 
directions. Liberal democratic citizens would be expected to accept certain rights, 
responsibilities and duties, such as, paying taxes, complying with the justice system, 
participating willingly in the electoral process. Liberal citizens would be expected – and 
would expect of themselves – to follow certain rules based on reciprocity such as  
respect for others and tolerance. In return liberal citizens would expect and demand 
freedoms to make choices about how to live their lives within a broad conception of a 
‘common good’. 
 
 
Furthermore, liberal societies would incorporate protection of citizens against potential 
abuses of government - or other dominant groups within society - and provide people 
some freedoms to challenge laws and to enable them to work towards changing them.  
As such liberal citizens would typically adhere broadly to the maxim ‘live and let live’ 
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and would act to prevent themselves or other individuals being crushed  under the 
wheels of what ‘the majority’ or other ‘majorities’ want. 
 
 
As Callan states here (1997, p.18): 
 
 
The centrality of individual freedom to any recognisably 
liberal policy is incompatible with a comprehensive 
reinforced ordering of values. An authentically liberal 
moral doctrine could not dictate the content of the good 
life in all its fine detail. What liberal doctrines 
characteristically indicate is something of the style or 
manner with which we should conduct our lives,  
without insisting on the priority of any particular ends. 
 
Liberal democracies are political systems that attempt to accommodate people’s varying 
conceptions of what it means to lead a good life. They have to incorporate diverse   
groups with competing religious and moral doctrines. However, the inevitable pluralism 
within liberal democracy requires a degree of wider voluntary, social  cooperation. 
Liberal theory, according to Rawls (1993, pp.2-3) relies on ‘a willingness to propose   
fair terms of social cooperation that others as free and equal might endorse, and to act    
on these terms, provided others do, even contrary to one’s own interests’. A just (liberal) 
society is one where individuals deliberate through ‘the fair terms of social cooperation’. 
It is not sufficient however, according to Gereluk, to say that social cooperation means 
that community is constitutive of liberal theory: ‘The notion of community must be 
qualified […] in adhering to the principles of justice, and those that specifically assist 
toward the development of reciprocity and mutual respect, as citizens as free and equal 
persons under a fair system of social cooperation’ (2006, p.84). 
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Given this emphasis on individual freedoms and choice, along with a qualified notion of 
community within liberal doctrine, it may seem that patriotism with its concomitant 
expectation of an emotional attachment to the national collective may not align well 
with these values and behaviours. We shall now turn to address this. 
 
 
Minimal tolerance of patriotism within liberal democracies 
 
On the face of it liberalism and a certain kind of patriotism seem fundamentally 
incompatible in both moral and political terms. Liberalism privileges personal 
autonomy, individual liberty and self-government whereas one view of patriotism aligns 
it to permit, or encourage, a kind of tribalism where the needs of the collective majority 
trump and repress any non-conforming individual values, views or behaviour.  The 
values and dispositions associated with governance in liberal democracies typically 
include the need for neutral, dispassionate judgements and minimal state interference. 
The need for citizens to possess faculties of critical reflection, that require a high level 
of detachment, seem to preclude many kinds of patriotism. 
 
 
Kantian moral doctrine is at the bedrock of liberal political philosophy. Universalism is 
critical and would appear to rule out any notion of the moral privileges for local or 
partial attachments or exemptions that patriotism warrants. The central tenet of Kant’s 
critical philosophy is human autonomy and that moral laws apply unconditionally, and 
to everyone in the same way. So the idea that we owe more to our countrymen, or that 
we are expected by the state to have greater responsibility towards them, appears to run 
counter to the fundamental liberal idea that human rights are universal. As Wood says 
here: 
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It is an important tenet of Kantian doctrine that ethical 
duties are laid on each person autonomously by that 
person’s own reason, that the proper incentive for their 
fulfilment is the person’s own inner motive of duty, and 
that it is wrong and improper for others, or for society 
in general, to attempt to compel us to fulfil them (1999, 
p.172). 
 
Patriotic duty, with its sense of collective association – and some would say collective 
responsibility and even identity – seems to run counter to classical liberal tenets. For 
Kant, for example, morality’s concern is with the promotion of human perfection and 
happiness through voluntary conduct motivated by autonomous reason and duty. For 
Kant, morality begins with one innate right every human possesses simply in virtue of 
their humanity or rational nature – the right to freedom, or independence of being 
constrained by another’s arbitrary will. And further, 
 
To this right belongs also the right of equality – 
immunity from being bound by others to more than one 
can bind them – the right to being one’s own master,  
and the right of being “beyond reproach”, that is, 
considered to have done no wrong to others as long as 
you have not done anything to diminish what is theirs 
by right (quoted in Wood, p.173 original emphasis). 
 
On the face of it these fundamental rights are the inviolable tenets of liberalism and an 
assertion of the primacy of an individual’s rights over any claims made by any 
community, let alone a nation or patria. Other liberal moral philosophers would concur 
(for example, Rawls) and would agree that the separateness of persons, as opposed to 
fundamental human-relatedness, is the basic fact for morals. And as such, a liberal 
democrat’s primary allegiance, according to this view, should be to the community of 
human beings in the entire world rather than to her compatriots. The political form 
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assumed by these moral principles is best captured by the notions of negative and 
positive liberty (Berlin, 1958). An individual can pursue self-mastery (positive liberty) 
only through minimal state intervention (negative liberty) where laws provide a sort of 
neutral, non-aggression pact between individuals within a national community, and at 
their strongest perhaps only the duty to uphold the law protecting these freedoms. 
 
Understandably, from a classic liberal position, patriotism (as conceived in a narrow 
tribal sense) is not simply illiberal but can been subjected to severe moral criticism. 
Critics have argued that, ‘it is an arbitrarily exclusive and ultimately egocentric position, 
is incompatible with universal justice and common human solidarity, and unrestrained 
by moral considerations’ (this view cited in Primoratz, 2006, p.83). These scholars (for 
example, Kateb) have also pointed at the historical record of patriotism, which shows 
that it makes for international tension, conflict, and war. Soutphommasane suggests that 
some kinds of patriotism can be manipulated to fuel fanatical racism and to support 
dubious wars in foreign lands. Furthermore, and perhaps most illiberal of all, it can be 
used to justify government restrictions of individual liberties (2012, p.1). For all these 
reasons, several liberal scholars (although not Soutphommasane himself)  have 
suggested that it is prudent to discard all patriotism, ‘to think of ourselves as human 
beings first and last, and to act accordingly’ (Nussbaum, 1996, p.2). In one case, George 
Kateb argues that it is ‘a mistake twice over: it is typically a grave moral error and its 
source is a state of mental confusion’ (2006, p.3). He argues that a country is not in any 
way a ‘discernible collection of discernible individuals’ but is rather an abstraction ... a 
compound of few actual and many imaginary ingredients’ (ibid.). 
 
These varying ‘ingredients’ within liberal democratic states include many and 
sometimes competing conceptions of what it means to lead a good life. For this reason, 
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one of the principles of liberalism, at its purest, is to view context as irrelevant. Whereas 
communitarians argue for the primacy of context both philosophically and politically, 
liberals argue for the neutrality of government amongst the competing conceptions of 
the good life in order to respect persons as free and individual selves capable  of 
choosing their own ends. The central tenet of Rawlsian liberalism is the importance of 
impartiality through the application of the veil of ignorance in arriving at liberal 
regulations, which also looks entirely incompatible with the inevitable partiality that 
love for one’s country and compatriots involves, especially in liberal democracies with 
high levels of immigration and diverse ethnic populations. This neutrality and 
detachment is also important, for some scholars, in terms of acquiring one’s moral 
principles. Whereas for communitarians, like Alasdair MacIntyre (1986) patriotism is an 
essential moral virtue, one’s societal context - or moral community - is the very source 
of morality. As Primoratz (2006, p.7) states here: 
 
On the liberal view where and from whom I learn the 
principles of morality is just as irrelevant to their 
contents and my commitment to them, as where I learn 
the principles of mathematics is irrelevant to their 
contents and my adherence to them. For MacIntyre, 
where and from whom I learn my morality is of decisive 
importance both for my commitment to it and for its 
very contents. 
 
This distinction goes to the heart of the contradictions between classical liberalism and 
patriotism understood as a necessary and foundational civic virtue. 
 
 
However, not all liberals deny the importance of community and surely a core liberal 
principle would be to tolerate patriots living within any liberal democracy. Furthermore, 
only the most extreme laissez-faire liberals would argue that being part of a democratic 
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polity involves no sense of belonging or attachment to a civic community at all. Many 
liberal scholars of a more moderate persuasion argue that some form of civic 
responsibility, beyond a non-aggression treaty, is certainly not contradictory to liberal 
principles (for example, Williams, 1985). Many liberal scholars suggest that it is a 
requirement to secure the flourishing of liberal democracies. The proto modern liberal 
theorist, Rawls himself, gives community a central place in modern liberal theory 
according to several scholars (for example, Gereluk, 2008, Wood, 1999). According to 
these scholars, liberals value community and see them as a meaningful part of many 
people’s lives. Communities per se cannot be judged either good or bad. A liberal 
conception of community, according to Gereluk, ‘provides an evaluative mechanism for 
discerning communities that may be detrimental’ (p.177). As she states here: 
 
The basic structure of society is underpinned by the fair 
terms of social cooperation. Liberal theory identifies 
reciprocity and mutuality as necessary communal 
dispositions for the stability of a well-ordered society. 
[…] Communities must observe the constraints of  
justice … [and] respect and protect individual interests. 
 
Whilst these scholars may not embrace patriotism as an important virtue, idea or 
practice worth having or inculcating within liberal democracies, they would certainly a.) 
tolerate patriots and b.) agree that some notion of a moralised sense of community and 
citizenship is not only acceptable but part of what it means to be a liberal democracy. 
Rawls’ liberal theory can be understood as implying a form of political community. 
 
 
The inculcation of civic virtue in liberal democracies is important and necessary, 
according to these scholars. However, they would be likely to stop short of accepting 
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patriotism as a principle of liberalism and also deny its remedial value in preserving 
liberal democracies. 
 
Can liberal democracy’s need for patriotism be justified on remedial grounds? 
 
Do our increasingly diverse democratic societies force a rethink of this position? Liberal 
democracies are faced by two, essential and related challenges. Toleration of those with 
different worldviews is one key liberal principle. However, there are opponents of 
liberalism who use this principle against it. For example, some groups seeking to 
undermine liberal democracy use the right to free speech to express their own intolerant 
views, or further, to incite hatred. The second challenge is that it is difficult to create the 
‘common’ project for individuals to coalesce around given that individual autonomy  
and choice are prized features of liberalism. Procedural liberalism, as the common 
project, appears to be too weak to inspire people’s loyalty or love. Given these 
challenges, there has been a rise in attempts, in both European and North American 
liberal democratic politics, to introduce, resurrect or strengthen patriotism and harness it 
for the preservation of a liberal agenda. Many of these attempts have been borne out of 
concerns that in the wake of mass migration and examples of home grown terrorist 
attacks on home ground, our increasingly diverse democracies need to emphasise the 
value of national solidarity more explicitly through citizenship programmes and 
immigration policies. These efforts have come from governments of different 
ideological persuasions. Some examples include Gordon Brown’s ‘Britishness’ project, 
the introduction of citizenship tests in the UK, banning the burqa and niqab veils in 
public places in Belgium and France, the USA Patriot Act 2001 in the post September 
11th context. These political decisions have usually been justified ‘in relation to civic 
solidarity  and  national  values’  (Soutphommasane,  2012,  p.2)  and  sometimes  as  a 
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pragmatic reaction to fear of the rise of more virulent and nastier forms of nationalism 
bordering on xenophobia. They are seen as preventative measures. Whatever the 
principled objections for patriotism as an illiberal concept there are those who argue that 
modern liberal democracies are in a state of crisis and argue that some form of 
patriotism is needed to preserve them in the light of mass immigration, external threats 
and the centrifugal forces of pluralism (Callan, 1997). In short, patriotism is needed to 
save liberalism from existential threats. 
 
 
Charles Taylor goes so far as to state: ‘We cannot do without patriotism in the modern 
world’ (2002, p.2). The first part of his argument emphasises the remedial importance of 
patriotism in a world where liberal democracy is highly vulnerable to various threats. 
One of these threats, according to Taylor is inequality. As he states here (emphasis 
added):  
A citizen democracy is highly vulnerable to the 
alienation that arises from deep inequalities, and the 
sense of neglect and indifference that easily arises 
among abandoned minorities. That is why democratic 
societies cannot be too inegalitarian. But this means 
that they must be capable of adopting policies with 
redistributive effect (and to some extent also with 
redistributive intent). And such policies require a high 
degree of mutual commitment. [When this is absent…] 
this is perhaps the point at which most contemporary 
democracies threaten to fall apart. (ibid.) 
 
 
A further concern expressed by several liberal scholars (such as Callan, 1997, 
Nussbaum, 1996, Soutphommasane, 2012, Tamir, 1993 and Taylor, 2002) is the rise of 
some virulent forms of chauvinism and racism, which threaten emerging as well as  
more established democracies. Strengthening national identity and nurturing patriotism 
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is an important defence against this threat, in their view. As Taylor argues here (2002, 
p.2). 
 
The present drive towards Hindu chauvinism of  the 
BJP comes as an alternative definition of Indian 
national identity to the Nehru-Gandhi secular  
definition of India. And what in the end can defeat this 
chauvinism but some reinvention of India as a secular 
republic with which people can identify? I shudder to 
think of the consequences of abandoning the issue of 
Indian identity altogether [...]. 
 
The pressure of ever increasing pluralism within liberal democratic states, and greater 
cross border power in the hands of global elites, are further threats. As Eamonn Callan 
argues, ‘Centrifugal forces and pressures of pluralism should make us worry about the 
durability of any overlapping conception of justice and the state needs to nourish 
associative ties’ (1997, p.10). The traditional bonds that held such democracies together 
are weakening or disappearing, he argues, and this requires even more societal solidarity 
to support democratic self-government. Taylor concurs by arguing that modern liberal 
states are very demanding ‘common enterprises in self-rule’. Liberal democracies 
require a great deal of their members and this requires ‘much greater solidarity towards 
compatriots than towards humanity in general’ (Taylor, p.2). He summarises  the 
severity of the threat thus: ‘We cannot make a success of these enterprises without 
strong common identification. And considering the alternatives to democracy in our 
world, it is not in the interest of humanity that we fail in these enterprises’ (ibid.). And 
Callan adds a further warning, (1997, p.96) ‘Even if pluralism does not transform 
democracy into a kind of tribal warfare, democracy may yet perish through a process of 
affective withdrawal as citizenship becomes a tedious distraction from the real business 
of living’. 
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However, from a part of the word where national existential threats are all too real, 
Israel and Palestine, Yael Tamir warns against justifying nationalism or patriotism on 
remedial grounds. She argues that, whilst providing a remedial justification one might 
bring about a good outcome, there are dangers in pursuing this route. Whilst 
acknowledging that Tamir’s examples come from a context where the state of Israel, 
and the stateless Palestinians, experience frequent violence, she suggests one always 
needs to find universal justification for the compatibility of liberalism and nationalism 
otherwise remedial actions will always rely on contingent features of a particular 
country’s needs and there can be dangerously illiberal consequences in pursuing this 
route. Likewise, arguably, there could be illiberal consequences in harnessing the short 
term benefits of patriotism to serve the survival needs of liberal democracies by 
suspending or compromising some core principles. For example, the USA Patriot Act 
2001 dramatically expanded government powers to stop and search, to conduct secret 
searches of communication, homes, and medical and financial records 
(Soutphommasane, p.2). 
 
 
Liberal democracy’s reliance on pre-political, civic bonds 
 
However, whilst the arguments above suggest that patriotism is needed as a response to 
existential threats to liberal democracies, it can also be argued that liberal democratic 
states have always relied on pre-political bonds between their members. In other words, 
the ends of liberalism have always needed some form of civic bonds to be instrumental 
in these ends. The kinds of democracies that liberal democrats are striving to create, that 
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is, free, democratic, willing to some degree to share equally, require strong, arguably 
patriotic, identification on the part of their citizens. As Taylor argues: 
 
A citizen democracy can only work if most of its 
members are convinced that their political society is a 
common venture of considerable moment, and believe it 
to be of vital importance that they participate in the 
ways they must to keep it functioning as a democracy. 
This means not only a commitment to the common 
project, but also a special sense of bonding among 
people working together in this project (2002, p.120). 
 
More authoritarian states can rely on forms of coercion to mobilise citizens. However, 
liberal democracies need citizens to commit and respond voluntarily and spontaneously. 
This level of response is both necessary and not easily achieved without some kinds of 
identification with common causes, and national ones at that. Taylor and Callan defend 
the role of patriotism is serving the ends of deliberative democracy which needs trust. It 
is the affective dimension that patriotism brings that builds the necessary bonds, they 
argue. This does not preclude critical engagement in a liberal democracy. In fact, Callan 
would argue that these bonds, which build trust, serve the necessary process of critical 
engagement. 
 
 
So, whilst the remedial arguments for liberalism’s needs for patriotism may be too 
costly, patriotism can be viewed as instrumental in serving the needs of liberal 
democracies and, according to this line of argument, can be theoretically and universally 
defended as such. Liberal democracies do not need a mere ‘boost’ of patriotism to 
support their survival in a crisis but, arguably, they invariably need patriotic citizens for 
their essential flourishing. Could the citizenry’s love for the national community be, in 
principle, a necessary component of a fully flourishing liberal democracy? 
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We do not have to embrace full-blown communitarianism to acknowledge the 
importance of social relationships in liberal democracies. Within liberal scholarship 
there is acknowledgment at various levels of the importance of social relationships and 
the importance of interaction within democratic life. Bernard Williams states that any 
human being is embodied and lives a social life (1985) and sums up where liberalism 
differs from communitarianism when he suggests that liberals have ‘a shared 
requirement to live rather than a requirement to live a shared life’ (p.115). Charles 
Taylor argues along similar lines when he defends the notion of the autonomous, self- 
determining individual within liberalism but acknowledges the requirement for the 
individual to function within a social matrix (Taylor, 1985, p.14). The question remains; 
what kind of social matrix and is patriotism, in principle, critical to the formation of this 
matrix? 
 
 
Pre-political civic bonds 
 
There is a substantial body of political theory that has articulated the civic dimensions  
of liberalism – and who would not necessarily see the need for patriotic attachments in 
liberal democracies. Individual liberty and public justification needs some measure of 
civic bonds amongst the citizenry, it is argued (Macedo, 1995, Mason, 1997, Rawls, 
1971). This idea has a long tradition. Mill’s concept of ‘fellow feeling’ is invoked as 
necessary for the success of a liberal polity: ‘It, and it alone, will sustain the acceptance 
by the citizenry of the state’s constitutive principles of justice, will motivate their 
allegiance to its rule of law and define the democratic public culture in which all must 
participate’. 
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Some commentators have described two kinds of bonds between citizenry; thick and 
thin which may or may not be described as patriotic bonds. Social matrices in this ‘thin’ 
conception of community are essentially legally-based, participatory and procedural. 
Dianne Gereluk (2006) describes these as Gesellschaft communities requiring minimal 
interactions other than those needed for economic and political necessity and perhaps 
individual advantage. Proponents of this view would maintain their belief in the value  
of individual autonomy but they would also have to acknowledge that the notion of 
autonomy within liberal democracies is important but already circumscribed in many 
ways. Even within this ‘thin’ conception of community, there are necessary limits to 
individual freedoms in light of other liberal values of fairness, mutual respect and 
reasonableness, for example. Furthermore, there will be limits to individual freedoms 
when liberal societies have to protect their own pre-conditions and as a result laws limit 
the choices and behaviours of illiberal groups of racists or mafia members and so on. 
And, self-evidently, the kind of self-direction that characterises liberal democracies 
requires some collective decision-making that necessitate compromises and some 
surrender of individual autonomies. As Tamir suggests (1993) property rights, press 
freedoms and rights of association all require a fine and at times messy set of 
compromises. 
 
 
Furthermore, and as a result of acknowledging the limits of individual autonomy that 
this entails, proponents of the thin notion of community within participatory liberal 
democracies also take a measured stance on the notion of impartiality within liberalism. 
But  how  far  can  the  idea  of  impartial  detachment  be  taken  without  it  becoming 
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impossible? To argue that there is a perfect Archimedean point from which to make 
entirely rational and detached judgements would involve liberals becoming overly 
detached. And if the idea of liberal neutrality were taken to extremes we would be left 
with a potentially very destructive and unmanageable culture of legalism and conflict. 
Neutrality is not apolitical. 
 
 
The thin notion of community and social interaction within liberal democracies raises an 
important point of principle in relation to the nature of liberal principles. Arguably there 
is nothing contradictory in maintaining liberal principles of generality, universalizability 
and impartiality whilst maintaining their particularity in a local or even national 
community. As Stephen Nathanson (1993) argues, the conflict between impartiality and 
partiality, the universal and the particular, is not as deep as it may appear. As he argues 
here: 
 
Morality allows for both types of considerations, but at 
different levels. At one level, one is often justified in 
taking into account one’s particular attachments and 
commitments, including those to one’s country. At 
another, higher level, one can and should reflect  on 
such attachments and commitments from a universal, 
impartial point of view, delineate their proper scope and 
determine their weight. It turns out that universal, 
impartial justice allows everyone to be partial to their 
own within appropriate limits; universal human  
concern is best promoted if everyone takes care first of 
their own (cited in Primoratz, 2006, p.96). 
 
Here Nathanson is suggesting that participatory democracy is well served by some kind 
of arguably patriotic common civic concern. Fair play and tolerance do not exhaust the 
possibilities of dispositions that liberal democrats can ask of their citizens; a sense of 
well-judged and critical partiality to compatriots is, arguably needed too. And David 
$!&" 
Miller concurs suggesting that good citizenship within democracies must be reciprocal 
and requires two things. ‘First, citizens must know who their fellow citizens are and 
must expect them to act as citizens. Second, each must know enough about the others to 
know which outcomes are ones that they could possibly accept or not…’ (1995, p.10). 
So, in sum, even in light of a ‘thin’ notion of community, the condition for a successful 
participatory model of democracy is a strong identification with the fate of that 
community and the community in question here is the national one. 
 
 
This raises the question about just how ‘thin’ this sense of community actually is – and 
indeed just how thin or thick it needs to be to serve the ends of liberal democracy. 
Rawlsian liberalism’s duty of fairness, and each individual’s moral duty to abide by  
laws and to act as reasonable and rational citizens, arguably involves some fairly strong 
sense of a moral community. It seems clear that civic bonds are needed for liberal 
democratic flourishing. What is not yet fully argued is whether these civic bonds are 
stronger and contribute more if they are patriotic bonds. 
 
 
The concept of civic republicanism arguably captures the idea that successful liberal 
democracies depend on an essential element of some degree of national belonging as  
felt by the citizenry. As Sandel argues: ‘The notion of liberty depends on self- 
government and self-government requires citizens capable of deliberating about the 
common good, capable of sharing meaningfully in self-government and self-rule’ (cited 
in Phineas Upham, 2002, p.101). It is worth pausing here to consider whether a defence 
of these pre-political bonds take us into communitarian as opposed to liberal territory. In 
ideal terms, what the liberal holds is that the highest political good is freedom. But the 
liberal  might  concede  that  community  loyalty  is  needed  to  make  freedom possible 
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because it binds people together into a common liberal project. Community is 
instrumentally valuable for the traditional liberal. By contrast, communitarians hold that 
community, or what the community values, is the ultimate political good. Community is 
intrinsically valuable. Some communitarians may even value the fact that we have built 
up a democratic system in our community (democracy is part of the British way of 
doing things, say). But the reason why communitarians value democracy is because it is 
our way of doing things. It is perfectly possible to take a kind of patriotic pride in our 
democratic system. And Alistair MacIntyre, the proto communitarian, for example, 
argues that patriotism is actually the foundational virtue in thriving democracy (1987). 
 
 
The communitarian defence of patriotism cannot be swallowed whole if we are to 
maintain a defence of the value of patriotism for the survival and flourishing of 
specifically liberal democracies. According to the communitarian view the individual is 
not independent of her community and as such can have no sense of moral right and 
wrong independently of her community. She can only become a moral agent when 
informed as such by her community. So an individual can only thrive as a moral agent  
as a member of a community and her identity is inextricably bound up with the 
community’s traditions and collective hopes and so on. According to MacIntyre this 
kind of patriotism allows for patriots to shape their country’s political institutions 
towards its ‘true’ nature and aspirations. This line of reasoning accords, to some extent, 
with some other defenders of patriotism as one of the cornerstones of a good, 
functioning liberal and democratic society (Soutphommasane, 2012, Primoratz, 2006). 
But MacIntyre parts company with them when he makes it clear that there are some 
aspects of love of and commitment to a patria that require a kind of uncritical stance. 
Some if its ‘large interests’ are beyond critical scrutiny and MacIntyre admits that true 
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patriotism involves a ‘fundamentally irrational attitude’ (op. cit. p.13). Placing anything 
as important as patriotism beyond critical scrutiny does indeed rule out a defence of 
patriotism along communitarian lines for its place within liberal democracies. 
 
 
Civic bonds as liberal patriotic bonds 
 
Callan, for one, does not want to place patriotism beyond political scrutiny but he does 
argue there is a parasitical dimension to some claims that underplay the importance of 
pre-political bonds of trust and shared values and that in fact liberal democracies depend 
on shared bonds and sense of attachment to country and each other in order to flourish 
(2006). This line of reasoning is plausible and suggests that there is a foundational, 
ethical importance to social relationships within liberalism. Arguably, Rawls’ principle 
of justice as fairness is moral not just a modus vivendi and that the principle of the good 
of a well ordered society is a desirable, collective end. This suggests that the kind of 
social cooperation that Rawls describes in fulfilling the principles of justice and 
conception of the good require a conception of ethical communities. The social 
cooperation required for enacting the principles of justice and fairness describes socially 
coordinated activity not merely social association. This in itself implies a ‘thick’ sense 
of moral community rather than one based on necessary exchanges for legal or 
procedural decisions. And Callan, along with others, would argue that, whilst Rawls and 
others do not use the language of patriotic bonds they are in fact relying on them for the 
successful functioning of liberal communities. Viroli makes the point explicit by 
suggesting that ‘patriotism, well understood, is the foundation of a healthy, dynamic, 
open liberal society’ (1995, p.9). 
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This line of reasoning suggests that some form of patriotism might be a more valuable 
component of liberal democracy in its ability to require and engender collective moral 
responsibility and shared ownership of the structures and processes of democracy. As 
Primoratz (2004) states: 
 
In a democracy, sovereignty rests with the people. […]  
It is the people who are ultimately responsible for those 
laws and policies. When they are unjust or inhumane, 
the moral responsibility for the injustice or inhumanity 
lies with the people. […] If I am a full-fledged citizen of 
a democracy, I have a reason to show concern about 
such laws and policies different and, other things equal, 
stronger than my concern about immoral laws and 
policies of other countries. For they are laws and  
policies of my polity, designed and put into effect on my 
behalf too. They generate collective responsibility of all 
citizens, myself included. (Cited in Kleinig et al, 2015, 
p.1). 
 
Marcia Baron concurs and calls for ‘an expanded understanding of patriotism as a 
special concern for the flourishing of one’s own country, including its “moral 
flourishing’ (1989, p.75). The concern for the moral flourishing of one’s country, she 
suggests, should be seen as an additional manifestation of patriotism, and one that  
should make it even more acceptable to adherents of universal, liberal morality. And 
Martha Nussbaum argues along similar lines suggesting that giving ‘one’s sphere  
special concern is justifiable in universal terms’ (1996, p.12). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Patriotism has been defended in this chapter as an important component in the survival 
and flourishing of liberal democracies. The remedial argument for giving liberal 
democracy  a  much  needed  boost  of  patriotism  given  the  existential  threats  many 
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democracies feel themselves to be living under have been dismissed. These arguments 
fail on two counts. First, some of the remedial arguments can be accused of deploying a 
crude version of patriotic loyalty, which justify illiberal practices in order to defend the 
longer-term goal of preserving liberal democracy. Second, they do not give sufficient 
weight to the continuous instrumental value of patriotism within any flourishing liberal 
democracy. Civic bonds are important for liberal democracy’s flourishing and it has 
been argued that democratic politics is impossible without some sense of trust and 
loyalty among citizens. As Soutphommasane argues: ‘Why else would you listen to 
other individuals and groups in your society, or cooperate with them, unless you could 
assume that all parties share at least some common goals and aspirations?’ (2012, p.33). 
These important civic bonds rely on a form of patriotic attachment and serve liberal 
democracy well. 
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CHAPTER 4: WHAT KIND OF PATRIOTISM IS NEEDED 
FOR  FLOURISHING  LIBERAL DEMOCRACY? 
It has been established in Chapter Two that patriotism is love of one’s country and a 
patriot can be described as someone who has a deep emotional attachment to a nation, 
which they recognise to be their homeland. This chapter examines the different forms 
that the nature, form and precise object of this love can take. A tribal, xenophobic, 
fascist patriot may love her country as much as a social democratic civic patriot but, to 
use Callan’s term, they may not love their country well (2006, p.527). A constitutional 
patriot believes the political form of her country is the object of love whereas a 
MacIntyrean communitarian believes that her national community to be the source of 
her very moral identity. The work of this chapter is to assess several forms of patriotism 
and then to describe and defend a kind of patriotism that best contributes to liberal 
democratic survival and flourishing. Some forms of patriotism are easily ruled out, as 
their qualities are destructive of liberal democracy, or can be dismissed as essentially 
illiberal. Tribal, blind or belligerent patriotism will be examined briefly and dismissed, 
as will trait-based patriotism. Several kinds of patriotism have defensible characteristics 
and aim to promote liberal democracy’s survival and thriving. This chapter will  
examine the following defensible versions of patriotism: constitutional and civic 
patriotism; liberal nationalism and patriotism as a national cultural dialogue. These 
versions of patriotism will be examined for the way and extent in which they are the  
best kind of patriotism possible in promoting the health of modern liberal democracies. 
 
 
The chapter concludes that there are many commendable features in constitutional or 
civic patriotism, namely; its compatibility with liberal values, its instrumental value, and 
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its integrity in relation to the kind of love of country expressed. However, it will be  
found wanting for two reasons. First, it fails to acknowledge the potency of national 
culture and the pre political bonds that a vibrant modern democracy relies upon. Second, 
it emphasises the unifying civic dimensions of the modern liberal polity, which aim to 
minimise the centrifugal force of diversity, to the detriment of proper recognition of 
minority groups. This, it will be argued, makes it inadequate to the task of serving the 
liberal democratic cause as well as possible. Liberal nationalism will be examined as a 
version of patriotism that does give explicit recognition to the role of the national  
cultural community in serving the ends of liberal democracy. Its many commendable 
features will be examined but it too will be found lacking in some important respects, 
including its inadequate response to the effects of mass migration and effects of 
increasingly complex multicultural national cultures. 
 
 
The version of patriotism that shall be defended, as that which best serves liberal 
democracy in the face of current challenges, adopts many of the features of civic and 
liberal nationalism but adds an important dimension: cultural difference is regarded as a 
political resource and of intrinsic value. This version of patriotism encourages different 
groups to give public expression to their distinctiveness and takes the form of a practice; 
a public dialogue of collective interpretation. Whilst liberal patriots and liberal 
nationalists give central importance to deliberative democracy as a means of negotiating 
differences, it is only this cultural version of patriotism that gives enough motivational 
force for the necessary participation in this important democratic dialogue. It does this 
by understanding the national culture as pluralistic in its very character and loveable as 
such. The maintenance of this diverse national culture involves citizens being motivated 
to participate in the public realm not only by their political responsibility but by their 
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sense of attachment to their national community through their cultural recognition and 
their sense of personal belonging as well. This version of patriotism views national 
culture as an outcome of politics as well as a means to the achievement of political 
justice. 
 
 
Tribal patriotism that threatens liberal democracy 
 
Patriotism is a many-faced phenomenon and some of its forms serve to undermine or 
destroy liberal democratic values. There is one face of patriotism as vice, a dubious 
form of loyalty that can only be described as racist. Our contemporary experience offers 
many examples of love of country being used to fuel racist violence. For example, in 
2006 four white men repeatedly stabbed an Afghan immigrant, who had fled the Taliban 
regime, outside a London tube station. They laid an England flag over his dead body 
before running off. Billy Bragg describes this incident in his book The Progressive 
Patriot and he goes on to describe how the fact that people like this, along with his 
observation of the growing phenomenon of the National Front party in the 1970s made 
Bragg question his own patriotism. 
 
Any residual patriotism I harboured was eventually 
knocked out of me by the sight of neo-Nazi National 
Front marching through the streets in the 1970s, using 
the Union Jack as a symbol of their bigotry. The image 
of football hooligans rampaging through foreign cities, 
chanting my country’s name, didn’t help either. If these 
people were patriots, as they claimed to be, then I knew 
for sure that I wasn’t (p.9). 
 
However, as the book title suggests, Bragg has reclaimed his patriotism since the 1970s 
and has embarked on a project to rehabilitate patriotism in support of a progressive 
cause. Bragg is a different (better) kind of patriot to the neo Nazis who can still, 
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however, be described legitimately as patriots, given that they claim to (and probably do) 
love their country. Eamonn Callan describes this kind of bad patriotism as ‘not a case of 
misplaced love or lack of love – but a case of departure from the proper conduct of love’ 
(2006, p.530). 
 
 
This sort of tribal patriotism involves two kinds of errors with the same root cause. The 
first involves a kind of delusion about the object of your love. England is, and has been 
for millennia, a nation comprising many ethnic groups as a result of migration and 
conquest. The proper conduct of love involves honesty about the beloved and clearly the 
neo-Nazis patriots are not being honest about this fact. The second error involves a kind 
of love that ‘sets a false god above the dignity of individual human beings which alone 
deserves our moral reverence’. As Callan states: The fatal error of those who revere a 
quasi-deified nation is not their love of country but their idolatrous disregard for the 
proper reverence for human lives both within and outside the nation’ (op. cit. p.531).  
The root cause of this error is also about the proper conduct of love. Idolatry – in the 
sense Callan uses the term here – involves deifying the object of love, which will   
always involve some departure from the truth. This is a kind of blindness. In the case of 
the 2006 murder described above, this false worship involved viewing immigrants as an 
existential threat to the deified nation and had terrible consequences for the Afghan man. 
The neo Nazi patriots love their country but value tribal loyalty  and  defence  over 
honesty or respect for other people and in some cases the lives of others. This is a case  
of loving badly and as such clearly fails to meet the requirements for the kind of 
patriotism being advocated in support of progressive and just democracy. 
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Blind patriotism: our country right or wrong 
 
Another kind of patriotism that may be ruled out is the state-led variety advocated first 
by Machiavelli in the 16th century when he advises leaders (princes) to ‘break promises, 
to deceive, to dissemble, and use violence, sometimes in cruel ways and on a large scale, 
when political actions require such actions’ (1518 (1998), p.515). He continues: 
 
When the safety of one’s country wholly depends on the 
decision to be taken, no attention should be paid either 
to justice or injustice, to kindness or cruelty, or to its 
being praiseworthy or ignominious (ibid.). 
 
In this extreme form of state-led patriotism the interests of one’s country are supposed  
to override any moral considerations. According to Machiavelli (1525 (1906), Vol. 1, 
p.175) some citizens of Florence were willing to sacrifice their souls for the sake of  
their city. Whilst this kind of love of patria is extreme, various manifestations of it in  
our modern world are, perhaps not as rare as one might hope. ‘Our country right or 
wrong’ captures the essence of this kind of blind patriotism. Although the original 
quotation, 'Our country! In her intercourse with foreign nations, may she always be in 
the right; but our country, right or wrong'16 is more nuanced, the thrust of the argument  
is clear. Whilst there is nothing in this version of patriotism to contradict our core 
definition, it is ‘a love of country’ that is exclusive, uncritical and unconditional. Not 
much more needs to be said of the appropriateness of this kind of patriotism, as it 
amounts to a rejection of liberal morality as well as a departure from the proper conduct 
of love. “Our country, right or wrong” ‘cannot be right’ (Primoratz, 2006, p.7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!* Attributed to Stephen Decatur, a US naval officer, in an after dinner speech in c.1816. 
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Trait-based patriotism: loving one’s country only for its loveable qualities 
 
The kinds of tribal or blind patriotism described above require patriots to love their 
country because it is their country. Trait-based patriotism is a kind of love of country 
that requires patriots to love their country because it has loveable qualities. Trait-based 
patriotism results from one’s experience of particular qualities or traits that your country 
happens to have. It involves love or pride in one’s country’s achievements or qualities. 
A patriot of the former kind will resort to the special values and merits of her country 
when asked why she is a patriot. A British patriot may identify with her country’s sense 
of tolerance and fair play and a French patriot may identify with her country’s 
revolutionary republican ideals, for example. This kind of value-based patriotism seems 
more reasonable than the egocentric and immoral nature of tribal or blind patriotism. It 
seems entirely plausible that one could be expected to love something with loveable 
qualities. Or as Edmund Burke commented, ‘To make us love our country, our country 
ought to be lovely’ (1790, Para 130). It also might seem reasonable to suggest that one 
could cease to love something if these loveable qualities are lost. If Britain lost all its 
sense of fair play and tolerance it might very well be hard to maintain one’s love for it – 
if indeed this was the reason one loved it in the first place. 
 
 
However, there are some problems with this view. Loving a country is not the same as 
loving a brand of chocolate or wine for example. It would be quite understandable if one 
ceased to love the chocolate or wine if it lost the beloved qualities and changed beyond 
all recognition through, say, new ownership or as a result of updating a brand. Some 
British patriots might say that the neo-liberal policies pursued by the current  
government in the UK threaten the heart of British culture; the fundamental values of 
the country they love are being undermined. It might feel to these UK citizens that they 
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feel like they are living under an occupation (new branding, new management). But this 
should not – if one is to argue that good patriotism involves loving your country well – 
mean these patriots cease to love the UK. Many black South African patriots continued 
to love South Africa during the apartheid years, when, arguably, their country was under 
occupation. These patriots continued to love their country for what it was and what it 
could be again. They do not cease to love it because it has lost some of its loveable 
qualities. 
 
 
If a patriot loves their country because it has praiseworthy features it seems to be the 
values or an ideal, not the country itself, which are the objects of love. If this is the case, 
a trait-based patriot has to be concerned with any country that has similar values. As 
Soutphommasane (2012, p.20) suggests here: 
 
Let us say that the impartial patriot values her country 
(P) because it embodies certain features (say because it 
is a liberal democracy). If her country and another (Q, 
which, let us say, is not a liberal democracy) were to 
exchange features, it follows that the impartial patriot 
should then support Q rather than P. 
 
Leaving aside, for now, whether there can be such a thing as an impartial patriot, it does 
seem odd at the very least that patriotic love is only based on ideal, loveable qualities. I 
may love Denmark and its political values but I cannot reasonably describe myself as a 
Danish patriot. Loving one’s country seems to demand more than this. The proper 
conduct of love, again to use Callan’s helpful phrase, involves two features that are 
absent from this kind of trait-based patriotism. The first is that patriotic love involves 
something that transcends temporary disaffection. Suppose one of the qualities that one 
loves about your country is blemished or threatened. Some British patriots may view the 
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neoliberal policies of the current UK government as an erosion of an equitable welfare 
state funded by progressive taxation policies. A just social welfare system may be a 
beloved quality of their country. However, if they cease to love their country as a result 
of current policies this would seem to contravene the normal conduct of love. Loyalty 
through thick and thin describes love of one’s country more aptly. Love of the ‘proper’ 
kind may involve some genuine sadness; heartbreak even; active opposition perhaps. 
The phrase “My country, right or wrong; if right, to be kept right; and if wrong, to be set 
right” 17 may seem apt to patriots that love their country well. The second absent feature 
is that trait based patriotism seems to privilege that which is loveable in some objective 
sense above that which just is. If all the things and people we love had to possess 
qualities that are somehow objectively loveable we may find very little to love. Real 
countries, as opposed to ideals of a country, are always going to have some unlovely 
features. This does not make them unlovable. 
 
Belligerent patriotism: love of country that comes at too high a price 
 
The phrase ‘belligerent citizenship’ describes the kind of patriotism that emerges when 
democracies feel threatened and suggest that it manifests as a growing sense of patriotic 
unity, a growing support for security measures even when they conflict with civil 
liberties and a reduced tendency to deliberation (Ben-Porath, 2006). Belligerent 
citizenship, Ben Porath argues, can be viewed - although she does not - as advantageous 
for a society in times of war or other kinds of existential threat because it helps the 
citizens survive the hard times and respond to them constructively. It fosters a mutual 
sense of belonging and supports endurance during hard times. ‘This is an attack on all 
 
!$ Attributed to Carl Schurz (a German revolutionary and later US congressman) in 1872. 
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Americans’ declared President Bush in one of his first responses to the September 11 
attacks and shortly after the attacks declared that ‘our people are together and we will 
prevail’ (cited in Ben-Porath, p.13). A sense of solidarity, and a common cause are 
regarded by political psychologists as part of the required attitudes for enduring an 
intractable conflict. As Bar-Tal (1996, p.24) notes: 
 
The purpose of beliefs in unity is to provide a sense that 
all members of the society support the goals of the 
conflict and their leaders. They act to strengthen the 
solidarity and stability. … [A] lack of unity, on the other 
hand, creates the polarization and internal tensions  
that hamper the struggle with the enemy. 
 
The patriotic unity that is a distinctive feature of belligerent citizenship comes at a price 
as it often carries some problematic consequences, for example, the viewing of minority 
groups with suspicion. Note some of the negative treatment – some violent - towards 
Arab Americans after the September 11 attacks. During the so-called Global War on 
Terror, ‘Arabs and Muslims have come under increased scrutiny, serving as targets for 
public and institutional scorn in which they have often fallen victim to discrimination 
and hate crime (Parker, 2009, pp.97-8). 
 
There are many recent examples of this kind of ‘responsive’ or ‘reactive’ patriotism in 
mainstream liberal democracies in response to what may be characterised as various 
existential threats: mass migration, globalisation and terrorism. David Cameron, the 
former Conservative UK Prime Minister, called for a rejection of a doctrine of 
multiculturalism in favour of ‘muscular’ British values18. In April 2011, the French 
parliament introduced a ban on wearing the burqa and niqab in public places after 
 
!% Comments made in a speech at Munich Security Conference, 5 February 2011 
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Nicolas Sarkozy, the President at the time, instigated a debate about what it meant to be 
French. The practice was not confined to Conservative leaders. The former Labour  
Prime Minister, Gordon Brown in 2007 introduced a debate on ‘Britishness’ in the wake 
of the deadly attacks on the London Underground by British born  self-proclaimed 
Islamist terrorists. He also coined the then controversial phrase ‘British jobs for British 
workers’ as part of a campaign to reduce reliance on immigrant labour in the UK. The 
USA Patriot Act, passed after the September 11 attacks, significantly increased 
government powers to, for example, carry out secret searches of people’s 
communication, homes, and medical and financial records (Soutphommasane 2012, p.2). 
 
It is clear that this kind of special, ‘generated’ patriotic solidarity fulfils a remedial 
purpose in being seen to protect some aspects of democratic society when they are seen 
to be under threat, as argued in Chapter Three above. The cost, however, is arguably too 
high for the continued flourishing of liberal democracies. As Ben-Porath says here: ‘A 
sense of unity can generate alienation among members of groups that do not feel that 
they are appropriately represented in the public political discourse’ (op. cit. p.17). A 
concentration on the common enemy, for example, phrases used by politicians such as, 
‘An attack on all Americans’; ‘we are all Jews’; ‘native Britons are under attack’19, is a 
weak kind of solidarity. As Ben-Porath says here (p.21): 
 
 
First, this unity is thin, elusive and exclusionary, and 
therefore cultivates intolerance toward various sub 
groups. […] This cost is mainly borne by minorities,  
who are either excluded from the national solidarity or 
refuse to participate in the rites of patriotism. It  is 
borne by democracy itself. This kind of social unity and 
 
 
!& ‘An attack on all Americans’ - President Bush 2001; ‘We are all Jews’ - cited in Ben Porath p.17; 
‘Native Britons under attack’  - Nick Griffin of the English Defence League. 
$#+" 
solidarity comes at the cost of political stagnation – an 
inability to envision and support change in the political 
circumstances. 
 
It is recognised that wartime – or indeed other kinds of existential threat – creates a need 
to protect democratic values and practices whilst responding to the particular challenges 
of the threat or war. In several Western democracies, a certain notion of solidarity has 
shaped public responses to cultural diversity and perceived threats from outsiders. As 
Soutphommasane says: ‘ [Here] Liberal citizenship is seen as something to be protected 
from subversion by certain minorities, even if this should mean illiberal outbursts or 
heavy handed public policy’ (op. cit. p.3). Generating a belligerent citizenry by 
exploiting understandable feelings of insecurity is not, however, an adequate response to 
the perceived or indeed real threats to liberal democracy. Although this kind of muscular 
or belligerent patriotism can certainly include a demonstrable love of one’s country and 
serves some remedial ends to a genuine crisis in many liberal democracies it is clearly 
incompatible with, and will also serve to undermine, liberal values. Battening down the 
hatches in some way may actually serve to exacerbate the threat to liberal democracy as 
may be demonstrated by recent attacks in Brussels by Belgian nationals acting on behalf 
in the so-called Islamic State (March 2016). 
 
 
Constitutional and civic patriotism 
 
One response to counter the moral dubiousness of tribal patriotism, and which avoids 
the limitations of trait-based patriotism and the threats to liberal values of belligerent 
citizenship or engendering patriotism though falsifying sentimentalism, is constitutional 
patriotism. This form of patriotism aims to detach patriotic loyalty from the dominant 
culture thereby making allegiance to the community a political kind. Jürgen Habermas 
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is the original proponent of this view (Verfassungspatriotismus) and has argued that 
patriotism can be legitimate in liberal democratic contexts so long as it is directed at 
universalist-oriented political constitutions (1989; 1999). Thus the patriotic allegiance 
becomes independent of an individual’s ethnic or cultural origins. Arguably, many 
patriots in the USA love the constitution in this way. Cecile Laborde (2002) comments 
on constitutional patriotism noting that: 
 
… the relationship between patriotism and cultural 
diversity is problematic only if, as in  nationalist 
rhetoric, the focus of patriotic loyalty is the dominant 
culture. If, instead, patriotism is seen as fostering 
citizens’ commitment to the ‘abstract procedures and 
principles’ outlined in the constitution, it becomes 
compatible with a variety of cultural beliefs and 
practices (2002, p.593). 
 
 
So by this view, as Ferry states here: The social bond in a liberal-democratic state  
should be ‘juridical, moral and political, rather than cultural, geographical and 
historical’, (1992, p.174). By this view then citizens need not share a bond based on a 
shared history or, religion, mother tongue, or culture. It is sufficient that citizens share 
membership of a political community defined by liberal civic values and practices. As 
Soutphommasane expands: ‘This may involve identification with a love of liberty as 
embodied in the laws and institutions…it may involve a post nationalist allegiance to 
the norms, values and procedures of a liberal democratic constitution’ (2012, p.6). 
 
Whilst the focus, in relation to constitutional patriotism, is by definition the political 
constitution of the country, Habermas himself did not go quite so far in recommending 
allegiance to abstract principles alone. He acknowledged that constitutional patriots must 
show ‘loyalty to the common culture’ not simply to abstract principles (1994, p.134) and 
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more recently (1998, p.308) he has defined constitutional patriotism as a ‘patriotism 
based upon interpretation of recognized, universalistic constitutional principles within 
the context of a particular national history and tradition’. Constitutional patriots do not 
uncouple politics and culture entirely. Indeed, it is not possible to uncouple politics and 
culture in any neat form and there are a host of positions on the so-called spectrum 
between the ‘civic’ and the ‘ethnic’ pole of national identity. And although it is safe to 
argue that constitutional patriots argue for ‘thinner’, more political, social bonds between 
citizens focusing on what we share and do together rather than what we essentially are 
(Laborde, p.598), they - at least those who read Habermas’ proposition carefully - 
nonetheless acknowledge that citizens can share a commitment to universal principles 
and to the particular institutions which enact them. 
 
However, there is a remaining resistance to include the broad culture and ways of life 
within a narrow version of a constitutional patriot’s normative definition of national 
identity. According to this view ‘regardless of whether citizens feel they do indeed share 
these things (or even ethnic traits), liberal-democratic governments would be wrong to 
appeal to them as legitimate bases for social cohesion’ (Laborde, p.598). There appear to 
be several reasons for this resistance. First, there is only a very thin notion of common 
culture in plural democracies given the variety of ways of life within them. Second, this 
diversity means that voluntary patriotism does not seem likely and thirdly, the promotion 
of a stronger common culture would appear to threaten essential liberal values. 
 
This version of patriotism, by directing the love of country towards the legitimate 
constitution and promoting commitment to moral and judicial achievement of a society 
rather than nationalism overcomes some of the challenges of types of patriotism 
discussed  so  far.  However,  it  has  its  own  limitations.  One  very  practical  and 
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straightforward criticism comes from Callan. He argues as follows: ‘If a political 
constitution is the object of love then one cannot be a republican and a patriot in 
Canada20 but in USA patriotism requires republicanism and liberalism’ (2006, p.537). 
Furthermore, Kurds or Palestinians cannot be patriots by this definition because they 
have no state, and as such, no constitution. Within the UK, the Welsh and Scots do not 
have their own constitution or their own sovereign governments. Their constitution is, 
whether they like it or not, the constitution of the UK. So, on the constitutional view, 
this would mean that if you are, for example, a Scottish patriot you should love and be 
loyal to the UK constitution. The problem with this literal interpretation  of 
constitutional patriotism is that it is inherently conservative or deferential to the current 
constitution. It is hard to see how one can be a constitutional patriot and still want one’s 
country’s constitution to change or at least, change radically. But then Callan makes the 
point that ‘if a country is loved well then the question of whether the constitution befits 
that love is irrevocably open’ (op. cit. p.537). This line of argument suggests that a 
country is substantially more than its political constitution and it would be quite 
legitimate, required even, for a patriot to love it even if the constitution (currently) 
lacked worthy, lovable qualities. 
 
 
Arguably, constitutional patriots may make the legitimate retort that this is a somewhat 
wilful narrow interpretation of the constitution. However, perhaps a more significant 
criticism may lie in constitutional patriotism’s limitations in acknowledging the very 
important ties between the political and the cultural. For Habermas ‘the identity of the 
political community … is primarily anchored in the political culture and not on an 
ethical cultural form of life as a whole’ (1998, pp.513-14). Any democratic right to self- 
'+ Although Canada has a Constitution Act, (1982) parts of the constitution itself remain unwritten 
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determination ‘includes the right to preserve one’s own political culture, which forms a 
concrete context from right to citizenship, but it does not include the right to self- 
assertion of a privileged cultural form of life (ibid.). But as Soutphommasane argues, 
Habermas elsewhere seems to be defending a much more explicit connection between 
the political and non-political identities. Habermas contends that ‘ethical-political 
decisions are an unavoidable part of politics and their legal regulation expresses the 
collective identity of the nation of citizens’ (1994, p.125). 
 
 
Whilst this version of patriotism has much to commend it in relation to contributing to 
liberal democracies flourishing it is not as full an account of ideal patriotism for this 
purpose as it could be. A more explicit acknowledgment of the ways in which citizens 
have attachment to each other - in all their diversity - as well as the polity is required. 
Arguably what is needed to sustain a liberal political community is an explicit 
recognition of the need for a shared national identity - which is multicultural - among 
citizens motivating reciprocity and co-operation. And whilst constitutional patriotism 
attempts to avoid any imposition of identity or excluding those that do not confirm to a 
single ethnic group, there does seem to be an attempt to manage differences as neutrally 
as possible rather than viewing difference as an asset in a modern liberal democracy. 
 
 
A version of patriotism where the object of love is broader than the constitution but 
remains essentially political rather than explicitly ethnic or cultural is civic patriotism. 
According to this conception of patriotism compatriots, as well as the constitution, are 
the objects of patriotic love in the form of moral duties or associative obligations. In 
constitutional patriotism the collective identity becomes ‘based on public interpretations 
in the light of norms, rather than on “pre-political” criteria’ (Müller, 2007, pp.31-32), 
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whereas civic patriotism may be expressed as a common love of liberty (Viroli, 1995, 
p.102) and its key component is arguably that of participatory self-rule. The distinction 
between the two kinds of patriotism (constitutional and civic) is a fine one but as 
Soutphommasane outlines, civic patriotism or as he classes it, republican patriotism ‘is 
concerned with restoring the basis of patriotism in a political love of the republic, rather 
than in the universalistic principles of a constitutional culture’ (2012, p.64). And as 
Viroli adds, any national solidarity should be based on ‘good government and well- 
ordered participation in the many instances of civil society and in the political decision- 
making process’ (op. cit. p.176). People identify with their compatriots because they 
belong to the same polity, not primarily because they share a history or culture. 
 
This conception of patriotism can be traced back to some of Kant’s writing and also, 
arguably, has roots in Rawls seminal work Theory of Justice (1971), although it is 
important to note that Rawls does not use the language of patriotism. It is argued here 
that his theory of justice in fact amounts to a defence of civic patriotism. As, these 
philosophers are the forefathers - albeit from different centuries - of modern liberalism  
it should be evident that this version of patriotism meets the requirement of 
compatibility with liberal values. Given that the fundamental idea of Kant’s critical 
philosophy is human autonomy and that moral laws apply unconditionally, and to 
everyone in the same way, it is perhaps surprising that some philosophers (e.g. Cavallar, 
1999; Kleingeld, 2003; Wood, 1999) claim that Kant advocates patriotism as a moral 
duty. Kant’s commitment to - and defence of – civic patriotism needs to be understood 
as inextricably linked to his views of republicanism, and often in contrast to despotism, 
according to Kleingeld. (It is perhaps worth stating here that we must, of course, 
understand Kant’s comments on patriotism within the context of the 18th century and the 
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relative infancy of many nation-states. German unification and the birth of the German 
nation-state did not happen until the mid 19th century, for example). Kant does not argue 
that the existence of a state represents a limitation of freedom even though a state 
possesses power to control the external freedom of citizens through force. Kant argues 
that rather than the state being an impediment to freedom it is actually rather the means 
to freedom. By participating and exercising their rational will, within and towards state 
institutions, individuals are truly autonomous. The danger of the state coercing 
individuals to recognise their subjection to state power against their will is overcome 
since Kant defines ‘will’ as ‘practical reason itself’ (Groundwork, 4 412). Arguably then 
Kant’s view of patriotism is that it serves, and is inextricably linked to, practical reason. 
The duty of civic patriotism then is to promote the functioning and improvement of the 
republic as an institution of justice. It is not a duty simply to promote the 
institutionalization of justice in their own state but to support one’s compatriots. 
 
 
This view echoes Rawls’ view that a ‘public conception of justice’ constitutes the 
fundamental character of well-ordered human association (1971, p.4). The associative 
obligations that derive from common citizenship define and preserve major institutions. 
Importantly, the major institutions that Rawls refers to here include the political 
constitution but go further to include a well-ordered society’s ‘principal economic and 
social arrangements’ (op. cit. p.6). Members of the (national) community value these 
institutions and as such have obligations towards their preservation and to each other. As 
he says here: 
 
The well-ordered society is a social union whose 
institutionalized forms are prized as goods in 
themselves by those who grow up and live in a world 
structured by them […] The distinctive motivation of 
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principled morality is the desire to act on the natural 
duty to advance just arrangements for the good of the 
larger country (1971, pp.474-6). 
 
Civic patriotism has much in common with constitutional patriotism given its 
essentially political nature. However civic patriotism more explicitly acknowledges the 
need for social bonds and cooperation between citizens. As Laborde (op. cit. p.592) 
states here: 
 
It emphasises the motivational prerequisites of 
democratic governance, stresses the need to preserve 
existing ‘co-operative ventures’, and demands that 
existing political cultures be democratically scrutinized 
and re-shaped in an inclusive direction. 
 
Like constitutional patriotism, it promotes a mainly political identity and its mainly 
political content enables it to remain compatible with a variety of citizens’ practices and 
beliefs. Social cooperation is valuable as a means to preserving the institutions but 
remains a relatively thin ‘particularistic form [which] justifies citizens’ commitment to 
specific institutions’ (ibid.). 
 
 
So, does civic patriotism fulfil all the requirements of the kind of rehabilitated patriotism 
needed for the flourishing of liberal democracies in the early part of the 21st century? It 
certainly meets the liberal requirement as outlined above. Like constitutional patriotism, 
it minimises the prospect of unjustly imposing some sort of common identity on all 
citizens. It fulfils some of the requirements to serve as an instrumental good for the 
flourishing of liberal democracy. However, it is not entirely clear how either 
constitutional or civic patriotism can flourish without some reliance on the pre political 
bonds and trust that emerge from a national, shared history and shared national culture. 
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Liberal nationalism 
 
In the version of patriotism, described as liberal nationalism, the central place of the 
nation beyond its political form is key. Liberal nationalists are explicit in their 
recognition that where citizens have an attachment to their compatriots and political 
community, it is because there is a sense of national belonging underpinning it. Those 
who belong to a nation will have a sense of belonging together. This belief does not  
arise from nowhere. As Yael Tamir, a key proponent of this view, (1996, p.90) states: 
 
Where a sense of national belonging exists, it does so 
because people share – and critically believe that they 
share – with other nationals ‘objective’ features such as 
a distinctive shared culture, language, history and way 
of life. 
 
There are clearly dangers here. Can liberal nationalism be prevented from veering 
towards an ethnic nationalist imposition of national culture? As Soutphommasane asks: 
‘If the object of love of one’s country should be that of a community shaped by a 
national culture (and hence a particular ethnic community’s history), does that not mean 
that it must involve defending what is ultimately an ethnic identity from subversion by 
cultural diversity?’ (op. cit. p.74). But Tamir rejects the idea that national culture has to 
be essentialised as ethnicity. She argues that those who subscribe to it actively 
reinterpret a national culture. Membership of a national culture implies ‘an aspiration to 
have a communal domain that is construed not only as an arena of cooperation for the 
purpose of securing one’s individual interests, but also as a space where one communal 
identity finds expression’ (1993, p.74). Similarly, Will Kymlicka (2001, p.211) suggests 
that liberal nationalists typically ‘want a societal culture that is rich and diverse’ and 
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that borrows whatever it finds worthwhile in other cultures, integrates it into its own 
practices, and passes it onto the subsequent generations’. As Tamir argues: 
 
Why are the Jewish practices of a New York Reform 
community less authentic than those of an eighteenth 
century Orthodox community in Eastern Europe? Why 
is American-Italian culture less authentic than Italian 
culture in Milan? Is it because it is heavily influenced 
by American culture? But was not Italian culture 
influenced by neighbouring cultures? (op. cit. pp.52-3). 
 
And David Miller echoes many of the same sentiments when he argues that, 
 
 
… when assessing national identities, we need not only 
to look at what identity presently consists in - what 
people believe it means to be Italian or Japanese – but 
at the process by which it has all arisen. To the extent 
that the process involves inputs from all sections of the 
community, with groups openly competing to imprint 
common identity with their own particular image, we 
may justifiably regard the identity that emerges as an 
authentic one (1995, p.40). 
 
This deliberative, dialogical quality ensures, he implies, that national identity evolves 
more or less spontaneously. But Miller argues further, that the nation plays a largely 
instrumental role in democratic deliberation within a political community. ‘States’, he 
argues, ‘require citizens to trust each other if they are to function effectively as 
democracies; in particular if they are guided by the ideal of deliberative democracy’.  
This in turn ‘depends on common identification of the kind only nationality can provide’ 
(op. cit. p.96 and p.140). Tamir adds that one fulfils one’s national obligations ‘not 
through self-sacrifice, or by subordinating one’s well-being and interests to the welfare  
of the collective, but rather by participating in a cultural dialogue’ (op. cit. p.89). There 
are variants of the form this deliberative democratic process should take. Some suggest 
$&+" 
that it necessitates a critical stance towards established power structures (Dryzek, 2000, 
p.8). Others locate it within existing liberal democratic institutions (Guttmann and 
Thompson, 2004, p.7). Essentially, however, there is shared belief that collective self- 
determination requires open debate in which citizens address each other as equals and 
on the basis of mutual respect and that the debate is grounded in a common 
understanding of national culture (Soutphommasane, p.77). 
 
 
And for liberal nationalists the national culture is defined in terms of a public or societal 
culture. As Kymlicka argues, here: 
 
By a shared culture I mean a territorially concentrated 
culture, centred on a shared language that is used in a 
wide range of social institutions, in both public and 
private life (schools, media, law, economy, government 
etc.). I call it a societal culture to emphasise that it 
involves a common language and social institutions, 
rather than common religious beliefs, family customs,  
or personal lifestyles (2001, p.25). 
 
And there are those who juxtapose a national culture with a private one. Whereas a 
public culture involves a set of understandings about the nature of a political community 
- its constitutive principles, public institutions and civic norms - a private culture 
encompasses all those beliefs and preferences that are likely to be shared within a 
family, an ethnic group or, what Miller describes as a ‘lifestyle enclave’ (1995, p.158). 
Therefore, when a minority group seeks cultural recognition, its spokespeople need ‘to 
step outside their culture and appeal to values the wider society itself subscribes to or 
can be persuaded to share’ (op. cit. p.151). 
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It seems, then, that liberal nationalism, whilst explicitly including the nation as an 
essential and underlying feature of patriotism, has much in common with other kinds of 
liberal patriotism in the privileging of the public institution of culture and by relying on 
reasonable public debate to settle differences and to accommodate new practices. As it 
stands is it adequate enough to stand the test of being the best form of patriotism 
possible for providing the much-needed support for liberal democracies? 
 
 
It falls short in some ways. Can deliberation along with the separation of public and 
private culture lead to liberal nationalism becoming a sort of Trojan horse for cultural 
assimilation? As Young argues, the ideal of deliberative democracy offers too narrow a 
conception of intercultural dialogue because it continues to privilege an ideal of the 
‘common good’ and insists on putting aside or transcending partial or particularist 
differences’ (2000, p.108). As Soutphommasane suggests: 
 
 
Only when difference is regarded as a political resource 
– when identity groups are encouraged to give public 
expression to their distinctiveness – can there be 
dialogue that takes cultural differences seriously 
without consigning them to the private realm’ (2012, 
p.83). 
 
It is also arguable whether there is enough motivation to participate in a deliberative 
democracy when one’s minority differences are not fully recognised but rather managed 
or minimised in the common public sphere. It begs the following question: why would 
enough citizens be motivated to participate in this national dialogue? What 
Soutphommasane argues is that there needs to be a more explicit cultural nationalism 
that  recognises  cultural  differences  publicly.  This  cultural  recognition  is  both more 
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worthy and accurate but, he argues and I agree, it will also motivate fuller participation 
in this important debate. 
 
 
Patriotism as a national-cultural dialogue 
 
This brings us to the kind of patriotism that is needed for flourishing liberal democracy 
and the kind I want to defend. Patriotism that advocates cultural recognition – rather 
than minimising difference - is key to preserving liberal democracy and will contribute 
to its flourishing. Adding the notion of cultural recognition is an important addition to 
the forms of civic, constitutional and liberal nationalist versions of patriotism outlined 
above. What this addition achieves is to understand patriotism as a love of country that 
values the country’s public institutions and to view a multicultural national identity as 
an (open ended) outcome of politics. As Soutphommasane argues (2012, p.230): 
 
If nationalism denotes some relationship between state 
and nation, then cultural nationalism involves 
understanding the maintenance of a national culture as 
an end of politics (in contrast to statist nationalism, 
which views national culture as primarily a means to 
the achievement of political justice). This logic of 
cultural nationalism is a presupposition of the liberal 
nationalist argument: how else could it explain why a 
national conversation will have vital force and cohesive 
power? 
 
Immigrant cultural groups often seek rights in ways akin to the way minority  
nationalists seek self-government rights. As such the approach to recognition advocated 
here goes beyond mere tolerance of diverse groups and beyond the assertion of an 
individual right against discrimination on national, racial, ethnic or religious grounds. 
Soutphommasane again (op. cit. p.45): 
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Rather there must be public endorsement of cultural 
identities by the political community; there must be a 
positive role on the part of the state to respect cultural 
identity and ensure equal treatment for members of 
minority groups. Multiculturalism derives from a 
philosophical idea about an individual’s flourishing 
being tied to their recognition by others. 
 
Charles Taylor, along similar lines suggests that ‘we define our identity always in 
dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our significant others want to 
see in us …Our identity is in part shaped by recognition or its absence such that a 
person can suffer real damage, real distortion if the people or society around them  
mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves 
(1994, p.25). Demands by minority groups for the recognition of their cultural identity 
necessarily challenge a political community to reflect as much on its own values and 
practices as those of the minorities seeking recognition. 
 
 
So if there is something real at stake – genuine recognition of a right, or achievement of 
a legal compromise, or agreement that a requested change in the law is denied – there is 
serious motivational value in this conception of a public patriotic dialogue. Clearly not 
all desired rights of all minority groups can be acknowledged in the law and the 
practicality of achieving a public dialogue of this kind is not easy. Recognition is not by 
any mean guaranteed. There will be struggles and disappointments and compromise – as 
well as triumphs. Public reasonableness as defined in liberal terms should trump 
unreasonable demands. But love still plays an important part. Otherwise we would be 
satisfied with advocating civic virtues rather than patriotic ones. This dialogue requires 
patriotism defined as a generous, constant, imaginative, yet critical love of country. This 
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adds an important affective dimension to the practice but does not descend into 
Galston’s more sentimental approach to instilling patriotism (1991, See Chapter 5). 
 
 
Patriotism as a national-cultural dialogue builds on other liberal forms of patriotism. In 
one sense it could be argued that civic patriotism relies on social and cultural bonds 
rather more than it admits and that liberal nationalism is just a more explicit articulation 
of that. It could also be argued that much of the content of constitutional patriotism - 
and liberal nationalism - involves deliberative debate and public dialogue. Although 
constitutional patriotism emphasises the political form of the nation it cannot operate in  
a national vacuum – and no constitutional patriot would claim that. 
 
 
What a national-cultural patriotic dialogue adds is to suggest that any modern liberal 
democracy is inevitably multicultural and its national identity is enriched by this fact. 
This is not to deny a nation’s shared history, language and culture. The dialogue 
advocated here needs to be conducted in the language broadly defined by a national 
tradition. The advocacy of a national-cultural dialogue is to be explicit about the fact  
that liberal democratic nation’s cultures and identities are inevitably forged through 
deliberation, dissent, compromise, assimilation of minority groups, integration of ethnic 
groups and - over time - the wholesale adoption of some immigrant values and practices. 
Given the current crisis in some forms of liberal democracy and increasing numbers of 
alienated citizens it seems timely to invigorate this national-cultural debate. And to be 
clear, this is not intended as a means of integrating minority groups. It is of benefit, it is 
argued here, for all members of the nation. A national project that reflects on the content 
and character of national identity itself and sees it as a collective act involving 
interpretation in an open ended, generous, imaginative, critical way appears to capture 
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the best of civic and liberal nationalist patriotism, whilst giving it some vital force. This 
will not happen spontaneously and involves a significant degree of nation-building 
though education and other public policy. As Ben-Porath argues: 
 
Working to preserve rather than contain diversity is an 
educational aim that can better be met  through 
teaching citizenship as a form of shared fate […] 
Learning to conceive of citizenship as shared fate can 
cultivate a more open and inclusive form of national 
affiliation. In a way that may initially seem 
contradictory, the pluralistic and open-ended nature of 
this form of nationalism can in fact be more unifying 
than the more rigid conception of nationalism as 
identity […] The aspects of the actual and conceptual 
network that holds society together are open to change 
and evolvement (2006, p.26 and p.120). 
 
This is a defensible and much needed version of patriotism. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored a number of kinds of patriotism. Some of these have been 
easily dismissed as illiberal or not serving the needs of liberal democracy well; blind, 
tribal and trait based forms. The version of patriotism that was ultimately defended, as 
that which best serves liberal democracy in the face of current challenges, adopts many 
of the features of civic and liberal nationalism but adds the dimension that cultural 
difference is regarded as a political resource and of intrinsic value. This version of 
patriotism takes the form of a public dialogue of collective interpretation. Whilst, it was 
seen above that liberal nationalists also give central importance to deliberative 
democracy as a means of negotiating differences, it is only the cultural version of 
patriotism that gives enough motivational force for the necessary participation in this 
important democratic dialogue. It has been argued that it does this by understanding  the 
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national culture as pluralistic in its very character and loveable as such. The  
maintenance of this diverse national culture involves citizens being motivated to 
participate in the public realm not only by their political responsibility but by their sense 
of attachment to their national community through their cultural recognition and their 
sense of personal belonging as well. This defensible and worthwhile version of 
patriotism is needed for liberal democracy to flourish and as such has instrumental value. 
Whilst it is not argued here that patriotism is intrinsically valuable, this version views a 
multicultural national culture as a worthwhile outcome of politics as well as a means to 
the achievement of political justice. 
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CHAPTER 5: IS PATRIOTIC EDUCATION COMPATIBLE 
WITH  LIBERAL EDUCATION? 
Thus far a version of patriotism has been outlined and defended that contributes well to 
modern liberal democratic survival and flourishing. Patriotism, which takes liberal 
democratic national culture as open and pluralistic and loveable as such, it is argued, 
gives motivational force for necessary participation in deliberative liberal democracy. 
This kind of patriotism takes the form of a collective, national dialogue where the 
desired outcomes remain, to a significant degree, open. In this chapter it will be argued 
that this requires relatively high levels of participation from educated citizens and is 
predicated on some form of patriotic education. It is commonly claimed that liberal 
education and patriotic education are necessarily incompatible. It is the job of this 
chapter to set out and defeat arguments that suggest that liberal education in state 
schools is incompatible with some form of education involving the acquisition of 
knowledge, skills, values and dispositions that cultivate a sense of national sentiment 
and prepare students for participation in an interpretive national-cultural dialogue. 
 
 
A liberal education that, rightly, sets a high bar of rationality, reasonableness, 
independence and impartiality does not seem immediately compatible with an education 
for patriotism, which, amongst other things, is aimed at partial attachment and geared 
towards instilling love for a national community. In order to show that there is a 
possibility – and even desirability – of patriotic education within a liberal education 
framework, this chapter begins by setting out the essential characteristics of liberal 
education. It then outlines the arguments suggesting that patriotic education is 
necessarily illiberal. Finally, it defeats these arguments thereby paving the way for a 
conception of progressive patriotic education 
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that aims to benefit students in state schools and liberal democracy more generally. 
 
 
 
Two broad conceptions of liberal education: education that ‘liberates’ and 
politically liberal education 
It is important to state at the outset that there are different forms of, and aims for, liberal 
education just as there are different forms of liberal democracy. And furthermore that it 
can be somewhat hijacked to convey different meanings for different ideological 
purposes. As Paul Hirst suggests (1974, p.30): 
 
The phrase ‘liberal education’ has today become 
something of a slogan which takes on different  
meanings according to its immediate context […] 
Whatever else a liberal education is, it is not a 
vocational education, not exclusively scientific 
education, or not a specialist education in any sense’ 
(original emphasis). 
 
This chapter explores two broad conceptions of liberal education. The first conception is 
essentially apolitical and equates liberal education with education that aims to liberate, 
both individuals and the mind itself. There are divisions within this broad conception of 
liberal education. For some commentators, this conception of education allows only for 
the teaching of academic subjects. For others, academic disciplines are privileged but 
there is a role for some aspects of moral, emotional and character education too. 
However, this view is explicitly apolitical. The second broad conception of liberal 
education is associated with politically liberal education. There are divisions within this 
broad conception too. On the one hand, there are those who propose that schooling must 
remain neutral about any form of comprehensive doctrine, whilst inducting children into 
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essentially Rawlsian liberal principles. Others, within this broad conception, argue that 
the liberal democratic state has a role and a responsibility to nurture good citizens. 
 
 
The chapter concludes its discussion by suggesting that there is no irreconcilable  
conflict within either of these two conceptions of liberal education and arriving at a 
broad inclusive definition is quite possible. It is concluded that liberal education can 
justifiably nurture certain aptitudes and dispositions beyond academic disciplines. 
Children can be taught how to live to some extent. Furthermore, children need to be 
helped to navigate knowledge to uncover truth in rather more direct ways than Hirst 
suggested in 1974. It is also concluded, in relation to liberal political education, that a 
genuinely liberal education should prioritise the development of a capacity for self-rule 
and enhance an individual’s freedom to live a good life and, as such, this kind of 
education can permissibly inculcate certain values and behaviours. The liberal neutralist 
view is rejected. But, it is argued here, a liberal civic society aims not to simply ‘echo 
the patterns instilled by others, whether by parents or the state or some other party’ 
(Soutphommasane, 2012, p.168). Liberal education ultimately aims to eliminate the 
possibility of manipulation of beliefs. 
 
 
The chapter then turns to an analysis of ways in which patriotic education may be 
commonly viewed as opposed to this conception of liberal education. Four aspects of 
potential incompatibility with patriotic education are explored, namely: the 
indoctrination problem; the distortion problem; the requirements of global justice (or 
cosmopolitanism) and the claim that patriotism should be taught as a controversial issue 
in liberal state schooling. The chapter concludes with a rebuttal of each concern given 
the emerging conception of patriotic education being proposed here. 
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The first broad conception of liberal education: liberating education 
 
Liberal education as apolitical and purely academic 
 
One of the most extreme conceptions of apolitical, ‘liberating’ liberal education, the  
first broad conception, suggests that there is no place for any kind of formal education  
in anything other than the pursuit of academic knowledge and ideas. This kind of liberal 
education would eschew any kind of state soul craft or character education assuming 
that, through the relentless, uninhibited pursuit of knowledge and truth the liberal 
character would be assumed and developed. According to this view, any explicit 
promotion of particular character traits, even liberal ones, would undermine the  
essential purpose of education which is to allow students to access and assess  
knowledge rigorously and freely.  State control over curricula would also be anathema  
to this conception of liberal education given its inevitable, constraining agenda. This 
view of liberal education is propounded by, for example, Claire Fox, who is the director 
and founder of the think tank the Institute of Ideas, an institution dedicated to the 
promotion of free speech. This view suggests that transmission of knowledge is of 
paramount importance and this may, or may not, lead to people leading richer and fuller 
lives. Responsibility for improving the quality of life is beyond what education can or 
indeed should take on, according to this view. 
 
 
Apolitical liberal education as characterised by Hirst and Peters 
 
The version of liberal education outlined above certainly has strong echoes in the work 
of Paul Hirst and Richard Peters but differs in its explicit absence of what could be 
described as moral development or cultivation of habits of the mind that ensure children 
lead a good life. But like Fox, Hirst and Peters agree that any truly liberal education 
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should also be essentially apolitical and that education is needed ‘whose definition and 
justification are based on the nature and significance of knowledge itself, and not on the 
predilections of pupils, the demands of society, or the whims of politicians’ (Hirst, 1974, 
p.32). Liberal education in this view is the ultimate form of education and the only  
limits to it are imposed by ‘those necessarily imposed by rational knowledge’ (op. cit. 
p.43). Basing liberal education on a foundation of rational knowledge, according to this 
view, serves the twin purposes of providing freedom for the mind which allows 
individuals to pursue their own good and also to guarantee a level of objectivity which  
is an important bulwark of liberal values. This objectivity is achieved when ‘what is 
being justified is both ‘intelligible under publicly rooted concepts and is assessable 
according to accepted criteria’ (ibid.). Hirst states this further here: 
 
For it is a necessary feature of knowledge as such that 
there be public criteria whereby the true is 
distinguishable from the false, the good from the bad, 
the right from the wrong. It is the existence of these 
criteria which gives objectivity to knowledge; and this  
in turn gives objectivity to the concept of liberal 
education (ibid.). 
 
This view of liberal education is predicated on an understanding of certain forms of 
knowledge, to use Hirst’s own term, which amount to a publicly derived and accepted 
‘framework of knowledge’ (op. cit. p.50). These forms of knowledge are the essential 
articulation of all human experience to date and, as such, both an achievement of the 
human mind and also the source of future endeavour and exploration. 
 
 
What this amounts to is a suggestion that education should provide children with 
opportunities to seek knowledge, which in turn will reveal truth. This truth in turn 
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should enhance our capacity for good. And this is where Hirst and Peters part company 
from Fox. Acquiring knowledge is the means by which we develop as critical, rational 
beings and expand our minds through the proper acquisition of knowledge. As he says 
here: 
 
To acquire knowledge is to become aware of experience 
as structured, organised and made meaningful in some 
quite specific way, and the varieties of human 
knowledge constitute the highly developed forms in 
which man has found this possible. To acquire 
knowledge is to learn to see, to experience the world in  
a way otherwise unknown, and thereby to come to have 
a mind in a fuller sense (op. cit. p.41). 
 
This kind of education does not narrowly socialise children but rather initiates them into 
what it means to be more fully human. Such knowledge acquisition is based on a 
concept of truth that goes beyond uncertain opinion or temporary value. Liberal 
education, according to this view, aims to ensure that children lead a good life through 
the pursuit of academic knowledge and the cultivation of the intellect. 
 
 
Bruce Ackerman (1980, p.159) captures what this form of education might entail for 
students and by implication for teachers and policy makers: 
 
The entire educational system will, if you like, resemble 
a great sphere. Children land upon the sphere at 
different points, depending on their  primary  culture; 
the task is to help them explore the globe in a way that 
permits them to glimpse the deeper meanings of the 
dramas passing on around them. At the end of the 
journey, however, the now mature citizen has every 
right to locate himself at the very point from which he 
began – just as he may also strike out to discover an 
unoccupied portion of the sphere. 
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And part of this task, as described above, would be to support children in navigating the 
vast terrain of human knowledge and to induct them into understanding how to, for 
example, assess validity of information or to make moral judgments. Hirst 
acknowledges that there is a dialogical or conversational dimension to supporting our 
growing knowledge and cultivation of our minds. He cites Oakeshott (op. cit. p.52) 
describing education as an initiation into a conversation in which we: 
 
[L]earn to recognize the voices, to distinguish the  
proper occasions of utterance, and in which we acquire 
the intellectual and moral habits appropriate to 
conversation. And it is this conversation, which, in the 
end, gives place and character to every human activity 
and utterance. 
 
Hirst does however suggest that Oakeshott is being more literal in this passage above 
than he would like to be. Hirst sees the conversation metaphor as more a form of 
visualising the forms of knowledge themselves in some sort of dialogue.  The learner  
has to make sense of the connections and differences between these various forms of 
knowledge. According to this view it would be doing a disservice to children and young 
people - and ultimately to liberal society - to provide them with any specific political 
education. 
 
 
Liberal education: more than the unfettered pursuit of knowledge? 
 
The contribution of Paul Hirst, and Richard Peters (Hirst and Peters, 1970), to the field 
of education is viewed as seminal in contributing to debates on the nature and purposes 
of state education. However, the view that inducting children in education via the 
pursuit of knowledge alone has been challenged over recent decades by those who see 
that as too restricting a definition of liberal education. These commentators would still 
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see themselves as staunch defenders of liberal education. John White, in a paper 
critiquing the liberal education theory proposed by Hirst and Peters (2009) suggests that 
there are several problems with this conception of a liberal education, not least, its lack 
of acknowledgement that ‘the disciplines stand in need of thoroughgoing 
interdisciplinary investigation and critique. His [Peters] attitude seems to be that they 
are self-correcting and should be trusted absolutely’ (White, 2009, p.6). And 
furthermore, on a more practical level, that by demanding that children engage with all 
forms of knowledge they seem to asking an awful lot of children. It certainly raises 
many questions about how to develop this capacity for ‘self-rule’ with no imposition of 
ideas or practices in order to ensure that children ‘acquire intellectual and moral habits’ 
as Oakeshott suggests above. It is worth stating here that children’s experience of 
schooling goes beyond the formal curriculum and that any conception of liberal 
education should take account of the range of learning that schooling comprises, inside 
and outside the classroom. It should be acknowledged, at this stage, that Hirst himself 
did not preclude other kinds of education. As he says here: 
 
Certainly liberal education as is here being understood 
is only one part of the education a person ought to have, 
for it omits quite deliberately for instance specialist 
education, physical education and character training 
(op. cit. p.51). 
 
However, several commentators, including White, have argued that liberal education 
itself can legitimately include greater guidance for children regarding practical  
education or in educating for particular virtues and so on. As Hand, another defender of 
a broader conception of liberal education, says here: 
$'&" 
Inquiry into the meaning of life … is not merely an 
intellectual exercise, not an academic activity insofar as 
this implies disinterestedness and detachment from 
practical concerns. It is certainly focused on truth, on 
finding the best ‘general theory of the universe’, but it is 
equally concerned with how to live, with what  
ultimately matters and what that requires of us. It is a 
form of inquiry that makes hefty emotional and 
intellectual demands: inquirers risk losing their grip on 
their most taken-for-granted assumptions, and must be 
open to changing not only their understanding of the 
world but also the way they ‘determine themselves 
thereto’ (2014, p.9). 
 
Arguably, liberal education can have a primary focus on cultivation of the intellect 
whilst also recognising the importance of practical knowledge and education for action 
– including some kinds of induction in education for leading good individual lives and 
an understanding of what it means to be part of a wider society. The means of ensuring 
that children cultivate practical skills or virtuous dispositions or are capable of moral 
enquiry, and so on, seems to go beyond solely cultivating of the intellect through the 
acquisition of academic knowledge. 
 
 
Given the enormity of existing human knowledge and the short time children spend in 
formal education, organisational structures and criteria for selection have always been 
necessary in creating curricula and wider goals for state schooling. In liberal 
democracies public criteria for devising this policy structure or making necessary 
selections are important. Inevitably these structures and selections are made on the basis 
of values and in liberal democracies these foundational educational values are debated, 
negotiated and (variously) democratically arrived at. It is therefore quite possible that 
liberal education can retain its foundation in objectivity - as Hirst argues above – whilst 
conceptualising the educational experience beyond unfettered exploration of knowledge. 
$''" 
Arguably children need adult guidance on what truth is, on recognising truth, on 
choosing paths of inquiry, on debating reasonably contestable issues and so on. 
 
 
Educating the ‘whole person’ 
 
Some commentators, within the first broad conception of liberal education, argue that 
the education of the ‘whole person’ is a legitimate aim of liberal education and as such 
involves explicit emotional, moral and even spiritual dimensions to the curricula (see  
for example, Callan, 1997; White, 2009; Hand, 2014). And whilst there is an inevitable 
variety in the exact content of, say, moral education in any liberal democracy’s national 
curriculum we can mostly agree on its content and that we should teach this content to 
children along with the rational justification for it. It is in the interests of the individuals 
and the broader liberal society that we do so. As Hand states: 
 
For one thing, children’s lives will go better if they 
know, see the point of, and comply with, basic moral 
rules. For another, it is in the interests of everyone to 
ensure that each new generation submits to the 
authority of morality (2014, p.5). 
 
The requirement of objectivity in any liberal education is met by teaching students 
explicitly how to choose intelligently between competing perspectives on a range of 
issues and by including an engagement with the rational justification of aspects of 
content. 
 
 
And what of educating emotions? The important liberal values of, say, a capacity for 
detachment and objectivity, do raise important questions about this aspect of liberal 
education.  And  as  Hand  suggests  above,  educating  the  emotions  has  a  more  than 
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legitimate place in the curriculum; liberal education itself places ‘hefty academic and 
emotional demands on us’. Surely there is no necessary conflict between high bar for 
rationality and reasonableness, respect for telos of truth to a high degree, justified belief, 
promotion of autonomy and self-rule with a certain kind of education of the emotions. 
And in fact it is not easy to separate out what we might describe as an affective thought 
or an academic process as, say, Hirst might claim. Educating emotions is not the same  
as manipulating emotions to the detriment of an individual’s autonomy. There are many 
emotional attachments and responses that benefit children and as such good reasons can 
be found to nurture them. Children are rightly taught to care for others, respect others, 
be tolerant, develop empathy and so on. They are also taught to understand and respect 
difference. Furthermore, supporting children to manage their emotions - when and how 
to nurture them, when to give vent to them, when to suppress them, when to question 
them - is an important capability that most liberal schools would see as a duty of care. 
As Hand puts it: ‘Emotional education is defensible insofar as it consists in offering 
pupils good reasons and effective techniques for fostering or suppressing particular 
emotions’ (2011, p.4). 
 
 
What of love as one of the important emotions that liberal education must acknowledge? 
Galston, a staunch defender of one kind of liberal education, makes an interesting point 
when he states that there is some difference between teaching and instilling love of 
learning. As he puts it: 
 
Ordinary language is suggestive: we speak of “teaching” 
a subject but of “instilling” a love of learning. The latter 
typically occurs through the power of example rather 
than through cognitive  instruction.  While  Aristotle 
may well be correct that we all by nature desire to know, 
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we come to love learning in the presence of those who 
compellingly exemplify the worth of lives guided by that 
love (2010, p.1). 
 
He is suggesting here that the power of ‘compelling exemplification’ is sometimes 
greater - and as such should be deployed within liberal education systems - than 
cognitive instruction. This opens up some interesting fissures between the likes of 
Galston and those who argue that any kind of compelling exemplification may 
jeopardise the very capabilities that a liberal education is trying to cultivate (for 
example, Archard, 1999). Love is an interesting category of emotion. Love of learning 
for example does seem to be a very obvious and worthwhile outcome of any liberal 
education. Love of country may be more problematic and we shall examine this in more 
depth below where I examine the arguments against patriotism as a state school aim.  
For now, it is important to acknowledge that some kinds of affective as well as  
cognitive elements are well within any common understanding of what liberal education 
comprises. 
 
 
So, it is also clear at this point that liberal education involves engaging children with 
certain kinds of key curriculum content or school experiences that involve the 
acquisition of ideas as well as certain kinds of dispositions and capacities for enacting 
ideas. Moral and emotional education are included within this content or experience: for 
example, understanding, valuing and applying ideas of justice, tolerance, fairness and 
respect are worthy aims in any liberal education. 
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The second broad conception of liberal education: liberal political education 
 
The second broad conception of liberal education is liberal political education. Within 
this view the principles of liberalism as a political doctrine and way of life are imparted. 
There are different conceptions of the nature and extent of this political education, 
however, and the extent to which the state should take on or promote any particular 
comprehensive doctrines. 
 
 
Liberal neutralism 
 
At the extreme end of this broad camp, there are those who see the importance of liberal 
political education but who express reservations about the dangers of state sponsored 
civic education (See for example, Ackerman, 1980; Clayton, 2002; Feinberg, 1990)21. 
By this view, civic education effectively shapes - and in some ways can be seen as 
indoctrinating - children into particular kinds of citizens and as such fails as the true aim 
of liberal education, which is to promote autonomous development. It also fails in 
treating people with equal respect by promoting one worldview over  another.  The 
state’s role in education, according to this view, should remain as neutral as possible in 
relation to conceptions of the good. As such, these liberal neutralists would argue that 
any kind of civic education would in effect be some kind of justification or endorsement 
of one kind of life above another. Matthew Clayton (2002) in his work on liberal 
equality and ethics, suggests that liberalism demands that the state be neutral about any 
form of comprehensive doctrine, because it is only if the state is neutral about 
competing claims about what the good life is that it can be fair to all citizens. He argues 
that schooling can inculcate essentially liberal principles and practices only – and that 
 
'! See Mozert vs. Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F 2d. 1058 (6th circular 1987) for an 
interesting case illustrating parental views regarding alleged illegitimacy of civic education 
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this involves avoiding the promotion of any other comprehensive doctrines. Some 
liberals insist upon the protection of the realm of privacy and individual liberty 
suggesting that governments should have no authority to interfere directly with the ways 
in which children are brought up. According to most proponents of this view, it should 
be the responsibility of parents22, if not their duty, to decide how their children should 
be educated. 
 
 
Limits of the liberal neutralist position 
 
But these arguments seem weak. First, the neutralist position seems to justify the strong 
promotion of liberalism itself – which is not strictly a neutral position. And second, 
these arguments appear to rest on an implicit assumption that people will be good 
citizens and that the state has no responsibility for what it allows to happen – albeit 
negatively by not explicitly nurturing particular values and behaviours. This seems 
precarious. Most liberal commentators suggest that a stable and legitimate political  
order can be more easily sustained where there is some form of civic education, or 
means of cultivating habits of citizenship among the young. Macedo suggests that 
political order is not the product of a felicitous invisible hand but ‘rather …a 
construction for discernible collective ends and purposes, including the preservation of a 
broad swath of liberty (2003, p.5). Arguably, any liberal democratic order needs to 
ensure that its public institutions promote and secure the preconditions of engaged and 
active citizenship. According to Soutphommasane (op. cit. p.168): 
 
This is true even of minimally liberal states (which are 
concerned only with maintaining the rule of law and 
 
'' There are those who argue that parents should not impose their own world view on their young either 
and there are extensive debates on the right of children to their own opinion (see Feinberg, 1980; Morgan, 
2006). 
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protecting individual rights) and neutral liberal states 
(in which the state refrains from favouring any 
conception of good over others), let alone deliberative 
political communities characterised by mutual respect, 
public reason and patriotism. 
 
Stevens also argues against the neutralist position suggesting that  liberal  education 
should properly ‘focus on teaching for understanding and application of ideas such as 
democracy, equality, fairness, justice, rights, responsibilities, and cooperation …’ (1999, 
p.366 emphasis added). Many national curricula in liberal democratic states aim to 
develop understanding of core liberal principles, such as universalizability, fairness, 
reasonableness, autonomy, impartiality and democratic self-determination, along with 
the explicit development of key capabilities and dispositions. And Amy Gutmann (1999, 
p.288) suggests that agreement on the civic dimensions of liberal education can be 
achieved by dividing authority between the state and parents and viewing civic  
education as ‘best viewed as a shared trust of parents, citizens, teachers and public 
officials’. This protects against any one civic agenda being hijacked by any one 
government. 
 
 
There are inevitable tensions in liberal principles of self-rule and objectivity alongside 
the explicit need to cultivate liberal individuals and societies. Liberal education  
typically aims for high levels of justification and debate over what the good life means 
in the liberal state curriculum. This, however, does not negate the idea that there are 
necessary limits to individual freedoms in liberal democracies, which need to be 
understood and enacted upon by most liberal citizens. To argue that there is a perfect 
Archimedean point from which to make entirely rational and detached judgements is 
problematic and as Callan argues (1997, Chapter 2), if the idea of liberal neutrality were 
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taken to extremes we would be left with a potentially very destructive and 
unmanageable culture of legalism and conflict. State education cannot be neutral about 
promoting some core ideas and values. According to one of the founding fathers, Rawls, 
liberalism’s duty of fairness, and each individual’s moral duty to abide by laws and to 
act as reasonable and rational citizens, involves some fairly strong sense of a moral 
community (1971). Furthermore, Rawls argued for education that preserves liberal 
democracy, and as such any form of education that does this, even one including some 
kinds of state induction into citizenship is justifiable. Clayton’s view of state neutrality 
seems to fall down on this argument and further, it fails to accord enough responsibility 
to the state in terms of negative actions. The state could, according to his view, 
legitimately allow liberal democracy to weaken because of lack of good citizenship 
education. 
 
 
The idea of the nation as a moral community - and the challenge of neutrality - seems 
especially important in most modern liberal democracies with their high levels of 
diversity. The precise nature of liberal education will vary in countries where there is 
more of an assimilationist approach to diversity as opposed to policies aimed for 
integration and higher levels of retention of original cultures and appreciation of 
difference. The French education system exemplifies an assimilationist approach which 
takes as central the three values of liberté, egalité and fraternité through ‘state neutrality 
with respect to religious difference; a perfectionist state committed to individual 
autonomy; a communitarian state fostering a civic sense of loyalty’ (Soutphommasane, 
2012, p.60). The USA takes a similar approach. In the UK the state is not neutral on 
questions of religion and takes a more integrationist approach. Religious education, for 
example, in England and Wales includes the study of the world’s religions and moral 
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themes. However, the curriculum must reflect the predominant place of Christianity in 
religious life and therefore Christianity represents most of the content. Parents can 
withdraw a child from religious education, but schools must approve this. 
 
 
Interpretive, deliberative civic education 
 
What assimilationist and integrationist approaches to civic education have in common is 
the preparation of the young for life as productive and responsible citizens within their 
respective liberal democratic societies. This entails a focus on the value of, and skills to 
enact, democratic participation in order that the young are well equipped (but are not 
forced) to play an active part in society. As one set of curriculum recommendations 
expressed it (Crick Report, 1998,): ‘Young people … learn to develop their own sense  
of belonging and self-esteem’ and ‘young people need learning that enables them to 
explore, to take action, to collaborate etc.’ And in many of these curricula the means of 
delivering the curriculum, for example, via independent inquiry, questioning, research 
and critical discussions is important.  The message of the curriculum, for example,  
rights and responsibilities of individuals and societies; about principles like freedom and 
equality of opportunity; democracy, law, wealth creation and public services is learned 
through discussion, interpretation and deliberation. Furthermore, the idea that 
incommensurable ideas are an inevitable part of plural democratic culture means that  
the capacity for deliberation, critical inquiry and reflection (as opposed to an 
understanding of these ideas alone) are important outcomes of any national education 
within liberal democracies. As such liberal education is understood as interpretative, 
deliberative and to some extent open in relation to its outcomes. 
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A further, arguably more contentious, concern of liberal education is the extent to which 
education plays its part in cultivating the widespread feelings of ‘fellow feeling’ seen by 
many liberals as necessary to animate liberal democratic states (see Chapter 4). This 
takes us into interesting territory where discussion of what it means to be a citizen 
within one’s national community is pertinent alongside the aim of liberal education to 
promote equal respect for all people. Most commonly liberal civic education curricula 
will acknowledge that civic education inevitably takes places within a national context - 
national citizenship - alongside the promotion of ideas and dispositions relating to 
cosmopolitan or global citizenship. The national dimension of the curriculum is often 
seen as historically and politically important rather than the source or object of the 
fellow feeling and/or that if any feelings are to be aroused then they should be directed 
at the polity rather than the nation itself (Stevens, p.368). There is, of course, variance 
across liberal education systems about the nature of democracy and this has an impact 
on the significance of the ties that bind citizens. Arguably, where democratic education 
is seen as educating citizens for a largely representative system the significance of civic 
bonds may be perceived as weaker. Here the emphasis may be placed on civic duties 
towards the polity first and other citizens only in relation to those duties. Where there is 
stress on participatory and deliberative democratic education then emphasis on, and 
initiation into, forming civic bonds that facilitate deliberation and dialogue is likely to 
become more significant. The latter approach to liberal education does not necessarily 
amount to cultivating national sentiment but might, for example, outline what civic 
bonds or even ‘civic friendship’ might look like and design a curriculum for its 
cultivation. 
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Reconciling the broad conceptions of liberal education 
 
So, let us take stock. Thus far I have discussed two broad forms of liberal education.  
The first conception involves liberal education as apolitical and liberating. Within this 
conception there are differing views on the primacy of academic knowledge and the 
extent to which the primary educational aims are to equip students with capacity for 
navigating the options and having the capacity to judge for themselves. This broad 
conception contains differing views on extent to which liberal education privileges the 
role of academic knowledge in promoting wisdom and truth as necessary components of 
a good life. There are also debates within it about how far liberal education can provide 
guidance, including moral education and the education of the emotions. Proponents of 
liberal education within this group also debate what has been called the education of the 
‘whole person’, which amounts to greater levels of explicit inculcation of certain 
aptitudes and dispositions to equip children for a good life within liberal democracies – 
and for the sake of the liberal democratic society itself. This raises the question about 
how essentially apolitical this conception actually is. This leads us to the second 
conception of liberal education, which places political education for liberal citizenship 
much higher on the agenda. Within this group there are those who argue for the 
importance of inculcating liberal values and principles but argue against the state’s role 
in doing this. There are others that suggest that it is quite legitimate for the state to 
educate future citizens if it retains a high threshold for differing views and competing 
conceptions of the good life. Many commentators have agreed that some kind of civic 
dimension to any liberal education is perfectly acceptable, even desirable and necessary, 
within its broad conception. Most of these commentators would argue that civic 
education of this kind is, in fact, a subset of a broader liberal education. There would be 
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no conflict in teaching academic disciplines in apolitical ways alongside this kind of 
civic education. 
 
 
So, there are clearly some differences among the conceptions of liberal education 
discussed here in relation to, for example, the precise content and delivery of the 
curriculum or the extent of ‘soul’ or ‘state craft’ therein. However, reconciliation of one 
broad conception of liberal education could legitimately contain an explicitly high bar 
for the development of critical reasoning and the pursuit of truth along with the 
development of moral values, civic dispositions and abilities as well as some form of 
educating the emotions in a non-manipulative way. Liberal education needs to retain no 
tolerance for any forms of indoctrination. As such it needs to include means by which 
young people are equipped to debate and assess ideas critically. All these forms of 
liberal education have key components in common; the importance of objectivity, 
rational inquiry, acquisition of key forms of knowledge, the importance of students 
making independent and well informed choices. What they do not have in common is 
any sense that patriotic education is compatible with their aims. In fact patriotic 
education is typically met with a considerable amount of concern to many liberal 
educators. I now aim to show that neither conception of liberal education discussed 
above excludes the kind of patriotic education that I want to defend. 
 
 
Arguments claiming that patriotic education is illiberal 
 
Before setting out the claim that patriotic education is necessary for the survival of 
liberal democracy, and as such is an important element within liberal education, it is 
important to set out what the concerns are for many liberal educators. The cultivation of 
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patriotism through state schooling is often seen as not simply incompatible with liberal 
education but antagonistic to its aims. For example, as argued above, a liberal neutralist 
such as Clayton (2002) would say that, even if it could be done well, the state should 
stay out of promoting a substantive view of what is good in life and that would include 
the view that children should be taught to love their country. Others would claim that 
patriotic education cannot be done well; it is necessarily indoctrinatory (for example, 
Keller, 2005; R. Miller, 2007). Other commentators would argue for a lesser charge 
against patriotic education but nonetheless a fatal one, namely, that patriotic education 
cannot help but distort the truth (for example, Brighouse, 2006). Some liberal 
commentators suggest that patriotic education is necessarily opposed to the more 
appropriate educational aim of teaching about global justice and universal human rights 
(Starkey and Osler, 2006). And finally, Hand (2010) argues that given the reasonable 
disagreement over the benefits or otherwise of patriotism it is appropriate to teach it as a 
controversial issue. These concerns are set out below. 
 
 
Is patriotic education any more than indoctrination? 
 
Any form of education that sets a high bar for rationality, impartiality and critical reason 
has to have a good justification for elements of that education which sets out to instil 
values or promote particular attitudes and behaviours. In the forms of liberal education 
set out above there are some safeguards in place which aim to subject moral, emotional 
and civic education to the high standards of rigour akin to those within academic 
disciplines. These safeguards include providing children with objective, public criteria 
by which to make judgements, providing children with justifications for their beliefs, 
encouraging critical inquiry, providing alternative world views and so forth. It can 
certainly be argued that there is a fine line between inculcating values and behaviours in 
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children and indoctrinating them but given the safe guards in place the dangers of 
indoctrination can be avoided and arguably the line here is pretty clear. 
 
 
As Hand argues (2014, p.2): 
 
 
Indoctrination is considered a significant harm because 
of the difficulty of shifting beliefs one has come to hold 
non-rationally. Insofar as one holds one’s beliefs on the 
basis of evidence and argument, they are open to 
revision and correction. One is prepared to modify or 
relinquish them in the light of fresh evidence, or fresh 
appraisals of old evidence. Insofar as one’s beliefs are 
held non-rationally, on the other hand, they are highly 
resistant to reassessment. Because they are  not  
founded on evidence, the discovery of counter-evidence 
has little or no effect on them. …Indoctrinatory beliefs 
are generated by by-passing or subverting a child’s 
capacity to think rationally… 
 
Indoctrination is the antithesis of liberal education and can cause serious harm to 
individuals and wider society. As Wilson (quoted in Hand) puts it: ‘For here we have 
taken over, or put to sleep, a central part of the child’s personality - his ability to think 
rationally in a certain area. To put it dramatically: there is always hope so long as the 
mind remains free, however much our behaviour may be forced or our feelings 
conditioned. (Wilson et al., 1967, pp.174-5). The main defence against indoctrination is 
the ability to retain a critical reasoning faculty, which includes the will to find and 
evaluate new information about a previously held belief and the capacity to revise one’s 
views. 
 
 
There are those that suggest that inculcating patriotism in children falls into the 
indoctrination category given its potential for disengaging rational thought and lack of 
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attention to evidence. As Keller argues here (2005, p.581) ‘A society in which 
patriotism is regarded as a virtue will be one in which people, especially children are 
given special encouragement to view their country with pride and reverence and to have 
the associated descriptive beliefs supported by the relevant evidence or not’. The core of 
Keller’s argument that patriotism is likely to be a vice lies in the patriot’s non-neutral 
defence of their country’s special qualities. Keller suggests that it is acceptable for a 
parent to claim special talents for her child and to simultaneously admit likely bias. But 
if a patriot did the same, for example, by stating ‘As a patriot, I think my country stands 
for freedom and equality, but I’ll admit I’m biased’ it would ‘be difficult to hear this 
statement except as the speaker’s taking a step back from his own patriotism’ (op. cit. 
p.590). Therefore, Keller claims, the patriot will be strongly motivated to maintain her 
belief in the special qualities of her country. Patriotic loyalty will force her not to admit 
bias. Therefore, she falls into bad faith, which is morally defunct: 
 
Driven by her loyalty to country, the patriot will hide 
from herself the true nature of the procedure through 
which she responds to evidence that bears upon the 
question of what her country is really like (op. cit. 
p.580). 
 
Sartre captures the notion of bad faith in his well-known existentialist treatise Being and 
Nothingness: ‘The one who practices bad faith is hiding a displeasing truth or presenting 
as truth a displeasing falsehood’. Bad faith is an existential condition of self-deception; 
it is dehumanising because we get some illicit satisfaction in performing some of our 
societal roles (like the famous waiter who performs like a robot and seems to revel in  
his ‘performance’). But we are in fact being turned into quasi automatons because, as 
Wilson suggests above, we have put to sleep one of our most precious and crucial 
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human faculties; the capacity for critical reason. And Martha Nussbaum (1997, p.1)  
adds weight to these concerns when she argues that: 
 
One of the greatest barriers to rational deliberation in 
politics is the unexamined feeling that one’s preferences 
and ways are neutral and national. An education that 
takes national boundaries as morally salient too often 
reinforces this kind of irrationality by lending to what is 
an accident of history a false air of moral weight and 
glory. 
 
In response to critics who suggest that it is possible to teach children to objectively 
evaluate one’s country and still remain patriotic, Keller argues for the impossibility of 
this: 
 
Moving away from an instinctive attitude to your 
country of the form “This is my great/beautiful/free/ … 
country” and toward the recognition that your country, 
like any other, needs to be critically evaluated and that 
the patriotic picture of it held by you and others could 
well be illusory. In coming to this realisation, you come 
to take a perspective on your country that is too 
detached to co-exist with genuine patriotism…’ (p.584). 
 
And others agree. Richard Miller argues forcefully for the need for the US education 
system to help children urgently ‘unlearn patriotism’ (2007). He suggests that instilling 
patriotic love in children involves selective memory and viewing the country through 
rose-tinted spectacles: ‘A love that must constantly be nursed along with amnesia, 
wishful thinking and inattention to morally urgent interests is not steadfast and deep but 
obsessive and stultifying’ (p.14). He continues: ‘Since our loves make our world 
valuable to us and are not changeable at will, it sometimes makes sense to preserve the 
residue of amorally burdensome love’. He cites the case of white Southerners in the 
1960s who genuinely opposed Southern racism but also acknowledged that their way of 
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life involving gentility and grace ‘were bred in slavery and depended on black labor’ 
(p.13). 
 
 
The distortion problem 
 
Education involving indoctrination involves significant manipulation of the learner and 
results in bad faith. Historical distortion for patriotic purposes is, arguably, a lesser 
crime but can come close to doing the same. In one US school history textbook, Build 
Our Nation, the descriptions of US conduct in some countries are brief and arguably 
highly distorted. US involvement in Vietnam is described, without any reference to 
civilian casualties as a defence of ‘South Vietnam which like South Korea, opposed 
communism’ attacked by communist North Vietnam. The brief narrative is followed by 
‘Lesson Review - Critical Thinking: Compare. How would helicopters be helpful during 
the war? When would planes be more useful?’ (Bednarz et al., 2003, pp.573 and 575). 
And in similar vein as Ben-Porath describes: 
 
In the summer of 2002, Israeli high  school  students 
took their final exams …At age seventeen or eighteen, 
just before gaining their voting rights and beginning 
mandatory military service, these students were 
confronted with the following question on their civic 
studies exam: “Explain why conscientious objection is 
subversive”. 
 
Harry Brighouse (2006) coined the phrase the ‘distortion problem’ in his discussion of 
the legitimacy of patriotic education and argues that it has two dimensions. First, ‘when 
the state uses its agency (the education system) to promote patriotism it will wrongly 
influence the character of the vision of the country that children come to have’. Second, 
state schools ‘should avoid using history as the vehicle for fostering patriotic loyalty, 
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since even the most honest, clear-sighted, unsentimental attempts to teach national 
history [for patriotic purposes] are likely to degrade and undermine the other purposes 
that teaching history properly has … the truth is often inconvenient and may suffer in 
pursuit of patriotic sentiment’ (op. cit. p.112). And even those in favour of some form of 
patriotic education would agree that the idea that history should be taught partly for 
patriotic ends is extremely repugnant to most history teachers. As White suggests:  
‘They will point to the corruption of school history under the Nazis, to the  
indoctrination [via distorted history teaching] of pre-war British children into the 
imperial myth and the rites of Empire Day’ (p.339). And 58% of a sample of state  
school History teachers when polled in UK in 2007 disagreed or strongly disagreed with 
the statement: ‘It is proper for state funded schools to promote loyalty to the state’. 
Leave aside the phrasing of the statement, which equates patriotism with ‘loyalty to the 
state’ not ‘love of one’s country’ the point is clear. David Stevens concurs with this  
view suggesting that curricula can include an examination of the historical significance 
of nationality but should not tackle its ethical significance because ‘the emphasis on 
nationality and national sentiment is both morally dangerous and ultimately subversive 
of the worthy goals such as justice and equality of respect’ (p.368, emphasis added). 
 
 
There are some liberal commentators who acknowledge the distortion problem but who 
nonetheless argue that - to some degree - it is an instrumental necessity in preserving 
liberal democracy’s conditions for survival. William Galston is one such commentator 
suggesting that the process of education needs to be more rhetorical than rational. He 
claims that the emphasis on rational argument or critical engagement can itself be a 
negative force in achieving the proper aims of liberal education. Galston defends a more 
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sentimental civic education to counter the apparent destructive force of detached critical 
reason. As he says here (1991, pp.243-244): 
 
On the practical level, very few individuals will come to 
embrace the core commitments of liberal societies 
through a process of rational inquiry. If children are to 
be brought to accept these commitments as valid and 
binding, it can only be through a process that is far  
more rhetorical than rational. For example, rigorous 
historical research will almost certainly vindicate 
complex ‘revisionist’ accounts of key figures in  
American history. Civic education, however, requires a 
more noble, moralizing history: a pantheon of heroes 
who confer legitimacy on central institutions and 
constitute worthy objects of emulation. 
 
But although this sentimental approach to history aims to serve the ends of liberal 
democracy, it arguably comes at too high a price. Archard describes it as a ‘falsifying 
national sentimentalism’ and Callan suggests that it sustains three moral problems, 
namely: a truncated historical imagination; a propensity to filter complex political 
problems through a network of mutually supportive moral fictions (secondary 
falsehoods to protect the primary lie of national purity); and a debased conservatism 
which regards an inherited past as incapable of improvement (Callan, 1997, p.106).  
And arguably, whilst there may be short term gains at the level of schooling, these 
liabilities also create problems for sustaining liberal democracy given that this kind of 
sentimental education might instil dispositions that cannot be reconciled with those that 
should underpin liberal democracy. For example, a capacity for critical reasoning does 
seem to be fairly crucial to liberal democracy’s survival and flourishing. 
 
 
Keller argues even more forcefully against any instrumental claims for patriotic 
education. He acknowledges that patriotic education may galvanise liberal democratic 
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citizens but also points out that ‘there are also reasons to suspect that patriotism leads to 
war, intolerance, bigotry, and stupidity – and is hence of instrumental disvalue’ (p.591). 
He argues that patriotic education is not just wrong but also dangerous stating that, 
‘…the patriot is likely to be drawn toward unrealistically rosy pictures of her country’s 
people and history, the principles for which it stands, or the way it operates. All of this 
could well turn out to be influential when it comes to her making morally significant 
decisions: decisions about whether to support or fight in a war, about who gets her vote, 
about whether to make certain significant sacrifices, and so on’ (p.588). And David 
Stevens agrees, warning that we ‘should be wary of the Siren call of nationality that 
promises to do our work for us. The emphasis on nationality and national sentiment is 
both morally dangerous and, ultimately subversive of the worthy goals, such as justice 
and equality of respect, that its defenders set out to serve’ (p.368). 
 
 
Is patriotic education incompatible with global awareness and responsibilities? 
Some critics of patriotic education suggest that it needs to be subjected to what may be 
called the ‘global justice’ critique. This argument suggests that patriotic education at 
best fails to support sufficiently - or at worst contradicts – the principle of equal respect 
for all persons. If one’s allegiance is to humanity in a global sense then, according to 
these scholars, patriots’ special concern or loyalty towards compatriots violates a 
universal moral standard of treating all people with equal concern (for example, 
Nussbaum, 1996; Appiah, 200623). Liberalism is based on a universal ethic and 
patriotism militates against that, so, it would be reasonable to assume that patriotic 
education would also militate against the aims of liberal education. Nussbaum outlines 
the  origins  and  essence  of  cosmopolitanism  thus  and  argues  that  it  is  this   global 
 
23 Although Appiah does defend a version of Cosmopolitan Patriotism in his 2016 Reith Lecture 
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community that is, most fundamentally, the source of what she describes as ‘our moral 
obligations’ (1994, p.3): 
 
Asked where he came from, the ancient Greek Cynic 
philosopher Diogenes replied, "I am a citizen of the 
world." He meant by this, it appears, that he refused to 
be defined by his local origins and local group 
memberships, so central to the self-image of a 
conventional Greek male; he insisted on  defining 
himself in terms of more universal aspirations and 
concerns. The Stoics who followed his lead developed  
his image of the kosmou politês or world citizen more 
fully, arguing that each of us dwells, in effect, in two 
communities -- the local community of our birth, and  
the community of human argument and aspiration that 
"is truly great and truly common, in which we look 
neither to this corner nor to that, but measure the 
boundaries of our nation by the sun" (Seneca, De Otio) 
(ibid.). 
 
The main point here is that our main allegiance should be given to the human 
community, not to any form of government or other source of authority. As Nussbaum 
states here: ‘The idea of the world citizen is in this way the ancestor and source of 
Kant's idea of the "kingdom of ends," and has a similar function in inspiring and 
regulating moral and political conduct’ (1996, p.7). 
 
 
Osler and Starkey also make the case specifically for cosmopolitan education, arguing 
that patriotic education wrongly focuses on difference and cultural barriers and should 
instead focus on ‘citizenship [that] starts from our common humanity’ (2015, p.1). 
Cosmopolitan education thereby allows for pupils to celebrate a number of ‘identities’  
or loyalties’ within this common framework of our shared humanity. 
 
 
Patriotism as a controversial topic within liberal education 
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Hand (2011, p.35) suggests that patriotism has meaning in national and global affairs 
and in individuals’ lives, but that it should be taught as a controversial subject. As he 
states here, patriotism is a part of our lives: 
 
Patriotic sentiment has manifestly played, and 
continues to play, a significant role in national and 
international affairs. Vast swathes of history and 
substantial areas of contemporary political discourse 
would be incomprehensible in the absence of some 
understanding of patriotic feeling and nationalist 
conviction. Moreover, few pupils will pass through life 
without experiencing at some point the tug of patriotic 
attachment, or coming under pressure from others to 
cultivate such an attachment. So it will not do for 
schools just to avoid the subject, to abdicate 
responsibility for equipping pupils with an 
understanding of patriotism and the wherewithal to 
make reasoned judgments about its value. 
 
However, he goes on to argue that there is legitimate and reasonable disagreement about 
its desirability and, as such, it should not be promoted in schools. He is particularly 
concerned with the possibility of losing truthful perception of the object of love in 
patriotism. In many cases it does not have particularly dire consequences if people have 
a distorted view of their beloved spouse, dog, favourite novel and so on. However, it is 
potentially disastrous if large numbers of people have distorted view of their nation state 
– and cultivating an emotional attachment to a country has the potential to do this. As he 
states here: ‘In very few cases of loving attachment does the loss of truthful perception 
matter as much as it does when the object of love is a liberal democratic nation-state’ 
(ibid. p.34). But neither should patriotism be ignored. Given that it is a phenomenon  
that we are highly likely to encounter in some ways in our lives we need to learn about  
it and how to make good judgements about it. Therefore the reasonable approach to 
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teaching patriotism is to include it in the curriculum as a controversial topic and handle 
it accordingly. As Hand argues here: 
 
Our responsibility as educators is not to endorse a 
position in the debate about patriotism, still less to 
ignore that debate: it is to acquaint pupils as even- 
handedly as possible with the benefits and the  
drawback of loving one’s country and encourage them to 
decide for themselves how to handle this aspect of their 
emotional lives (ibid. p.36). 
 
So, let us sum up the criticisms of patriotic education thus far. For some scholars, 
patriotic education is incompatible with the more appropriately global concerns  of 
liberal education. For others patriotism itself is rationally defensible but patriotic 
education is not compatible with liberal education and should be taught accordingly as a 
controversial issue. For others it is at best distorting and threatens to undermine liberal 
education’s more worthy aims. At its worst, critics claims that it is morally dangerous 
and threatens, not only children’s capacity to think rationally and critically but, the 
foundations of liberal society itself. 
 
 
Patriotic education as liberal education 
 
This concluding section of the chapter takes each of the criticisms of patriotic education 
above showing that they are either wanting in some way or flawed. The liberal neutralist 
objection to any state promotion of a comprehensive doctrine, including patriotism, was 
defeated above by suggesting that the liberal state can be held responsible for its non- 
intervention in working for the interests of its citizens and that a principled stance can 
be achieved by ensuring that any form of civic education is deliberative and open ended 
to some degree. It was argued that any liberal democratic order needs to ensure that its 
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public institutions - including schooling - promote and secure the preconditions of 
engaged and active citizenship. Furthermore, liberal civic education should provide 
opportunities for children and young people to understand - and deliberate over - the 
rationales for including particular curricular content and educational aims. So, having 
argued that there is legitimacy in civic education itself within liberal educational 
principles, this next section argues that patriotic education can align with those same 
principles. 
 
 
Patriotic education indoctrinatory or distorted 
 
Whilst patriotic education of a certain kind can certainly lead to bad faith through 
manipulation and distortion it does not have to. One response to the charge that patriotic 
education is necessarily indoctrinatory is to show that there are a.) benign versions of 
patriotism and b.) it could be encouraged amongst other values and dispositions that we 
owe it to children to encourage. According to this rebuttal, patriotic education should 
not trump other kinds of liberal education that encourage critical reasoning and so on. 
Clearly there are dangers in encouraging any feelings beyond a certain point through 
state education so, as White argues, ‘national sentiment could be encouraged as one 
value among many without according it a privileged place’ (p.328). If, like other kinds 
of moral education, the rationale for its place on the curriculum is openly debated with 
learners and justifications for its value offered for critical debate, it ceases to be 
indoctrinatory. This, if you like is a weak (but legitimate) defence and shows how 
patriotic education - or encouraging national sentiment – can add value to any 
curriculum and empower children in important ways to value, understand and 
participate in their liberal national community in benign, reasonable and constructive 
ways. 
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There is also a stronger argument against those who level the accusation of 
indoctrination at patriotic education. Callan, for example, argues convincingly that 
loving one’s country does not automatically lead to bad faith and, as such, patriotic 
education does not need to be indoctrinatory. Rather than suggesting, as White does,  
that national sentiment is one of many values and dispositions instilled in children, 
Callan suggests that there is a way of instilling love as well as teaching children to 
subject it to critical reasoning. Whilst he does not deny the importance of other values 
he argues more forcefully for the importance of instilling love of country as part of 
liberal democracy’s survival. Whatever its instrumental value it is also important, 
however, to show that the manipulative or distorting possibilities of some kind of 
patriotic education can be countered. For example, nostalgic, ‘blind’ attachment is not 
the same as love, clearly. Love involves something much less sentimental, harder and 
worthier and as Callan puts it: ‘Emotional generosity and sentimentality are not the  
same thing’ (1997, p.118). One can subject one’s love to critical interrogation if one 
loves well, for example, but this does not have to result in a kind of ‘complete’ critical 
detachment. Callan argues that critical reason alone can be destructive and corrosive of 
liberal institutions and values – and is incompatible with loving these institutions. He 
argues that critical reason is not the same as ‘implacable scepticism’, which is a kind of 
detached view from nowhere which eschews all partialities and commitments to any 
particular community (p.161). 
 
 
So, for Callan we need both some sort of emotional (unsentimental) engagement and 
scrutiny of that engagement. Sentimental education of the kind, for example, that 
Galston expounds above, comes through misrepresentation of reality in some way and 
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affects the judgments that can be made about the subject (in this case the nation). These 
are unearned emotions according to Callan (op. cit. p.105). Instead we need to teach 
children how to explore their ‘nation’s history seriously and imaginatively in an 
unsentimental spirit, and whatever public emotion can survive that process is emotion 
that one has paid for…’ (ibid. p.107). And one way of doing this in practice is to use the 
best and worst of national traditions and to hold them up to scrutiny together, using the 
best of a nation’s traditions to interrogate those occasions when it failed to live up to its 
best. 
 
 
Patriotic education can be consistent with liberal education and not fall foul of bad faith 
or necessarily involve distortion when there is a deeper understanding of what it means 
to love a country well and that this necessarily involves critical scrutiny as well as some 
kind of imaginative generosity about how it may become better and some emotional 
engagement that is unsentimental. 
 
 
Patriotic education compatible with cosmopolitan aims 
 
Richard Rorty argues for the inherent weaknesses in the cosmopolitan view suggesting 
that ‘cosmopolitan civic virtue seems no more than a philosopher’s figment unless 
citizens have empathetic imaginations powerful enough to sustain a sense of common 
fate with culturally distant compatriots’ (1997, p.85). And Yael Tamir concurs quoting 
the eighteenth century French philosopher, De Maistre, as follows: 
 
I have seen, in my times Frenchmen, Italians, and 
Russians. I even know, thanks to Montesquieu, that one 
may be Persian; but as for Man, I declare I have never 
met him in my life; if he exists, it is without my 
knowledge (in Tamir, 1993, p.13). 
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Theresa May, the British Prime Minister, recently stated at the Conservative Party 
Conference that: ‘If you believe you are a citizen of the world, you are a citizen of 
nowhere’ (May 2016). These views come from quite different ideological perspectives. 
Rorty, for example, is arguing for a reclaiming of patriotism for the political left in the 
USA and May is, arguably, aiming to appeal to nationalists who voted for a British exit 
from the European Union. But, what these views have in common is the view that a 
reasonable locus for our common fate - that has reasonable cultural proximity and  
where our political decisions count and have consequences – is the national one. This 
does not preclude global concerns. Indeed, more connectedness, care and participation 
at the national level might actually support more just global policy. Other scholars have 
suggested convincingly along these lines and suggest that there is no necessary conflict 
between patriotism and cosmopolitanism in principle. Marcia Baron puts it in its 
weakest form arguing that: ‘citizens can retain their ‘particularity’ while learning to 
think and behave from perspectives of generality’ (Baron, 2002, p.72). And many other 
commentators have suggested that patriotism can actually enhance or ‘actualise’ 
cosmopolitanism. Charles Taylor, for example, has forcefully argued that what is 
urgently needed in liberal education is both patriotism and cosmopolitanism: the former 
does not necessarily counter the potential of the latter. Indeed, he - and others - argues 
that national loyalty education enhances cosmopolitan potency and efficacy (for 
example, Appiah, 2016). Soutphommasane, (2012, p.159) agrees suggesting that global 
concern can easily feature within patriotic deliberation and can be described as a pre 
requisite for any feelings of global solidarity. Liberal patriotism can take the form of an 
expansive rather than narrow moral aim and project. As argued in the introduction to the 
thesis, patriotic concern allows citizens to transcend their local and parochial bonds and 
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embrace other citizens, who are otherwise strangers, as fellow members of an imagined 
community (Anderson, 1993). The reason for cultivating a shared nationality could 
surely be understood as ‘an equally compelling reason for cultivating humanity’ (Tan, 
2004, p.104). And as Soutphommasane argues: ‘If national pride is something worth 
having, it must be open to global justice in addition to social justice at a national level’ 
(op. cit. p.161). Any nation to be proud of should do its part for global justice and be 
open to criticisms from outside its borders. 
 
 
Patriotism as an uncontroversial topic in liberal state schooling 
 
Hand, as argued above, is concerned that when you love something or someone you  
tend to see the good points and you do not always see the bad points of the beloved 
person or object as clearly as a more objective person might. Love can cloud our 
judgement and this is especially worrying when we are educating young people to love 
their country. The risks associated with clouded judgment about one’s country are 
higher than with our love for a spouse or child, he argues. So if our objectivity can be 
clouded in this way then the goodness of patriotism is at the very least controversial.  
But love does not necessarily have to cloud our judgement. We argued in Chapter 2 that 
truthful perception of the beloved is, in fact, a facet of loving something or some one 
well. This truthful perception can be accompanied by a degree of emotional generosity 
but this does not have to lead to clouded judgement. As Callan has argued, love can 
involve truthful perception alongside a sense of constancy that means one can continue 
to love a person – or indeed a country – through thick and thin. We argued above that 
moralised love may involve the kind of devotion and self-sacrifice to someone or 
something that continues through challenging times and despite a variety of similar and 
potentially  lovable  alternatives.  Declaring  love  for  something  requires  more  than 
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fleeting feeling and therefore a certain level of steadfastness involved. This should of 
course require us to teach patriotic education in a way that involves teaching what it 
means to love a country well – and to maintain a truthful perception of it. 
 
 
If we conceive of patriotic education as a progressive project that ensures that young 
people learn to love their essentially multicultural liberal democratic nation and are 
motivated and equipped to participate in its continuous national renewal through an 
open, interpretive, national dialogue we diminish the risks of clouded judgement. The 
advocacy of this national-cultural dialogue is explicit about the fact that any liberal 
democratic nation’s cultures and identities are inevitably and necessarily forged through 
deliberation, dissent, compromise, rejection of some practices, assimilation of minority 
groups, integration of ethnic groups and - over time - the wholesale adoption of some 
immigrant values and practices. This is not about promotion of a rose tinted view of a 
nation. The danger of nurturing a distorted love of country is averted if we take this 
view of patriotic education. As such there is nothing controversial about it. The bar for 
the liberal values of respect for truth, critical scrutiny and individual’s autonomous 
choices can remain high. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have argued here that despite the different broad conceptions of liberal education, it 
is quite possible to arrive at a view of liberal education as possessing some key features. 
Liberal education - as I defend it here - explicitly sets a high bar for the development of 
critical reasoning and the pursuit of truth along with the development of moral values, 
civic dispositions and abilities as well as some form of educating the emotions in a non- 
manipulative way. Safeguards against manipulation or indoctrination have to be in place. 
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These safeguards include providing children with objective, public criteria by which to 
make judgements, providing children with justifications for their beliefs, encouraging 
critical inquiry, providing alternative world views and so forth. And, whilst on the face 
of it patriotic education seems to contradict many of the tenets of liberalism, we have 
argued here that it need not. The understandable fears of some liberal commentators 
have been set out and defeated above. Patriotic education, when done well, appears to 
be entirely compatible with liberal education. Nurturing love of country does not have  
to be indoctrinatory or distorted. It can be compatible with, and even a prerequisite for, 
global awareness. It can complement liberal values and furthermore, a national (shared) 
project which is open to interpretation - as indeed is the national community within 
which it operates - is not only compatible with liberal principles but could strengthen 
liberalism. The nurturing of underlying commitment to the shared national community  
is important and the genuinely open nature of the renewing of the nation as a project 
may secure strong affective commitment from a diverse range of citizens. Self-rule, 
individual autonomy and critical reasoning are preserved and valued as part of this 
formative project. 
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CHAPTER 6: PATRIOTIC EDUCATION IN CONTEXTS OF 
STRUGGLE  FOR  LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 
This chapter examines the nature and purpose of patriotic state education in contexts 
where liberal democracy is fragile or otherwise under threat. Important questions 
regarding the kind of patriotic education that can justifiably take place in newly formed, 
war torn or otherwise fragile contexts are explored. For example, does the urgency or 
instrumental necessity of liberal democratic nation building justify illiberal means? Is it 
in principle permissible to pursue liberal ends using illiberal means? On the face of it, it 
seems less problematic to see the instrumental value of patriotic education in a post- 
conflict context. Arguably, emergent or struggling nations can justify some, arguably 
temporary, policy measures to bring new compatriots together in order to build the 
conditions for liberal democracy. There is an understandable temptation, perhaps, to 
view more belligerent forms of patriotic education as more necessary where liberal 
democracy is perceived as vulnerable or embryonic. It could be argued that some forms 
of patriotic education that might otherwise be viewed as incompatible with liberal 
education might be justified for the sake of urgent creation or reinforcement of national 
unity. These issues are explored here in the context of a variety of nations explicitly 
aiming to develop national solidarity or engaged in renewing elements to their 
citizenship or patriotic education agenda. Overall the argument, that it may be justifiable 
to tolerate more illiberal elements of patriotic education in the short term for the sake of 
either building, renewing or defending a liberal democratic state, is explored and 
defeated. A form of patriotic education based on the concept of ‘shared fate’ rather than 
patriotic education that aims to create a common national identity is proposed as a  
viable alternative to more belligerent patriotic education in all liberal democratic 
contexts. 
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Croatia, Lebanon and Lithuania’s educational responses to nation building are explored 
first. The challenges facing new or fragile national systems aspiring to  liberal  
democracy are acknowledged and are not underestimated. At this point I should declare  
a direct interest in Croatia having lived there, with my Croatian husband and our two 
children, from 2004 to 2007. The considerable damage of the war of independence, 
which ended in 1995, was very much in evidence in material as well as socio- 
psychological and political terms. The nation state was in early stages of its construction. 
My children went to local state schools and, as such, I had some direct experience of the 
relatively newly formed national curriculum. Croatia’s educational response to post- 
communist and post conflict nation building for democracy manifests many of the 
challenges new nation states face when tackling the twin goals of creating national 
solidarity after a bloody (internal and external) conflict whilst simultaneously creating 
democratic citizens. Initially there was emphasis on a more ethnic sense of national 
identity through the history curriculum at the expense of more civic virtues. Since 2010 
however there have been considerable moves towards a more civic-based citizenship 
education and more nuanced teaching of history with deliberative practices that  
conforms more to liberal educational purposes. 
 
 
The reason for including Lebanon in this analysis is twofold. First I have direct 
experience of working on a recent nation building World Bank education project24 
involving the creation of national state school standards for teachers and leaders. 
Second,  Lebanon  presents  an  interesting  case  of  a  post  conflict  nation  aspiring to 
 
24 The Lebanese Ministry of Education working with the World Bank since 2013 – present (October 
2016) on a national school improvement, leadership capacity building project 
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democracy in the Near East region. As Quaynor (2012, p.11) states: ‘[According to a 
global security report in 2010] Only the constitutional republic of Lebanon qualified as 
a democratic ‘post-conflict’ country, as the other countries involved in conflict in the 
region have been classified as continuously actively involved in conflict’. There will be 
those that argue, convincingly, that Lebanon continues to be rife with conflict and is 
understandably struggling to cope with the enormous influx of Syrian refugees since 
2011, which has seen its population increase by a third. An analysis of the Lebanese 
government’s educational response to nation building, in its protracted fragile and 
vulnerable state, makes it a good test case for the extent to which illiberal means are 
justified by the aspired-for liberal ends. The third country in this category of newly 
formed or fragile nations, Lithuania, is included as a post-communist nation developing 
as a new democratic state. I have no personal connection with, or experience in, 
Lithuania. However, there is some good scholarly research exploring the civic and 
ethnic tensions within its nation building liberal education programme which draws out 
the challenges of nation building and democratic education within previously 
undemocratic states (McLaughlin, 2002). 
 
 
The analysis of these three countries concludes that each has faced considerable 
challenges in promoting a new, or strengthening an existing, sense of national solidarity 
alongside education for democracy in previously undemocratic contexts. Part of the 
challenges in Croatia and Lithuania led to some initial emphasis on developing a shared 
national identity rather than the civic elements of progressive patriotic education. 
However, each country, in different ways, has resisted the continued or sole emphasis 
on shared ethnic national identity and has journeyed towards more explicit education for 
civic virtues. The challenge in Lebanon has been the lack of liberal principles in telling 
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the national story, which has actually undermined chances of national solidarity. The 
argument is made that the inclusion of liberal democratic values and practices early on 
in any post conflict patriotic education is both more liberal and more efficacious in 
sustainable liberal nation building. 
 
This chapter also explores the extent to which, and ways in which, nation building 
patriotic education remains a significant feature of Israel and the USA through the work 
of Sigal Ben-Porath (2006). She describes both nations as experiencing what she calls 
‘citizenship under fire’: Israel in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the 
USA in the post 9/11 context. Both nations, she argues feel some sense of existential 
threat. The value of what she describes as ‘belligerent patriotism’ in this context is 
contrasted with education that construes nation building for democracy as an ongoing 
project in which citizens develop a sense of ‘shared fate’ rather than the more 
problematic sense of shared, common national identity. This ‘expanded’ education 
retains its liberal and patriotic elements and, Ben-Porath argues convincingly, is suitable 
for democratic nations at war or currently experiencing domestic social conflict, as well 
as those emerging from recent conflict, either international or domestic. As such this 
chapter touches on the ways in which even more established liberal democracies, such  
as the UK, face some specific challenges to their democratic processes and, as such, 
some of the arguments about urgent patriotic education for nation building may apply to 
them. For example, a ‘nation healing’ agenda has been promised by the UK’s new  
Prime Minster, Theresa May (July 13th 2016), after the considerable social and political 
divisions exposed by the EU referendum, as well as the alarming rise in racist attacks 
and apparent legitimisation of anti-immigration rhetoric since the ‘Leave’ vote won by a 
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small margin25. As May said on her first day as UK Prime Minister: ‘Now, more than 
ever, we need to work together, to deliver on Brexit, to build a country that works for 
everyone, and to truly unite our party and our country’ (The Guardian, July 13th 2016). 
The Trump presidential victory has revealed deep divisions in US society, as well as 
some threats to liberal democracy contained within the president-elect’s own 
conservative-nationalist agenda.  May’s words are being echoed in the US too. 
 
What all these nations share, albeit to significantly varying degrees and in varying forms, 
is the sense that a national commitment to liberal democracy needs to be built from its 
foundations or an established democracy is under some specific or significant threat. 
This chapter explores the kind of patriotic education that is required in these 
circumstances and examines whether its instrumental value in these more uncharted, 
threatened or extreme conditions justifies its existence – or influences the legitimate  
form it may take - any more than in what might be described as peacetime conditions in 
long established liberal democracies. It concludes with the view that patriotic education 
needs to be construed as an open, participatory project, which provides affective glue 
that creates common bonds between liberal democratic citizens, not construed as a  
shared national identity-forming project. This kind of patriotic education  has  value 
within all liberal democracies or nations aspiring to liberal democracy in that it creates 
the much needed affiliative connection at the important level of national community 
where important decisions are made and which have consequence for citizens at sub 
national and transnational levels. Any nation building liberal democratic project is 
arguably more about strong, shared, democratic participation and civic virtues within a 
national context than it is about containing or managing diversity within a constructed 
')"UK European Union referendum: 52% of voters chose to leave the European Union and 48% voted to 
remain. 
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‘national identity’. The chapter concludes that, if patriotic education, at any point in a 
liberal democracy’s history or formation, focuses on creating a strong national identity  
it is more likely to display tendencies towards bad faith and tendencies towards 
indoctrination. As such it is illegitimate and will fail. Patriotic education always, and in 
all circumstances, needs to pass a high bar for truth claims, rational deliberation and 
moral justification. 
 
 
What is nation building? 
Liberal democratic nation building, to varying degrees, is a feature of the countries 
explored here so it is important to be clear what we mean by it, particularly as there is a 
certain amount of what might be described as ethical baggage that comes with the term 
within a liberal democratic context. As Kymlicka suggests, it can appear - but does not 
have to - to smack of some forms of social engineering (2007, p.62). Ernest Gellner, one 
of the most influential scholars of nationalism in the 20th century suggests that the   
nation usually follows the state, rather than the other way around (2006, Ch. 1). On the 
surface this may seem to contradict some core liberal ideas of freedom,  choice,  
openness and rational deliberation; hence Kymlicka’s expression of potential ethical 
discomfort. However, it is difficult to argue against the view that to some extent all  
states bear signs of ‘nationalist efforts at self-determination, efforts, that is, to determine 
the content of national life’ (Soutphommasane, 2009, p.95). And as Amy Gutmann 
(1987, p.15) says: ‘Political socialisation of citizens is one of the functions of education’. 
As such, there are, and always have been, some inevitable ideological elements of  
nation building. A classic Old World example is the way in which the French Third 
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Republic in 1870 explicitly expressed its aim of ‘transforming peasants into Frenchmen’ 
(Soutphommasane, 2009, p.94). 
 
 
Nation building, expressed at its simplest is the political means to reinforce and shape 
society. It also involves the use of public policy to reinforce, promote and shape a 
national identity, as Norman expresses it (2006, Chapter 2). And this national identity is 
not to be understood in overly crude ethnic or mono-cultural terms. A nation’s sense of 
itself may involve the extent to which citizens enjoy and protect very high levels of 
robust, democratic participation. In one sense this may be construed as a  national 
identity of sorts. However, it is more helpful to view shared fate patriotism in contrast to 
national identity forming patriotism. A nation’s cultural sense of itself as an open 
participatory democracy that values pluralism is a desired outcome of this endeavour. 
However, this is not equivalent to sharing a common ‘identity’. And there are clearly 
different contexts and different purposes of nation building, from the formation of new 
nations to the continuous nation building elements that inform many state education 
programs in established liberal democracies. Established democracies do not take 
citizens’ commitment or democratic participation for granted. State education usually 
involves some elements of citizen soul craft, as we argued in Chapter 5. In relation to 
liberal nation building specifically, this, arguably, involves states in taking on more of a 
democratically elected designer or negotiated facilitator role than what might be 
described as a state architect and builder role associated with more authoritarian models. 
As a result of this, the shape liberal democratic national identity takes can be influenced 
by public deliberation and its final outcomes remain, to some extent, open. 
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Norman’s definition, which serves us reasonably well here, suggests that nation  
building involves using policy, including state education, to reinforce, promote and 
shape a nation’s collective sense of itself. However, clearly, the precise form of any 
nation-building project will vary according to context. Newer, liberal democratic  
nations may have some urgent priorities in creating the very notion of national solidarity 
from societies recently riven with civil war or international conflict and, as such, may 
need to begin with a more modest legal agenda for mutual tolerance of each other or 
minority groups. Representative multicultural democracies, as opposed to more 
participatory multicultural ones, may have more explicit reinforcing aims for national 
solidarity in mind through assimilating minority groups, for example. Other liberal 
democracies may choose an approach, which emphasises accommodating minorities or 
more explicit recognition of difference as part of the national culture and therefore a 
more integrationist approach. As Neil Burtonwood (2006, p.112) says here: 
 
There are several types of nation building. There is 
‘reprioritization’ of national identity that calls for 
members of sub-national groups to identify more closely 
with the wider national community. [This…] 
reprioritization […] does call for some level of 
identification with a pan-state identity. Then there is 
‘reconfiguring’ which aims to make an existing national 
identity more inclusive and therefore more hospitable to 
immigrant minorities. 
 
As one illustration of ‘reconfiguring’ aims, a British Labour government minister said  
in 1997: ‘When we try to understand our national culture and sense of identity, let us 
remember first and foremost that diversity is one of the key ingredients of both that 
culture and that identity’ (cited in Burtonwood, 2006, p.112). Established liberal 
democracies, as illustrated here, may need to reinvigorate their state nation-building 
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policies at times when there are strains or cracks appearing in national unity or sense of 
shared purpose. As argued in Chapter 4 above, these strains are now endemic and as 
such, nation-building elements of state education programmes are, arguably, more 
explicit and instrumentally essential. Part of this agenda may involve nation-building 
patriotic education, which can support de-sentimentalising aspects of any national 
curriculum or even, as Soutphommasane argues, ‘re-moralising it’ (2012, p.208). This 
may involve state education programmes ‘unlearning’ some aspects of previously held 
false beliefs or as Ben-Porath describes it, undergoing some form of ‘reverse forms of 
patriotism’ (2006, p.114). This involves ‘reversing’ the forces of belligerent patriotism 
and driving towards a more inclusive, noble form of liberal patriotism. 
 
 
We shall now turn to an examination of various examples of nation building in different 
contexts where patriotic education has been harnessed for that purpose. 
 
 
Teaching for war 
 
State education for nation building can be harnessed for many national purposes and it  
is worth ruling out the use of patriotic education in preparation for war or for the 
purpose of ‘knowing one’s enemies’. In Chapter 4 the notion of belligerent patriotism 
was ruled out as compatible with liberalism, even in wartime. We can do the same for 
belligerent patriotic education. As Ben-Porath states (op. cit. p.34): 
 
When the education is conscripted to  teaching 
belligerent citizenship, it turns education into part of  
the war culture; through facilitating the use of 
belligerent rather than democratic perspectives, 
education becomes war by other means. 
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Sometimes democratic values have been subordinated to, or sacrificed for, immediate 
survival needs in liberal democracies. As one policy commission, What the Schools 
Should Teach in Wartime in the US decreed in 1943: ‘Long range values … must be 
subordinated to the life-and-death needs of today and tomorrow’. And, arguably the 
USA Patriot Act (2001) suspended some key liberal principles and practices for short- 
term security needs in education settings amounting to harnessing aspects of education 
to a ‘war on terror’ culture. There are plenty of British examples of similar practice. 
David Archard, in his article Should We Teach patriotism? (1999, p.157), traces some 
examples of British imperial patriotism, which was designed to give children a sense of 
Britain as: 
 
A country who does not have to cheat in order to  
succeed whilst others do, which is confident of victory 
but temperate in enjoyment of its triumph, a country, in 
short, which both always plays by the rules and always 
wins […] [A] belief in an Empire on which the sun never 
sets, guardian of a glorious past and protector of the 
values of civilization against Teutonic barbarism… 
 
These examples of patriotic education are a version of ‘teaching for war’ during  
wartime or other kinds of protracted struggle (even if protecting British imperial 
interests may not have been viewed as a ‘struggle’ at the time). There are also examples 
of state education as teaching for war or for developing essentially bellicose attitudes in 
the young as an essential, preventative measure to ensure national survival. The 
emphasis here is for the young to love their nation but also to know their enemies. As 
one commentator puts it: ‘[For some nationalists] the point of teaching wartime history 
in school is to instil patriotism, and to convey that in a dangerous world the survival of 
any nation depends on its ability to win its battles’ (A European Stability Initiative 
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Report, 2015 p.1). Whilst the concept of knowing one’s enemies may be more explicit  
in authoritarian contexts, there are certainly some more sub-textual examples in 
relatively recent history of textbooks in established liberal democracies. The teaching of 
Irish history in late twentieth century England has been called into question. Since the 
1960s the conflict between Northern Ireland’s state forces and Protestant Unionists 
against chiefly Catholic unionists claimed over 3,500 lives and caused over 50,000 
casualties. Some English textbooks, up to the early 1980s, framed this as ‘The Irish 
Problem’ - rather than its current phrasing ‘The Irish Question’ - conveying the 
Republican Irish as, in some sense, an enemy of the UK. 
 
 
Harnessing history education, which emphasises hostility towards a nation’s traditional 
or potential adversaries, for the purposes of national stability or survival is clearly an 
illegitimate use of patriotic education for liberal nation building. 
 
 
Post conflict liberal democratic nation building and patriotic education 
 
This section explores the significant survival challenges and potential threats facing 
nations recovering from war or conflict whilst simultaneously aiming to become liberal 
democratic states. The nature and extent of conflict can, of course, vary in what are 
known as post conflict states. Some have been ravaged by protracted war and are trying 
to establish a peace in the context of a fragile truce declared with former enemies, both 
external and internal, as well as a democratic future; for example, Lebanon. Others have 
emerged from, often unwanted, oppression by a majority group as in the case of many 
post-communist nations; for example, Lithuania. Some countries are nation building for 
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democracy after civil, as well as external, conflict and are also what are described as 
post-communist states; for example, Croatia. 
 
 
Facing continued existential threat and nation building for democracy are extremely 
challenging twin goals. There are no easy answers and it is by no means my intention, in 
providing some normative analysis, to oversimplify this difficult and important process. 
Post conflict and emergent nations often face inordinate hurdles and this can certainly 
lead to extraordinary civic relations. A sense of continued national vulnerability will 
result in an inevitable focus on immediate survival. Physiological safety will be 
paramount. This can amount to short-term policies that curtail the freedoms of citizens. 
Curfews and other kinds of travel restrictions are not uncommon is early stages of peace 
settlements. Other limitations of civic liberties are common where very delicate 
negotiations have to be managed, for example, returning to damaged homes that have 
been in the hands of the former enemy. ‘Repossessing’ property on a large national  
scale is neither straightforward ethically or legally; nor can it happen quickly. In the 
immediate aftermath of war, post conflict countries often restrict or violate civil liberties 
that may be taken for granted on peacetime. Psychological damage, of returning soldiers 
and the wider civilian population, will be a national priority too. This inevitably takes a 
great deal of delicacy, patience and time. All this amounts to some inevitable distortion 
‘of the relations of individuals and states – their expectations, their commitments, their 
rights and obligations’ (Ben-Porath, p.10). 
 
 
These post conflict challenges inevitably influence the educational response of any new 
national government. New national curricula, in contexts where liberal democracy is 
being built, convey long-term goals expressing eventual, desired outcomes. Indeed, this 
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is true of most national curricula; ideals are captured and communicated. The post 
conflict, emergent democratic nation faces many practical challenges to attaining these 
ideals, especially in the immediate aftermath of war involving internal ethnic divisions. 
An extensive literature review examining the experiences of teachers and students in 
citizenship studies in post conflict schooling (Quaynor, 2012) identified four common 
themes. First, teachers’ and students’ attitudes towards teaching and schools were 
permeated by a fear of violence reoccurring. The review reported on studies conducted 
in a number of countries including Bosnia-Herzegovina (Hromadzi#, 2008), Croatia, 
Lebanon, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Serbia (Plut et al., 2002), where teachers, students 
and curriculum content emphasised the need to be faithful to one’s own ethnic group 
and evade others perhaps out of fear. As Quaynor reports here (p.43): 
 
For example, teachers and parents expressed the need 
to manage classroom talk in order to avoid controversial 
issues. There was an avoidance of interethnic contact 
based on this fear. In Rwanda, participants stressed the 
desire to avoid talking about ethnicity overall. The fear 
of future violence led to considerable mistrust of other 
persons and institutions. 
 
 
The second theme facing education in several post war nations, identified by this 
extensive literature review, was a lack of trust in political parties or the political system 
itself. Distribution of power among different ethnic groups was often an understandable 
concern. The study captures participant responses: ‘Groups in power seemed to desire 
preserving the control they enjoyed, whereas groups who had lost power desired 
maintaining some type of power, from the need to preserve a group identity to the need 
to regain political power’ (op. cit. p.44). 
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And, third, these tensions over distribution of power and fear of returning violence 
affected responses to the content of the curriculum itself. Again in the words of the 
report (ibid.): 
 
Depending on the side of the conflict that their group 
was on, some wanted to teach about the conflict and 
some wanted to omit it from the curriculum. In Rwanda, 
the government did not permit teachers to present the 
genocide as an ethnic conflict – rather, teachers were to 
highlight how the conflict was a result of colonialism. 
 
The fourth theme to emerge from this review of the post conflict citizenship education 
literature was the legacy of authoritarianism in many post conflict contexts, even those 
intending to become liberal democracies. As Quaynor puts it here (op. cit. p. 45): 
 
In a surprising number of studies, both teachers and 
students scored high on measures of valuing 
authoritarianism. Both teachers and students in 
countries in the Balkan region exhibited authoritarian 
tendencies, and in Mozambique, students were highly 
critical of democracy, associating democracy with 
violence. 
 
The common features of the post conflict education environment identified above have 
tended, in some cases, towards some suspension of liberal principles for the sake of 
guaranteeing security or promoting national solidarity. As Ben-Porath argues when 
citizenship is under fire or is being newly formed, an emphasis on the ‘unique role of 
ethnicity and retreat into ethno nationalist citizenship is more likely in acute situations’ 
(2006, p.15). Plut et al (2002) analysed content on the presentation of democracy in 
history and mother tongue language textbooks, soon after the war, in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and then Serbia. They found that a belligerent ethnic tone prevailed in 
many cases. 
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In Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, textbooks stressed 
loyalty to one’s own ethnic group over peace education, 
and included the subject of basic civil defence in the 
eighth grade curriculum. Rights were presented in a 
negative form, giving students examples of persons who 
had been deprived of their rights. National 
independence was presented as a positive value and 
described as the right to resist aggressors. For example, 
the Serbian fifth grade reader stated that it is ‘better to 
die once than to serve a foreigner forever’ (2002, p.123). 
 
Whilst this bellicose content is not typical of all post conflict states, it is  safe  to 
conclude that national solidarity can become an overriding concern in post conflict 
environments. As Smith, (2003) suggests, in other - sometimes bitterly - divided 
societies, state education has involved ‘creating a national story of peoplehood that 
minimizes, or even overlooks, division and conflict in order to promote a form of 
association in which the claims of “the people” or nation take primacy over the claims  
of groups or over histories that might divide the people’ (cited in Staeheli and Hammett, 
2009, p.6). In the short term, these stories can exert a powerful unifying influence, and 
can sometimes have positive influence in peace building. But if oppression or conflict 
remains unexamined, this may have longer-term consequences for the health and 
sustainability of any future democratic state. Arguably, where textbooks included no 
substantial content about democratic principles or practical information about 
democracy, there are inevitably some significant consequences for civic education. 
 
However, there are also several studies that suggest this retreat into ethnic identity or 
avoidance of teaching about and for democracy is not a universal response in post 
conflict environments. The Quaynor literature review showed that, although students  in 
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some post-conflict societies seemed to desire avoiding controversial issues and politics, 
this was not universally true. As she reports here (op. cit. p.46): 
 
Studies from Northern Ireland and Lebanon cited 
students who desired increased political literacy and 
wanted a more active citizenship education curriculum 
than they experienced (Akar, 2007; Lomas, 1999; 
Watling and Arlow, 2002). In studies from [some parts 
of] Bosnia-Herzegovina [and] Indonesia and South 
Africa, a democratic classroom climate and the use of 
participatory methods increased students’ civic 
engagement, participatory skills and knowledge about 
democracy (Finkel and Ernst, 2005; Mapiasse, 2007; 
Soule, 2000). 
 
 
In a similar vein, Christopher Gunness, spokesman for UNHCR on Palestinian 
education, has defended the teaching of Shakespeare as part of refugee education. As he 
declared: ‘Using the phrase ‘Once more unto the breach’ does not amount to an 
incitement to war and in liberal education everyone has a right to learn about 
Shakespeare’ (2016). 
 
 
The liberal educational nation building journeys of Croatia, Lebanon and Lithuania 
reflect many aspects of what may be described as both typical and more desirable in  
post conflict or emergent states. 
 
Patriotic education for nation building in Croatia 
 
Croatia embarked on its nation-building journey in 1995 after it was established as a 
parliamentary democracy following the bloody dissolution of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and the demise of communism in Europe. As such, Croatia 
faced the nation-building challenges shared by many former communist countries as 
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well as having to address the consequences of emerging from a difficult and costly war 
of independence. Serb military aggression followed Croatia’s proclamation of 
independence in June 1991. A few months later almost all major cities suffered some 
damage, a third of the territory was occupied and ethnic cleansing led to the 
displacement of half a million people. In 1992 the Bosnian war involved Croatia in 
further fighting and by 1996 there were 300,000 refugees living in Croatia whose 
original total population was just over four million. The complex history of the 
dissolution of the Former Yugoslavia is a study in its own right. I am not examining the 
causes here; I am focusing on the outcomes of this conflict in order to place the nation 
building educational strategy in its appropriate context. 
 
The fact that Croatia is a ‘nation forged in war’ is highly significant as Tanner (1996) 
suggests in his book of that title. It would be fair to say that the immediate post war 
context was one of hardship and threat and that this is significant in understanding why 
the first government of the newly independent Croatia (HDZ26) was, for all the stated 
commitment to democracy, in practice authoritarian. Its emphasis was on maintaining 
national independence through the promotion of cultural homogeneity and spiritual 
renewal. National survival made little room for democratic changes in the first instance. 
Spaji#-Vrka", (2003, p.3) argues that the autocratic government of the HDZ bungled ten 
years of transition, aided by inappropriate international pressure to speed up reform. She 
suggests that the HDZ over emphasised the need for homogenisation at the expense of 
wider human rights. Nepotism was widely practised; there was an opaque and vague 
legal system. Economic recovery from the war was a disaster and, somewhat ironically, 
the middle class disappeared. They had been quite strong under the old (non-Soviet) 
 
26 Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union) 
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Yugoslav system. A new class emerged - the nouveau riches (dubbed the mafiocracy) 
and there were a large majority of impoverished citizens. 
 
 
Spaji#-Vrka", suggests that the post-war situation in Croatia and the handling of the 
transition period was symptomatic of a lack of what she implies is a lack of social 
maturity in the region and failures of those in authority to fill the ‘compliance gap’ (op. 
cit. p.4). This view is challenged robustly by Kymlicka and Opalski, 2001, and in 
Kymlicka’s further writing in 2002. These scholars question the view that a democratic 
maturity continuum exists or that liberal democratic models from the West can easily be 
transferred to central and eastern European countries (CEEs). It is not, in their view, that 
this part of the world in not ‘ready’ for liberal democracy and that this part of the world 
are relics of pre modern or pre liberal tribalism but that other complex factors abound. 
New national governments should not be judged on their ability to ‘comply’ with 
traditional democratic models. One of the most prominent factors differentiating CEE 
country responses to liberal democratic nation building, in their view, is the treatment of 
minority groups. As Kymlicka (2002, p.20) says here: 
 
In CEE countries many dominant groups throughout  
the region feel they have been victimized by their 
minorities acting in collaboration with foreign enemies. 
(Slovakia re the Hungarian minority; Baltics re the 
Russian minority; Croatia re the Serbian minority; 
Bulgarians re the Turkish minority). 
 
There is therefore an understandable concern that minorities may be disloyal, that a 
strong state requires relatively weak and disempowered minorities and that therefore the 
treatment of national minorities is a matter of national security. Kymlicka suggests that 
there is a sort of ‘zero sum game’ understanding of the relations between minorities and 
!$%" 
states in this situation and whilst he does not suggest it is the most constructive view, 
and can in fact cause damage to minority-majority relations in the long term, he does 
suggest that it is at some level a reasonable view given the historical context. Whatever 
the reasons for the authoritarianism and quasi-autocratic governance in the immediate 
period after independence, education policy in Croatia reflected this focus on short-term 
survival and containment of national minority views. Whilst Education for Democratic 
Citizenship (EDC) and human rights were accepted as key goals in the immediate post 
war education context or the early 1990s, it is debatable how far these ideas were really 
implemented in practice in the earlier years of independence. It is worth noting here that 
the very fact that human rights and democratic aims had such high status in the stated 
aims of the new government is not to be trivialised. The stated aims did go beyond mere 
rhetoric, even if the practice took some time to catch up. 
 
 
There were tensions, then, between the curricular liberal democratic ideals and the 
practice at school and classroom level. There were also mixed messages being conveyed 
through the content of the civic curriculum and the mostly didactic, authoritarian means 
by which it was delivered. There were, however, also tensions at the level of principle at 
curricular level. The History curriculum was chosen as the primary source of building 
national solidarity whilst the civics curriculum was the source for developing children’s 
democratic knowledge and dispositions. What emerged was a fairly narrow conception 
of civic virtue in these early years and a fairly formidable sense of Croatian national 
identity based on some deliberate historical revisionism. 
 
 
Several scholars worked on the content of history textbooks in post war Croatia, most 
notably,  Ivo  Makek,  Josip  Adamcek,  Agneza  Szabo  and  Ivo  Peri#.  Ivo  Makek’s 
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textbooks remained in schools in the early days of independence and were updated with 
the help of Josip Adamcek. (Cited in ESI, 2015). Their purpose did seem to be directed 
towards reviving or creating a sense of the ancient rights of Croatians and the thousand- 
year claim to statehood being thwarted by enemies, including the Serbs. As one Serb 
scholar, in a very critical article about Croatian textbook history, suggested: ‘[here] 
Malek probably stated the greatest untruth in the whole textbook: that from the 10th to 
the 20th century, during a stormy millennium, from the Drava to the Adriatic Sea there 
was only one state – Croatia’ (cited in ESI, 2015). Other examples of politicised history 
in the early years of history education abound. Agneza Szabo, an influential actor in 
President Tudjman's campaign, was appointed special consultant for history textbooks  
at the ministry and her stated aim was to foster ‘healthy patriotism’ among the young. 
Many accusations of distortion to portray Croatia as heroic, innocent and victims of  
Serb oppression have been levelled at her. However, at the time President Tudjman was 
happy with Szabo's curriculum and awarded her a presidential decoration declaring that 
he appreciated that ‘Croatia's new nationalist history offered a sense of orientation to a 
generation growing up in a country at war’ (ESI, p.12). Ivo Peri# has been accused of 
similarly distorting national history for patriotic purposes, for example, in relation to 
what is known as the Bleiburg incident. At the end of the Second World War, tens of 
thousands of Croatian officials, soldiers and civilians had fled to the border town of 
Bleiburg in southern Austria. They were handed over by British troops to the Yugoslav 
Partisans. Thousands were executed on the spot. Peri#'s textbook emphasised that 
towards the end of the war many (Serb) Chetnik fighters joined the Partisans: ‘Those 
former Chetniks/Partisans hated anything Croatian and Catholic … and showed it 
everywhere, committing crimes: theft, maltreatment, killings’ (p.11). No mention, for 
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example, is made of the responsibility of Tito (who was half Croat) or of other senior 
communist leaders. 
 
 
In recent years, however, some Croatian historians, teachers, students and some parents, 
have vigorously challenged these nationalist distortions. Kre"imir Erdelja, a history 
teacher at a Zagreb primary school, describes the need for ‘adult history’ teaching as 
opposed to nationalist history teaching in Croatian schools. And when the national 
curriculum was revised in 2000 this gave some other authors the opportunity to produce 
History textbooks in ‘an open society to prepare students for citizenship in a world 
where values clash and where all institutions are imperfect – a world where, 
unnervingly, even those we admire may be responsible for crimes’ (ESI, p.iii). Erdelja 
and Igor Stojakovi#, submitted a manuscript that broke new ground. In their book, they 
included atrocities committed by the Ustasha regime, by communist partisans, by 
Serbian forces against Croats in the early 1990s and by Croatian forces against Serb 
civilians in 1995. In the relatively new Croatian nation this aroused some debate. As the 
ESI report states here (op. cit. p.3): 
 
This elicited criticism from the former curriculum 
developers… For Szabo and her colleagues, it was not 
sufficient that [Erdelja] referred to crimes committed by 
Serbian forces in earlier passages of his book. They 
wanted to preserve the image of Croats as victims and 
Serbs as perpetrators at all times. [An] open letter 
called for the textbooks by Erdelja … to be withdrawn. 
 
This attempted suppression of new history textbooks failed. Other historians signed the 
open letter defending Erdelja against Szabo and her colleagues. The HDZ-led ministry 
of education agreed to allow the continuation of these textbooks and by 2011 the most 
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widely used book was the one by Kre"imir Erdelja and Igor Stojakovi#. This 
progression and signs of strengthening democracy seem set to continue. In June 2016 
there was a large demonstration in Zagreb, attended mostly by teachers, students and 
parents, asking for a ‘party politics free’ curriculum and better quality textbooks that 
align to contemporary liberal democratic standards27. 
 
This development in nation building patriotic education has, of course, taken place 
within wider societal developments and a political context including Croatia’s 
membership of EU membership since 2013. The most recent national curriculum, 
devised in 2010, explicitly privileges lifelong learning competencies alongside a 
continued emphasis on patriotism, which is stated as the second most important 
educational goal. As the Croatian National Curriculum Framework states here (Ministry 
of Science, Education and Sports, 2010, p. 15): 
 
Educational Goal 1: providing a systematic method of 
teaching students which fosters and enhances their 
intellectual, physical, aesthetical, social, moral, and 
spiritual development in keeping with their  abilities 
and aptitudes. Educational Goal 2: developing student 
awareness regarding the preservation of Croatian 
national identity as well as the material, spiritual, 
historical, and cultural heritage of the Republic of 
Croatia. 
 
Over the last two decades Croatia’s nation-building education agenda has moved from a 
more civic nationalist approach away from a more ‘ethnic’ nationalism. As Michael 
Ignatieff says here, (1994, pp. 3–6): 
 
'$"25,000 people gathered in central Zagreb, and in several other Croatian cities, to call for a politics free 
curriculum against the staunchly conservative group in the government who wants its views reflected in 
teaching materials about controversial social issues. The slogan used by demonstrators is ‘Croatia can do 
better’. 
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Civic nationalism is democratic in character, envisaging 
the nation as a community of equal, rights-bearing 
citizens, patriotically attached to a shared set of  
political practices and values. In contrast, ethnic 
nationalism sees national identity as based on ethnicity 
rather than citizenship and law. Whilst civic 
nationalism can be rational, flexible, pluralistic and 
morally rich, ethnic nationalism is tempted by 
irrationality, fanaticism and authoritarianism. 
 
And, arguably, Croatia has gone further than this and moved towards a more nuanced 
version of patriotic education that includes an emphasis on democratic values alongside 
national affiliation understood as ‘shared fate’ rather than national identity (Ben-Porath, 
p.35). The question remains whether there were some lost years in the early transitional 
stage and whether the country might have moved faster towards this to greater effect in 
terms of its democratic development as well as national building agenda. Its immediate 
recourse to nationalist identity-building education may have been an unwarranted 
distraction and arguably counter-productive. We shall return to this question below. But 
before that we shall focus on Lebanon as another interesting test case of patriotic nation- 
building education. 
 
Patriotic education for nation building in Lebanon 
 
The nation-building educational project in Lebanon has had a longer, more protracted 
and more complex history than Croatia’s. It is not possible to do the country’s history 
justice here but others have done this admirably (e.g. Lebanese historians: Fattah, 2007, 
Salibi, 1988 and Traboulsi, 2012 and non-Lebanese historians: Fisk, 2001, Harris, 2012). 
I shall provide some high level background only as this will be necessary to understand 
modern day Lebanon and its continuing nation-building educational challenges. 
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After the First World War the emergent nation’s boundaries were set by colonial powers. 
As Salami (2014) says here: 
 
 
The demographics of Lebanon were profoundly altered 
in 1919, as the added territory contained people who 
were predominantly Muslim or Druze: Lebanese 
Christians, of which the Maronites were the largest 
subgrouping, now constituted barely more than 50% of 
the population, while Sunni Muslims in Lebanon saw 
their numbers increase eightfold, and the Shi'ite 
Muslims fourfold. The Modern Lebanon's constitution, 
drawn up in 1926, specified a balance of power between 
the various religious groups, but France designed it to 
guarantee the political dominance of its Christian allies 
(2014, p.30). 
 
And the terms set on the difficult road to independence in 1943, under a then Vichy 
government in France as France was still under Nazi occupation, are still evident in 
remaining divisions today. For example, the nation compromised five distinct groups in 
1943 and many of the tensions between these religious and culturally distinct groups 
remain evident today. The French-backed Maronite Christian groups dominated politics 
after 1943 and to an extent continue to do today. Considerable tensions remain between 
the more economically advantaged Sunni Muslim groups and the politically active, 
through more economically disadvantaged Shia’a Muslims. The formation of Israel on 
Lebanon’s southern border in 1948 had profound consequences for the country. For 
example, during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Lebanon played no active role in it but was 
profoundly affected by its aftermath when Palestinians used Lebanon as a base for 
attacks on Israel. Thousands of refugees have sought refuge in Lebanon since the 1960s. 
There has been a very damaging civil war in Lebanon 1975-90 started when Christian 
militia attacked Palestinians, which led to retaliations. There continue to be Christian- 
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Muslim tensions, not least because some Lebanese Christians welcomed the invasion of 
Lebanon by Israel in 1982 as defence against the increasing power of Syrian-based 
Hezbollah. Lebanon is also a crucial battleground that falls between Iran and Israel’s 
interests. The Syrian conflict that began in March 2011 spilled over into Lebanon in 
deadly clashes between Sunni Muslims and Alawites (a branch of Shi’a) in Beirut and 
Tripoli. And finally the Syrian war has led to a huge refugee population increase since 
2013 seeing the overall population rise from approximately 4.5 million to over 6 million 
in a very short space of time. This creates overwhelming human challenges, not least for 
educational infrastructure. 
 
 
This protracted, complex and devastating conflict is an extremely challenging context 
for nation-building education. There are certainly no easy answers, especially given the 
lack of infrastructure and resources. Indeed, these material challenges might be viewed 
as quite enough alone for policy makers and government ministers to manage. However, 
some Lebanese educationalists are critical of the failures of the state nation-building 
education programme and its inability to diminish the strong sub national identities. 
Nabil Constantine, in his doctoral thesis on multicultural education in Lebanon (2012), 
argues that unfortunately loyalty to the nation always comes second to citizens’ sub 
group identity and that this helps perpetuate historical divisions. Whilst social cohesion 
has been one of the key stated goals of education in Lebanon over the last few decades, 
Constantine argues that the policy and curriculum reforms have not contributed 
adequately to this goal. For example, the Ta’if agreement that ended the civil war in 
1990 entrusted the Educational Centre for Research and Development (ECRD), a 
government department, with developing a history curriculum and textbook  in an effort 
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to provide ‘united, post-civil war national identity’ (Volk, 2008, p.309). But the 
consensus is that it failed. 
 
 
Hassan M. Fattah has written a history of history teaching in Lebanon entitled ‘A  
Nation with a Long Memory, but a Truncated History’ (2007), where he points to many 
of the distortions involved in this enterprise - and their consequences. Whilst his first 
claim about the universal purposes of History teaching may be contentious, the point he 
makes about Lebanon’s truncated history teaching remains salient. As he says here: 
 
History classes across the globe serve two purposes — 
they educate the young and they  shape  national 
identity. They also often sidestep controversy to avoid 
offence. It is the same here [in Lebanon] as elsewhere, 
but the controversy being avoided is the vicious, 15-year 
civil war that started in 1975. […] The bizarre results 
are evident in any schoolbook here — history seems 
simply to come to a halt in the early 1970s, Lebanon’s 
heyday. With sectarian tensions once again boiling here, 
some educators fear that the failure to forge a common 
version of the events is dooming the young to repeat the 
past, with most of them learning contemporary history 
from their families, on the streets or from political 
leaders who may have their own agendas. 
 
And a former director of the ECRD, Nemer Frayha, concurs when she states that 
‘America used the school to create a melting pot; we used it to reinforce sectarian 
identity at the expense of the national identity […] From the start, I am forming the 
student as a sectarian person, not as a citizen’ (cited in Fattah, 2007, p.1). And other 
policy failures further contributed to this lack of common curricula purpose when a 
stated commitment to revise and unify the content and purposes of the civics and history 
curriculum was reneged upon. As Fattah says here (op. cit. p.2): 
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Under the 1989 Ta’if accords that ended the civil war, 
Lebanon agreed to unify its history and civics 
curriculums with the hope of building a national 
consensus and a more solid national identity. Nearly 
two decades later, however, the history and civics 
curriculums are the only subjects that have not been 
revamped, and are still seen as the third rail of 
Lebanese politics. 
 
Milhem Chaoul, a professor of sociology at the University of Lebanon provides some 
insight into the reasons for the challenges over the history curriculum in Lebanon. 
‘Typically the victor writes the history and the problem with the civil war was that 
nobody won, and you still can’t write its history because we are still not at peace.’ 
(ibid.). 
 
Practitioners and students in many Lebanese schools feel this sense of uneasy peace. I 
have experienced this first hand in my work in the country in 2014 – 15, when I 
conducted focus groups of head teachers and staff in order to inform the content and 
delivery of a capacity building leadership programme and the development of new 
national standards for head teachers.  And this is borne out by a recent empirical study  
in five primary schools in Lebanon. Van Ommering (2015) found that history teachers 
frequently sought to avoid or silence discussions of the civil war arguing that teachers 
operate in a ‘complex web of power relations’ which he described as consisting of 
‘students’ interest in understanding the society in which they live; the limited contents  
of the national history curriculum; the didactic outlook that radiates from history 
textbooks and teacher training; the pressure exerted by political parties to endorse their 
interpretations of the past; and, finally, the personal conflict histories that teachers bring 
to the classroom, shaping their capacities and perceptions’ (p.204). There is also some 
evidence that students themselves are frustrated by the omissions, knowing they are 
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getting a distorted view of the past. ‘We keep asking them when we’re going to learn   
the real history,’ says Fatima Taha, a ninth grader at Hara International College, a 
secondary school in Beirut’s southern suburbs. ‘The history just suddenly stops.’ (Fattah, 
2007, p.3). One principal lays the blame with the policy makers and curriculum planners 
arguing that ‘If they would just give us a national history, this country’s entire outlook 
would change […] the kids need realities, a history they can believe in, otherwise, they 
will never learn the meaning of citizenship’ (ibid.). The stated goals  of  education 
include promoting a unified Lebanese identity, developing social skills, and reinforcing 
the importance of democracy in a diverse country. Such a goal is clearly articulated in 
the Lebanese government’s 1994 Plan for Educational Reform, which states explicitly 
that schools should contribute to ‘the formation of a citizen who . . . recognizes the long 
national Lebanese history that, emancipated from extremist beliefs, will attain a unified, 
open and humanistic society’ (as cited in Frayha, 2003, p.85). 
 
The practice has yet to catch up with the stated aims and the conditions under which 
practitioners – and indeed policy makers and curriculum planners – are working in 
Lebanon are by no means easy, as I have witnessed. Some remarkable, tenacious and 
committed people, representing all sides of the conflict, are collaborating in the Ministry 
of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) to improve nation building policy and 
practice. New national standards for schools and leaders have been developed as part of 
the project I worked on. These standards aim to reflect a nation building liberal agenda 
aiming to strengthen the national community as well as contributing to creation of 
global citizens too. As an excerpt of the leadership standards framework expresses it 
(2015, p.7): 
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Principals work within the social, political and local 
circumstances as well as contribute to the future of the 
national and global community. Successful principals 
are highly resilient and resourceful professionals who 
continuously strive to improve their schools, and the 
lives of their students, in the face of challenges. 
Successful principals harness opportunities and build 
upon success. They embrace change that improves the 
lives and opportunities for their students and their 
community. Lebanon’s Principals Standards  
Framework has been collaboratively developed to 
embrace these ideas and to support their realisation. 
 
There is clearly some political will to strengthen the educational nation building agenda, 
which sets out to strengthen democracy and national solidarity. However, whilst the 
history curriculum remains unreformed this task may be harder. And, as in the case of 
Croatia’s nation building curriculum, some more comprehensive and truthful historical 
content along with deliberative, democratic teaching methods may have expedited the 
process. 
 
 
Patriotic education for nation building in Lithuania 
 
Lithuania, like Croatia, has a complex national history involving periods of conquest, 
independence, division, occupation and invasion. Whilst its recent independence was 
not ‘forged in war’ to the extent Croatia’s was it has had difficult legacies to content 
with. Terry McLaughlin captures these here (2006, p.28): 
 
In 1795 Russia absorbed most of Lithuania. In 1863 
there was a national uprising against Tsarist rule, 
which led to forced emigration, and to increased 
repression. Although the uprising failed, it led to a 
revival of Lithuanian language and tradition. Lithuania 
was occupied by Germany in the First World War from 
1915. In 1918 Lithuanian independence was declared. 
[…]  During  the  Second  World  War,  Lithuania  was 
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subjected first to Soviet and then to Nazi occupation. 
From 1944, after the return of Soviet troops, Lithuania 
was incorporated into the USSR. Over 250,000 
Lithuanians were deported to the Gulag. A guerrilla  
war waged by Lithuanian partisans continued until 
1953. […] In 1989, on the fiftieth anniversary of the 
signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact, over  two 
million Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians joined 
hands in protest in a human chain stretching from 
Vilnius to Tallinn. 
 
 
Lithuanian Independence was declared in 1990 after the first free elections since 1940 
were held. Before its full acceptance by Russia and the wider world, this declaration of 
independence was followed by a blockade by the USSR and a number of violent 
incidents between Soviet troops and civilians. In common with many countries in the 
former USSR, Lithuania has had to contend with long periods of domination and 
oppression and its current process of democratisation has to confront these along with 
current geo-political and economic challenges. 
 
As with the Croatian nation building journey, there are many aspects of their context 
that have made an ‘ethnic’ rather than a ‘civic’ conception of national identity more 
tempting. As McLaughlin and Juceviciene (1997) say: ‘The long history of domination 
and oppression, for example, has heightened rather than diminished Lithuanian national 
sentiment, which has survived in circumstances of adversity for many centuries’ (p.30). 
This strengthened national pride, coupled with a lack of confidence in politicians and 
political processes, has contributed to an emphasis on strengthened national identity and 
somewhat ‘inhibited the evolution of Lithuania into democracy and into developing a 
‘civic’ national identity rather than civic processes’ (op. cit. p.32). However, a number 
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of developments since 1991 have supported the promotion of a ‘civic’ conception of 
national identity. 
 
The Science Council of Lithuania is currently 
encouraging universities to accept the additional 
responsibility of education for citizenship. Recent 
initiatives from other quarters convey a similar  
message to schools. The Lithuanian ‘General 
Conception of Education’ was formulated in 1992. This 
conception, at least at the level of principle, seems 
markedly similar to the conception of liberal democratic 
education [and] contains a mixture of ‘universal’ and 
‘particular’ elements (op. cit. p.33). 
 
 
The ‘universal’ elements are reflected in the underlying principles of freedom and 
responsibility of individuals and the primacy of democratic aims and values. Principles 
reflecting the ‘particular’ side convey a commitment to nurturing Lithuanian culture, 
identity and historical continuity, whilst simultaneously ‘emphasising the values of 
pluralism (in relation, for example, to minority groups) and the need for a critical 
acceptance of change’ (ibid.). This laid the foundation for education for Lithuanian 
national identity to be seen in ‘civic’ terms, which has been borne out by subsequent 
developments in policy and curriculum development. As Irena Zaleskene (2011, p.76) 
comments in her analysis of citizenship education developments in Lithuania: 
 
In recent years [Citizenship Education] has been a 
movement towards strengthening schools based on civic 
education that emphasizes instruction in the 
fundamental processes and instruments of democracy 
and government. Lithuanian developers of Citizenship 
Education look for new approaches reflecting needs of 
the contemporary global world. One of such approaches 
is Service-learning which could be described as an 
approach that combines a community service  
experience with classroom instruction and reflection; it 
has been suggested as an opportunity to bring to life 
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important political and social issues and thereby 
encourage youth activism and engagement. 
 
 
Illiberal means to desired liberal ends? 
 
Arguably all three nations discussed above deployed illiberal means to achieve liberal 
ends and in all three cases it has been more or less problematic. In the Lithuanian and 
Croatian nation building journeys, resurgent nationalism was one of the most important 
legacies of both countries at the outset of their independence. At the state policy level, 
given that both countries were set on becoming democracies, there was explicit 
commitment to both the civic and national elements of the curriculum. Despite this, and 
unsurprisingly perhaps, some aspects of the curriculum and at the level of practice, a 
more ‘ethnic’ national identity was promoted in the early years of independence. Whilst 
some elements of this ‘common nationality’ agenda remain, policy, curricula revisions 
and practice have developed in both countries, towards a more ‘civic’ version of 
national solidarity. But policy makers initially fell prey to the problems identified in 
Chapter 5 concerning legitimate forms of progressive patriotic education. Croatia and 
Lithuania both wrestled with elements of the distortion problem and enhanced the ethnic 
rather than civic features of national solidarity. Lebanese education planners did this as 
well where the absence of a strong national culture remains problematic. Patriotic 
education in Lebanon has so far failed to overcome strong sub identities which continue 
to undermine the fragile democratic state. This failure has been, at least in part, 
attributed to the distortion problem too. The history curriculum has been distorted and 
fallen short of telling a full and truthful story of the nation’s past. And, along with those 
in Lithuania and Croatia, Lebanese curriculum developers have fallen prey to what 
Archard  described  as  ‘falsifying  national  sentimentalism’  with  at  least  two  of  the 
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concomitant problems that Callan identified which can flow from this, namely a 
truncated historical imagination and a propensity to filter complex problems (see 
Chapter 5). It seems too that initially in Croatia and Lithuania policy makers did not 
heed the ‘global justice’ critique. Patriotic education in these contexts did not give 
sufficient attention to the principle of equal respect for all persons, by privileging some 
ethnic groups over others. And, arguably in Lebanon, the curriculum has not been 
developed sufficiently to allow the nation to be ‘emancipated from extremist beliefs’ 
(see above) which denies students the opportunity to develop as critical, rational 
inquirers. 
 
It seems important to state again that I do not underestimate the challenges in these 
contexts and do not want to come across as unreasonably critical. My aim is to show 
that illiberal patriotic education has not been efficacious in delivering the desired 
national solidarity as the foundation or liberal democracy in these cases. My contention 
is that if patriotic education had passed the liberal test outlined in the previous chapter 
the benefits to these societies may have been greater or at least the pace of change  
faster. 
 
We now turn, briefly, towards nations with more established democratic traditions in 
which citizenship is considered to be - to some degree - ‘under fire’ (Ben-Porath, 2006) 
and where these challenges have also been met with illiberal educational responses. 
 
‘Citizenship under fire’ in more established democracies 
 
Ben-Porath in her book Citizenship Under Fire (2006) defends a role for patriotic 
education but critiques the common tendencies of societies in conflict to limit 
educational  opportunities  for  the  young,  that  both  damages  the  individuals  and the 
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societies themselves. She focuses on the response of the USA since 9/11 suggesting that 
there are remarkable similarities in the way Israel and the USA have responded 
educationally to albeit very different kinds of national threat. There are aspects of the 
response in the USA that equate to being in a state of war, she argues. As a consequence, 
the USA, like Israel, has tended to unite ‘around common values such as narrower   
forms of patriotism and suppression of other forms of ideological difference’ (op. cit. 
p.5). There is also a tendency for the public agenda to narrow and limits to be placed on 
what might be ‘taken for granted’ civic freedoms. As such, she continues: ‘Expectations 
of good citizenship are hence related more to compliance and support of the basic needs 
of society as those are constructed through the lens of security threats’ (p.14). A further 
democratic casualty of this is that certain kinds of public deliberation have been 
suspended or limited. As she says here: ‘Deliberation is far less encouraged in a state of 
war than in other times or the ideal that democratic models aspire to’ and a more 
worrying consequence of this narrowing public debate is tolerance of contradictory  
views which can take the form of ‘self-censorship, the subsiding tolerance in the public 
for hearing corresponding with a variety of perspectives and for the silencing effect of 
this intolerance’ (p.15). This, more belligerent, form of patriotic education, Ben-Porath 
argues, has been the response of these two nations in the face of their different threats. 
 
 
The purpose of including the USA within this analysis of patriotic education for nation 
building is to suggest that there are some important lessons to be drawn from an 
established democracy that sees its liberal traditions or national cohesion being 
substantially undermined. It, like some newly independent post conflict, post- 
communist or threatened nations, has responded to threats by introducing what Ben- 
Porath describes as more ‘belligerent’ forms of patriotic education (op. cit. p.2). The 
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remarks of a Yale University historian and professor emeritus, Donald Kagan, who gave 
a talk entitled ‘Democracy Requires a Patriotic Education’ in the week after the 9/11 
attacks illustrates this point: 
 
 
In the long and deadly battle against those who hate 
Western ideals, and hate America in particular, we 
must be powerfully armed, morally as well as 
materially. To sustain us through the worst times we 
need courage and unity, and these must rest on a 
justified and informed patriotism (2001). 
 
This approach, focused on the formation of a kind of belligerent unity, comes at too  
high a price for the long term preservation or health of democracy even when the threat 
to a nation is imminent or prolonged. Nation building where education is overly focused 
on patriotic education for unity comes at too high a price. As Ben-Porath argues (p.21): 
 
Beware a thin veil of unity in post conflict education - it 
threatens the existence of meaningful public space.  
First this unity is thin, elusive and exclusionary and 
therefore cultivates intolerance towards various sub 
groups […] Cultural content relevant to minorities are 
often not reflected in the public sphere. This cost is 
mainly borne by minorities but also borne by democracy 
itself. 
 
In other words, shaping civic memory, however urgent the context, should not fall into 
bad faith – as we argued in Chapter Five. This kind of public manipulation ultimately 
threatens people’s capacity for rational deliberation and will inevitably build shaky 
foundations for future democratic nation building. Avoiding or eliminating controversial 
topics will store up trouble in the long run. Issues that have been ignored or suppressed 
‘could rise into the public sphere with a vengeance’, Ben-Porath argues, and ‘against the 
backdrop of a decline in the commitment to democracy that characterises periods of 
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conflict this situation could be perilous to social cohesion’ (p.18). This seems 
particularly prescient given the recent election results in the USA. Many respected 
public figures, including Republican politicians, are arguing that their new President- 
Elect is being financially and politically backed by white supremacists such as the Ku 
Klux Klan and some are calling for the reversal of the controversial appointment of 
Steve Bannon, a former head of the online racist platform ‘Breitbart’ as Trump’s senior 
adviser. Republican strategist John Weaver has stated that ‘the racist, fascist extreme 
right is represented footsteps from the Oval Office’ (Jones, 2016). 
 
 
And Richard Rorty concurs that the shaping of civic memory should not fall into bad 
faith. He suggests that, for example, sugar coating history for the purpose of national 
solidarity produces very high and destructive levels of cynicism when youngsters get 
older (1997, p.11). The UK’s citizenship agenda too, as we saw in Chapter One, has 
recently shifted towards a more muscular focus on common and shared British values 
which have to be actively promoted since 2014, rather than simply ‘respected’. This 
shift has raised considerable concern from commentators (see Chapter One) as well as 
school leaders and teachers. It came explicitly from the then Education Secretary’s fear 
that ‘ideologues and zealots [were] aiming to promote a strand of Sunni Islam’ in a 
number of British schools. Even well established liberal democracies, then, can resort to 
what might be described as illiberal responses when under a real or perceived threat to 
certain liberal freedoms. Actively promoting British values in British schools could be 
seen as falling prey to the distortion problem. For example, ‘British values’ are not seen 
as contributing to an evolving concept of what it might mean to be British but to a   
single identity best accessed through an understanding of ‘our island story’, as proposed 
by Gove (2010). 
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Is cosmopolitan education the answer? 
 
One alternative to belligerent or sugar coated patriotic education is to present a case for 
cosmopolitan citizenship in both fragile new democratic contexts as well as established 
ones, as we discussed in Chapter Five. This approach arguably supports teachers 
presenting a more global conception of humanity when they are faced with the real 
challenges of conducting classes where children are victims of recent civil war, have  
lost family, have parents currently serving in the military and so on. Osler and Starkey 
suggest that cosmopolitanism is an alternative to these potentially divisive features of 
patriotic education. As they argue here (2015, p.1): 
 
Rather than focusing on differences and cultural 
barriers to be overcome, education for cosmopolitan 
citizenship starts from our common humanity. Teachers 
are professionals who should ground their actions and 
judgments in the normative standards of human rights 
law such as the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC). This provides a language for 
identifying and naming injustices and discriminations 
and enables dialogue across difference. Rather than 
having a primary sense of belonging focused on 
membership of a nation-state, education for 
cosmopolitan citizenship accepts that learners celebrate 
multiple identities and loyalties. 
 
However, whilst this approach has appeal - and one would not want to exclude this kind 
of global awareness and justice agenda - it does not address the fact that war time 
creates a greater need to foster and enhance civic relations among members of the 
nation, to expand the public agenda, to encourage participation and engagement and to 
support an inclusive conception of citizenship. And, furthermore, on a separate but 
important note, it may be questioned whether the idea of global citizenship is a valid 
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one. Citizenship incurs certain legally enforceable rights and responsibilities but the 
concept of global citizenship does not seem to acknowledge or incorporate this idea. 
 
 
Ben-Porath suggests that abandoning the patriotic purpose to nation building education 
may weaken perseverance when citizens are under stress and, perhaps worse, that 
papering over divisions ‘can create antagonism and it may backfire or it may render the 
civic education effort detached and irrelevant’ (2006, p.52). For various purposes, but 
perhaps especially for nation building, affective attachments to the nation itself and to 
fellow citizens are, arguably, important pre requisites. This does not, however, equate to 
teaching for common national identity in some straightforward way. Whilst encouraging 
citizens to regard themselves as members of the nation by identity can be helpful in 
promoting cooperation and solidarity, it also has its dangers. It can also require an 
assumption, and potentially political backing too, that, as Macedo says, ‘diversity be 
kept in its place’ (2003, p.3). It may amount to a mere containment of diversity rather 
than a generous tolerance or even a means to embrace it. Instilling civic affiliations in 
the form of national identity through state education could, therefore, unintentionally 
damage the cause of democratic nation building. 
 
 
Patriotic education where citizenship is based on concept of shared fate 
 
Ben-Porath suggests a way out of this difficulty. Democratic societies, she suggests,  
‘are better served by a public education focusing on what the citizenry shares … rather 
than their personal or communal identity’ (op. cit. p.27). This concept of ‘shared fate’ 
does not describe social membership as evident. Instead it suggests that ties among 
members of the community and mutual effects are as a result of their common context 
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and political choices. As Billy Bragg puts it, national identity based on ‘place and space 
not race’ (2006, p.281). Citizenship as shared fate can be based on a shared cultural 
identity, much like citizenship as identity, but it also involves a shared sense of national 
belonging based on institutional linkages, such as representative government, material 
linkages, and ‘seeing our own narratives’ as enshrined with those of others’ (Williams, 
2003, p.231). As Ben-Porath argues: 
 
Conceptualising citizenship as ‘shared fate’ offers a  
more persuasive understanding of citizenship as well as 
a more promising educational endeavour […] it 
encourages the students and teachers to  understand 
and identify with their nation and with its complex 
history, to own it and thus be willing to amend what 
needs to be amended (p.53). 
 
Harnessing education to the purposes of building peace requires, what Ben-Porath 
describes as, ‘expansive education’. It aims to protect, and arguably build, democracy 
and citizens’ entitlements to liberal education against a narrowing agenda that often 
accompanies war or social conflict. And importantly, she argues convincingly that it is 
unwise to ignore the emotions and feeling that accompany this desire to contract into a 
more solid national culture or to restrict debate and so on. These emotions need to be 
harnessed into a more nuanced version of patriotic education where people ‘learn to feel 
and be united as a nation but also learn democratic principles, practices and 
commitment’ (op. cit. p.31). Constructing national identity as shared fate makes it 
possible for patriotic education to take on essentially deliberative and interpretive 
components. There is an underlying assumption that one can reinterpret one’s national 
group over time. Indeed, some reinterpretation may need to happen at the outset of an 
educational endeavour of this kind. What Ben-Porath describes as ‘reverse patriotic 
education’  may  need  to  take  place  when  a  national  identity  has  been  overly 
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mythologised. This kind of education can still focus on the nation but not solely on its 
mythic status. As she puts it: ‘Having a sense of ourselves as members of a community 
of fate entails telling ourselves (true) stories about how we came to be connected’. And 
further: 
 
The objective of this process is not the unquestioning 
endorsement of one’s nationality. To the contrary it is 
the understanding of the open flexible and contingent 
nature of national and communal affiliations as a  
shared project… Rather it is a demand for an active 
participation in the construction of an historic 
community that is not constrained by a final vision of 
the good and the social life or common good (p.120). 
 
Deliberation about diverse and competing views would inevitably be a part of this kind 
of nation building project. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Given the limits of the educational responses and consequences therein of all the 
countries explored above, an alternative conception of patriotic education for nation 
building or national renewal does seem to be needed. It is clear that the kind of 
interpretative project that Ben-Porath is advocating should certainly be seen as a long- 
term investment, and will require time, patience and hard intellectual work. There is no 
suggestion that it the easy route to take, but it is probably the best one. The short term 
gains of patriotic education that distorts national history, avoids historical truth and 
quashes diversity - even in the face of terrible post conflict divisions - does not pay off 
in the long run. Conceiving of a national identity as shared fate, acknowledging the 
emotions of emergent or threatened national sentiment and harnessing these to a 
collective, interpretative project seems to serve the building and preservation of liberal 
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democracies better than any of the alternatives. Any nation-building project for liberal 
democracy needs to fulfil certain conditions and satisfactorily pass some test of  
principle – whether in conditions of war or peace. These include the requirements that, 
as we argued in Chapter Five and as Soutphommasane says here: 
 
Nation building policies should not violate basic 
individual rights: they should not discriminate against 
persons on the basis of race, ethnicity or religion, or 
coalesce persons into abandoning their identity in a way 
that denies them a right to free conscience, expression 
for association (2012, p.208). 
 
Furthermore, nation-building policies need to be justified in relation to what might be 
described as public reason. There should never be attempts ‘to mislead or misrepresent 
the public about either certain minorities or the particular national identity that is being 
promoted. It would be unacceptable, for example, for public authorities to fabricate 
claims about immigrant groups being prone to higher levels of criminality or welfare 
fraud in framing their policies on integration’ (ibid.). And finally, in any liberal 
democratic nation-building project, in war or peace, it should be possible for minority 
groups to genuinely affect the outcomes of the shared national identity. The temptation 
to resort to illiberal means to achieve liberal ends is a temptation to be strongly resisted. 
A nuanced version of patriotic education for nation building is required as much in post 
conflict or warring context as it is in established liberal democracies given the threats 
they face. 
 
 
Overall the argument, that it may be justifiable to tolerate more illiberal elements of 
patriotic education in the short term for the sake of either building, renewing or 
defending a liberal democratic state, has been examined and defeated in this chapter. A 
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form of patriotic education based on the concept of ‘shared fate’ rather than national 
identity is proposed as a viable alternative to more belligerent patriotic education in all 
liberal democratic contexts. The next chapter will outline this version of patriotic 
education more fully. 
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CHAPTER 7: WHAT KIND OF PATRIOTIC EDUCATION IS 
NEEDED  IN  LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES? 
This chapter sets out a normative case for including patriotic education in established 
liberal democracies and provides recommendations for its form and content as well as 
the optimal pedagogical approach for its delivery. The case is made for patriotic 
education to take the form of a national education project or national conversation that 
involves collective, open and deliberative participation. Progressive patriotic education 
also involves teaching children and young people about the importance of love in 
relation to loving one’s country and providing ways for them to develop a kind of tough 
love towards their plural, ever-evolving nation. Patriotic love, like any kind of love, can 
be prone to pathological distortion, as discussed in Chapter Two. As we saw in Chapter 
Four, a tribal, xenophobic, fascist patriot may love her country as much as a social 
democratic civic patriot but, to use Callan’s term, they may not love their country well 
(Callan, 2006, p.527). The kind of teaching of patriotic love promoted as part of 
progressive patriotic education involves learning to love your country well. This kind of 
love includes important features of any kind of love, including a sense of deep care and 
some constancy. It is worth repeating John Wilson’s description of how love manifests 
itself towards an object: ‘One is strongly attached to it in one’s mind and heart, seeks it 
out, and wishes to preserve it’ (Wilson, 1995, p.14). Patriotic love, as part of  
progressive patriotic education within a liberal context, has these universal features but 
is also about rigorous truthfulness and a capacity for criticism, as argued in Chapter 
Four. It has been argued throughout the thesis that a sense of affiliative attachment 
(defined here as patriotic love) provides an important additional ingredient to civic 
education programmes in motivating people to engage in an open-ended, liberal nation- 
building project. The normative case for patriotic education set out here suggests that 
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patriotic love can be explicitly taught about and that the means of teaching through an 
open-ended dialogue about desired outcomes of a plural, liberal nation will engender 
trust and a sense of efficacy that leads to some form of patriotic love. And, finally, that 
engaging with a truthful and critical versions of national history, taught with a degree of 
emotional generosity, can instil affection and also motivate us towards greater national 
engagement. 
 
 
Thus far in the thesis it has been established that liberal democracies have an 
instrumental need for patriotic citizenry. The version of patriotism that has been 
defended, in Chapter Four, encourages different groups to give public expression to  
their distinctiveness and takes the form of a practice; a public dialogue of collective 
interpretation. Whilst liberal patriots and liberal nationalists give central importance to 
deliberative democracy as a means of negotiating differences, it is only this national- 
cultural project version of patriotism that gives enough motivational force for the 
necessary participation in this important democratic dialogue. It does this by 
understanding free societies’ national culture as pluralistic in its very character and 
loveable as such. This love may not be instant but it can be nurtured by engaging with a 
genuine sense of efficacy about shaping national outcomes. It has also been established, 
in Chapter Three, that any flourishing liberal democracy requires relatively high levels 
of affective national affiliation and participation from educated citizens and that this is 
predicated on some form of patriotic education. This proposed version of patriotic 
education accepts that national governments and liberal democratic institutions remain 
very important and yet levels of participation remain relatively low, as does faith in 
national politicians. Alienation from national politics, and party politics in particular, is 
high. A patriotic education that supports the necessary feat of imagination needed to 
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relate to an essentially diverse national community, and that engenders affection for this 
pluralism, is required. The patriotic education being advocated here conceives of its 
citizens sharing a common fate with the feeling and belief that they can genuinely shape 
the national community through reasonable deliberation. Care for the national 
community will be engendered through this sense of efficacy and via inclusive 
representations of the nation as worthy of emotional generosity as well as truthfulness. 
Citizens’ affective national affiliation and sense of efficacy at the national level will 
give liberal democracy vital strength. It has also been established that this form of 
patriotic education is compatible with liberal education. 
 
 
It has also been argued that the educational responses of many established liberal 
democracies has been wanting in various ways. For example, the focus on the current 
English policy context over several decades has shown that various governments have 
responded by emphasising a shared British identity or adherence to British values - 
albeit with different values being promoted by more centre-left and right wing parties. 
This focus on common national values has been coupled with an emphasis on enhancing 
political literacy and latterly, including some character education, but with an emphasis 
on performance rather than moral or civic virtues (Marshall et al, 2015). It has been 
established that civic education predicated on a common national identity or set of 
common cultural values and character education with an emphasis on performance 
virtues has not been an adequate response to the complexity of modern plural liberal 
democracies. The previous chapter established that patriotic education, under fragile 
liberal nation building conditions, needs to be construed as an open, participatory 
project, not a shared national identity-forming project, and that it has greater value as 
such.  This  chapter  sets  out  a  normative  case  for  including  patriotic  education  in 
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established liberal democracies, arguing that it too should take the form of a collective 
interpretive project. It is also argued that the educational means for achieving good 
patriotic citizens needs to mirror its desired outcomes. If, what is needed is a form of 
patriotism that is open, inclusive and interpretative, then the educational means to 
achieve this need to take a similar form. 
 
 
Does patriotism need to be taught? 
 
Before embarking on setting out the state educational case for including patriotic civic 
education, it is important to address the suggestion that patriotism is acquired without 
the aid of an explicit patriotic education programme. David Archard sets out the case 
that patriotic education is necessarily distorting which we addressed and defeated in 
Chapter Five. He makes a further point suggesting that, by definition, education is 
particularistic (national) in many ways and national understanding and affiliation is 
likely to rub off on us without it being explicitly promoted. As he continues: ‘In a very 
obvious sense every particular state-based education teaches a national, though not 
nationalist, curriculum. British children learn about the history of Britain, the lives of 
British people …’ (op. cit. p.168). And further, that there are many influences beyond 
the school that will lend weight to enlarging people’s capacity for patriotism.  
‘Education plays its proper part not in teaching us to be patriots but in teaching us what 
it is that we are, as we may be so inclined by our natures to be patriotic about. It does 
not commend our identity to us so much as clarify that identity for our own 
extracurricular commendation …’ (ibid. emphasis added). His claim amounts to the 
suggestion that state schooling conveys a national agenda anyway and that beyond the 
school’s influence we are all subjected to a number of external factors and stimuli that 
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will shape our national affiliation. Some may suggest that his claim also points to the 
impossibility of teaching love in any way apart from directing students towards those 
matters that are subject to evidential enquiry and hoping that any sentiment in relation to 
them (in this case, love) is somehow ‘caught’ as a result. This view can be challenged. 
As argued in Chapter 5, (a) liberal education places both academic and emotional 
demands on us and (b) educating emotions is not the same as manipulating them. 
Children can (and should) be taught to care for others, respect others, be tolerant, 
develop empathy and so on. And, the claim that a version of patriotism that  is  
defensible by critical reason and that will be of benefit, as Archard suggests above, will 
emerge through broadly national curricula and other extracurricular factors is highly 
questionable. Stephen Macedo (2003, p.5) suggests that it is morally acceptable and 
important to guide this kind of education albeit within what he describes as a ‘broad 
swath of liberty’. He suggests that it is not best left ‘to an invisible hand’ and that it is 
necessary to agree and construct discernible collective ends and purposes. Others have 
agreed, as we saw in Chapter Five, that any liberal education project can quite 
legitimately guide and shape students’ responses and indeed that this is necessary for 
most educational outcomes. There is empirical evidence to back up the claim that 
teaching citizenship, if not patriotism, had significant impact on student outcomes from 
a review of citizenship education in England spanning nine years (DfE, 2010). As the 
study reports here: 
 
The format, timing and duration of the citizenship 
learning experience are crucial variables: the CELS 
[Citizenship Education Longitudinal Study] analysis  
has indicated that the cohort was more likely to have 
high(er) levels of ‘received citizenship’ (and by extension, 
better citizenship outcomes) if they have attended a 
school  where  citizenship  education  is:  delivered  in  a 
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discrete slot in the timetable of over 45 minutes per 
week; developed by the teachers who are delivering the 
citizenship curriculum rather than the school’s PSHE 
coordinator; formally examined (e.g. as part of  the 
GCSE in Citizenship); delivered regularly and 
consistently throughout the cohort’s educational 
experience (Keating, 2010, p.4). 
 
The study reported that students who had higher levels of what is defined here as 
‘received citizenship’, that is formal teaching of citizenship, indicated higher levels of 
personal efficacy as citizens, for example. There is no denial that outside factors are 
important in shaping civic identity and levels of participation, too, but what is not in 
doubt is its importance on the curriculum. If we accept that the outcomes of the kind of 
patriotic education are needed in our students then it is safe to conclude that it needs to 
be explicitly taught. 
The limits of existing civic education 
 
And, indeed, some form of citizenship education is on most national curricula across the 
liberal democratic world. As outlined in Chapter One, the content and delivery of the 
citizenship education, and its patriotic components, vary considerably across different 
liberal democracies. As we discussed, McLaughlin (1992) distinguishes between a 
‘minimal’ and ‘maximal’ conception of citizenship. From the ‘minimal’ perspective, 
citizenship education is focused on providing information, for example, about the legal 
and political system and the ‘development of virtues of local and immediate focus’ – 
such as those relating to voluntary activity (op. cit. p.237). Whilst the ‘maximal’ 
interpretation of citizenship education ‘requires the development of a critical 
understanding of societal structures and processes, in order that they might be 
questioned, and ‘virtues’ that would empower students to change them’ (op. cit. p.238). 
In many contexts civic education lies somewhere on the spectrum between minimalist 
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and maximalist views and in some cases involves a rather mixed bag of each. The 
English citizenship curriculum could be described as essentially minimal with its focus 
on the practices involved in increasing political literacy but highly interventionist at the 
level of exhortation regarding promotion of British values. This is not the same as a 
maximal approach given that McLaughlin’s maximal definition involves students 
developing a critical understanding of societal structures. The current UK citizenship 
curriculum does not encourage that level of criticality towards British values. 
 
 
The introduction of promoting national solidarity into the education agenda has been a 
common response in preserving liberal democracy in response to significant threats. 
Several other liberal democracies have also recently wrestled with introducing a more 
nationalist element to civic education (for example, France, Belgium and the USA). The 
manifestations of these attempts have varied considerably and reflect  the  particular 
culture and political systems of each liberal democracy. In 2011, the French parliament 
introduced a ban on wearing the burqa or niqab in public places, including schools, as 
part of an official national debate about what is meant to be French following a similar 
move by the Belgian parliament in 2010 (Soutphommasane, 2012, p.2). This forceful 
expression of commonality can, arguably, lead to less reflection on cultural differences  
in a way that is needed and consistent with the demands of a deliberative political 
community. As Meira Levinson argues: The French model of education ‘shifts the brunt 
of liberal education from teaching toleration of private others to inculcating mutual 
respect for public similars (1999, p.125, original emphasis). The USA Patriot Act (2001) 
has, arguably, politicised the curriculum in many US States where, for example, there 
have recently been moves to revise school history, sociology and economics textbooks  
in order to ‘portray conservative ideas and movements in a more positive light and 
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emphasise the role of Christianity in the nation’s founding (Macedo, 2011, p.420). So, 
whilst the manifestation of the nationalistic element to civic education may vary, many 
commentators agree, the purposes are clear: the democratic nature of many free 
societies is in need of bolstering against a number of centrifugal forces that threaten to 
diminish or even destroy it (Ben-Porath, 2006; Callan, 1993; Soutphommasane, 2012; 
Taylor, 2002). This purpose is not in question here. What is being challenged is the 
adequacy of the educational responses that have been introduced thus far. 
 
Before outlining a more robust and efficacious educational response to these challenges 
it is important to state that, clearly, the blame for liberal democratic societies’ current 
vulnerabilities or failings cannot be laid squarely at the door of the education system. 
Globalisation with its growing economic inequalities, the rise of populism, mass 
migration from war and want and terror attacks are factors that are having significant 
consequences in many European liberal democracies. The recent decision of the British 
people to leave the European Union (June 23rd, 2016) has given rise to a number of 
pressing democratic questions. There is considerable evidence to suggest  that 
perceptions of overly high levels of immigration motivated large numbers of ‘Leave’ 
voters (Lordashcroftpolls, 2016). The analysis of voting patterns suggested that the least 
educated, oldest and poorest British citizens were far more likely to vote Leave (ibid.). 
The campaign tactics of the Leave campaign are being legally challenged at the time of 
writing (November 2016) for being undemocratic and motivated by bad faith. Examples 
of this include the fallacious claim that the national health service would gain £350 
million a week in extra funding; that Turkey was about to join the EU and a poster 
depicting hundreds of desperate refugees at the Croatian-Slovenian border was  
presented in a highly misleading way as Britain’s immigration problem and its breaking 
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point. The very fact that a referendum was called in the first place has been questioned 
with regard to its liberal democratic legitimacy. Referenda, the ‘nuclear weapons’ of 
democracy are not the typical responses to gauging or forming opinion on highly 
complex issues in most representative liberal democracies (Kinsman, 2016, p.1). David 
Cameron, the Prime Minster at the time and the instigator of the referendum, has been 
accused by many commentators of using this short-term tactics, and fuelling populism, 
to gain the support of the more ‘Eurosceptic’ right wing elements of the Tory party 
before the 2015 general election. 
 
 
What is being argued, however, is that there needs to be a stronger and more 
appropriately educational response to these challenges, which may at best contribute to 
their diminution or at the very least support people’s capacity to deal adequately with 
these very real threats. What is needed is a citizenry that, as Callan argues, is not 
susceptible to the cleverest sound bites uttered by politicians via their speechwriters or 
campaign managers but a population that is mostly willing and capable of evaluating the 
best arguments (1997, p.111). And in deciding upon the best educational response to 
this, and other challenges, Callan argues that we need to focus on what is urgently 
needed rather what, ideally, the liberal education agenda might be open to. The 
instrumental case for including some national affective loyalty is overwhelming he 
suggests (op. cit. p.112) and ‘the issue is not about what educational processes a liberal 
society should be open to; it is about what processes it cannot do without to preserve 
and enrich its public culture’. 
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A principled case for patriotic education in liberal democracies 
 
Having established an instrumental need for patriotic education it is worth reiterating 
that it is of paramount importance that the form of patriotic education proposed here 
retains its integrity in relation to liberal values. As was argued in Chapter Five above, 
self-rule, individual autonomy, pursuit of truth and critical reasoning are preserved and 
valued alongside the cultivation of patriotic love to one’s country as an ongoing, 
formative endeavour. It is the aim of this section to describe these educational processes 
in a form of progressive patriotic education that is efficacious as well as ethical. A 
number of scholars have contributed to this undertaking and I shall explore some of the 
main themes therein, borrowing and adopting aspects from some scholars (for example, 
Callan, 1997; Tamir, 1993; Ben-Porath, 2006; Soutphommasane, 2012). 
 
 
Patriotic education as a centripetal counter force to challenges of pluralism 
 
Eamonn Callan’s contribution to the normative debate on progressive  patriotic  
education is an obvious place to start. He suggests, as implied above, that the pluralism 
of free societies makes urgent the task of creating citizens who share a sufficiently 
cohesive identity. The increasingly powerful centrifugal forces of modern plural 
societies, he argues, require a centripetal counter force, namely, the development of 
citizens’ affective loyalty to a common liberal culture. As he says here (1997, p.131): 
‘Patriotism as a moral resource we would do well to cherish and encourage in our 
children and in the world’. This would encourage people to understand and act upon  
their moral obligation to improve their own patriotic inheritance, he continues. Callan 
strongly defends the idea of affective loyalty as one of the - currently weak - 
preconditions of flourishing liberal democracies and argues that it needs to be cultivated. 
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This national sentiment should not be founded upon sentimentality and needs to be 
cultivated carefully and with strict regard to liberal principles and practices. For 
example, in relation to teaching about the past he suggests (op. cit. p.118): 
 
The kind of historical sensibility [I advocate] combines 
an exacting commitment to reason with a generous 
susceptibility to those public emotions that bind us to 
the body politic. 
 
Whilst teaching about and for liberal democracy in terms of civic virtues without the 
affective national dimensions can be entirely worthy and appropriate, it simply will not 
work without the more affective dimensions, Callan argues. In liberal society citizens’ 
understanding of regulative principles themselves cannot guarantee the survival of 
democracy as there is a dependence on some kind of shared trust in institutions, people 
operating within these intuitions and between citizens. Given this, Callan argues, these 
affective bonds are needed for the flourishing of liberal democracy and therefore, any 
educational project needs to cultivate this affective capacity in its young. If a civic 
education programme, or indeed the educational project as whole, is too essentially 
neutral, critical or detached this much needed capacity for sentiment is threatened. 
Patriotic education needs to be both civically engaged and uplifting while remaining 
genuinely critical. There is an urgent educational need to engender national sentiment, 
without resorting to illiberal sentimentality, which will motivate a more engaged 
citizenry in maintaining the liberal project. 
 
 
Yael Tamir argues along similar lines. She argues that traditional kinds of liberal civic 
education are outdated or inadequate and there is a principled, instrumental, need to add 
a national dimension. In Liberal Nationalism (1993), she traces the history of civic 
!#)" 
education suggesting that it had its purpose at a particular time when the notion of 
universal rights of citizen and state neutrality served a particular function. This 
conception of civic education no longer holds true given the geopolitical demands of  
our times. As she says here: ‘This alliance among neutrality, universality, assimilation 
came to an impasse’ (1993, p.xxv). She suggests that the combination of civic and 
national education is indeed complex but that that should not daunt us. Many aspects of 
liberal society and education are as complex, for example, property rights when 
understood alongside concept of equality (ibid.). Tamir, like Callan, argues for the 
importance of national as well as civic education in a liberal democracy but further that 
the education for national identity is a fundamental foundation to effective civic 
education. She suggests that there is a need to place national thinking within the 
boundaries of liberalism without losing sight of either. And, like Callan, Tamir argues 
that whilst it is assumed in liberal democracies that individuals may have multiple 
identities, ‘their liberal identity is expected to trump, ideally, conflicting demands from 
other identities with which they associate themselves (cited in Ben-Porath, p.24). And 
further: 
 
The affective attachment to fellow citizens, for example, 
should serve as a barrier to the demands of secession by 
sub-groups within the nation state. National identity in 
its desirable liberal form – admittedly not the only form 
generated by national attachments throughout history 
– supersedes other forms of identity, to the extent that 
the various groups and individuals that make up the 
regime all regard themselves as integral and willing 
parts of it (ibid.). 
 
So, both Tamir and Callan, whilst encouraging and allowing for substantial liberal 
practices within their normative education aims  - and more of these below - do propose 
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a strong identity-forming agenda. And John White (1996), who expresses some 
sympathy with Callan and Tamir’s arguments, concurs that fostering national sentiment 
could contribute to the fulfilment of liberal aims and suggests that the nature of the 
national identity would be up for some renegotiation. As he says here: 'The promotion  
of national sentiment as an educational aim is not incompatible with liberalism and, 
more strongly, may be desirable for reasons of personal and cultural identity as well as 
for redistributive reasons’ and furthermore he proposes ‘a remodelled conception of 
British national identity to replace the traditional one’ (p.327). 
 
 
Patriotic education as an interpretative, open ended, collective dialogue 
 
Even if progressive patriotic education is seen as an endeavour - as the commentators 
above do – along with the creation of an ideal, it can be argued that an overly strong 
emphasis on any notion of forging a common national identity presents some challenges; 
not least in terms of the need, by definition, to keep diversity  in  its  place.  Might 
patriotic education be better conceived of as a continuous and fluid aspect of personal 
and public life in that it reflects not a given feature of the social fabric or personal 
character, but rather an ongoing task of reconciling collective commitment with 
democratic principles? This view concurs with Ben-Porath’s argument  for 
conceptualising patriotic nation building and citizenship as ‘shared fate’ (2006, p.27). 
Whilst she develops this argument in the context of ‘citizenship under fire’, as we  
argued in the previous chapter, it applies equally it is suggested here, to any civic 
education project. Thus conceived, the processes and outcomes of patriotic education 
align towards caring deeply about the fate of one’s nation within a context of a shared, 
undetermined fate. Patriotic education can therefore engender affective affiliation to this 
!&+" 
interpretative project by accommodating a variety of perspectives and by requiring 
citizens to negotiate about acceptable forms of national culture within liberal parameters. 
 
 
Tim Soutphommasane argues along very similar lines albeit in the context of  
established liberal democracies (2009; 2012). He suggests that patriotic education needs 
to comprise a national education project or national conversation that involves 
collective, open and deliberative participation. This is not an added extra or desirable 
aspect of healthy liberal democracies, but a critical component of their survival given 
the challenges that face them, he suggests. He argues that many of the usual arguments 
suggesting that civic education leads to a sense of responsibility to participate in a self- 
directing society assume that the reasons for this participation are self-evident and 
assumed. Soutphommasane suggests that there is an assumption in existing liberal 
nationalist arguments that democratic participation and social responsibility flow from 
knowledge and an understanding of liberal principles and practice. He argues that 
participatory democratic practices do not necessarily flow from knowledge of them and 
argues that an even more truly liberal response would be to introduce patriotic virtue as 
part of any national curriculum. This would involve taking part in a nation-renewing 
discussion in which young people are educated to value and care about their country and 
to see themselves as active agents within it and capable of shaping it in new ways. 
Furthermore given the multicultural nature of most liberal democratic nations, this 
national conversation and education project should develop patriotic virtues and a sense 
of shared national responsibility, which balances solidarity and diversity. As he says 
here: 
 
The right balance of solidarity and diversity depends on 
the character of citizens and therefore any 
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multicultural liberal democratic society has an interest 
in shaping this character (op. cit. p.167). 
 
This suggests a version of patriotic education that responds with proper recognition of 
human diversity and is inclusive and dynamic. It is inclusive in that it explicitly 
welcomes diversity – in a sense of going beyond tolerance – and it is dynamic in that it 
suggests that these communities will influence national identity over time – as they 
always have done. This interest in actively shaping the character of one’s nation is  
likely to be greater if people feel that investment in shaping the nation in their own, 
collective, diverse, evolving image can pay off in terms of recognition and 
empowerment. As was argued in Chapter Four above, the maintenance of a diverse 
national culture involves citizens being motivated to participate in the public realm not 
only by their political responsibility but by their sense of attachment to their national 
community through their cultural recognition and their sense of personal belonging as 
well. 
 
 
Two main criticisms need to be met and defeated here. One relates to the notion of 
shared fate that could be efficacious in motivating children to care but, arguably, does 
not have to be patriotic. The second relates to what might be described as the problem  
of the gap between our knowledge of moral issues and our motivation to act in 
accordance with them. This latter criticism is concerned, furthermore, that filling the  
gap by instilling feelings of love may subject patriotic education to inevitable 
indoctrination. 
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Let us turn to the first criticism regarding the notion of shared fate and its relationship to 
the necessity or otherwise of patriotic love. Critics of patriotic education - and 
reasonable ones at that - may suggest that children could be encouraged to see their fate 
as wrapped up, or shared, with their country in the form of a social contract rather than 
patriotic love. These critics might suggest that it is entirely appropriate to view the 
liberal project as akin to us all being in the same boat but this does not mean we have to 
love the boat. For these critics communicating the importance of a social contractual 
commitment to children could be accompanied by the encouragement to generate some 
sort of moral feeling for their fellow human beings along with a valuing of pluralism, 
dialogue and deliberation. All these potential and positive ingredients for civic  
education could, arguably, stop short of advocating love of country. This argument falls 
in line with versions of civic education that promote national civic engagement, along 
with the principles and practices of civic friendship. There are commendable aspects of 
this approach, as argued in Chapter One and, clearly, there is no logical connection 
between the notion of shared fate and patriotic love. However, the dismissal of  
sentiment or affective affiliation at the national level ignores the ways in which teaching 
children to care deeply about their (ever-evolving) nation may act as an intrinsic 
motivational factor - and deepen the impact and their efficacy as future citizens – rather 
than, say, engaging with a more detached (even objectifying) form of a social contract. 
The patriotic love engendered by progressive patriotic education is not a fiery 
passionate kind, clearly. It is a love that, through education, is likely to grow and 
strengthen the more the children and young people see the potential and reality of their 
efficacy in shaping national culture and influencing national politics. And, however 
openly a social contract is expressed, it necessarily signifies being locked in and bound 
by a contract, rather than encouraging what could be a more constructive, engaging 
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loving relationship. Expressing the terms contractually could also limit the levels of 
engagement and trust needed - perhaps especially for the most alienated youngsters. 
Furthermore, generating some moral feeling for fellow human beings may be made 
easier by communicating the affective attachment to the nation within patriotic 
education in relation to the collective (and open-ended) enterprise of nation-building. 
The teaching of patriotic love does not prevent any possibility of social commitment or 
fellow moral feeling (as these are clearly important) but it may enhance their likelihood. 
 
 
These same critics might argue that affection for the nation (or patriotic love) should not 
be encouraged because it is not an unquestionable truth that the country deserves this 
love. In response to this point we can provide two objections. The first relates to the 
nature of love. As was argued in Chapter Two, love is not always directed at something 
entirely or necessarily deserving of our love. We are quite capable of loving well in 
relation to a flawed person or indeed country. Loving well involves us in being quite 
honest about the flaws and judging when, how and, indeed, if to intervene. Loving 
something or someone well is more likely to make us enact our love in various ways. 
The second rebuttal relates to the particular notion of patriotic education being espoused 
here. This kind of patriotic education specifically expresses the nation as an evolving, 
open-ended project. Therefore, the love being engendered is directed at an object that is 
not fixed or determined and can be influenced and shaped by committed, affectionate 
citizens. 
 
 
Let us now turn to the second criticism, namely; the problem of the gap between our 
knowledge of moral issues and our motivation to act in accordance with them. And, 
further, the possibility that filling the gap with emotional education may be prone to 
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indoctrination. There has been some helpful literature on what might be described as  
the ‘gappiness problem’ in moral education. Augustus Blasi (1980; 1999) has 
contributed significant insights into the role of emotions and moral motivation. Blasi is 
clear that if actions arise unintentionally they cannot be described as moral. He also 
accepts that emotions arise spontaneously but disagrees that they unintentionally 
produce a will to act - as argued by many moral psychologists (1980, p.5). He also 
points to the limits in cognitive-developmentalism, which suggests that emotions can be 
subjected to reason and judgement in a way that is rationally detached. Blasi rejects the 
notion of ‘judgmentalism’ in relation to a solution to the problem of the gap between  
our moral understanding and moral acts (ibid. p.6). He defends a view that emotions can 
be evaluated and justified by the average person as ‘reasonable and fitting’ (Blasi, 1999, 
p.7). As he suggests here: 
My claim is not that emotions have little or nothing to do 
contribute to morality. This conclusion may agree with the 
standard interpretation of Kant, but runs counter to normal 
intuition and common sense. There is another way of looking 
at emotion and its relation to moral motivation and moral 
action. Here, spontaneously elicited emotions lack the 
intentionality and the specific moral meaning that would be 
necessary for them to produce moral motivation, but the 
agentic regulation of spontaneous emotions would then be 
emphasised and become the force of the explanation (p.15, 
original emphasis). 
 
Emotions can be consciously accepted, owned and integrated into the person’s moral 
concerns; they can be shaped and directed by the agent’s regulatory processes and since 
this kind of regulation is consciously motivated, it can be guided by concerns that are 
specifically moral. Ethical action, then, is about how one puts into practice the outcomes 
of one’s moral judgement and desires. There is am element of ‘willpower’ and self 
control involved and Blasi suggests that one’s self definition is important in terms of 
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achieving some internal consistency which requires self awareness, self organisation 
(1980, p.40). 
 
 
 
Kristjánsson (2010) also contributes usefully to the debate within what he describes as 
‘the post-Kohlbergian era of moral education, [where] a ‘moral gap’ has been identified 
between moral cognition and moral action. Contemporary moral psychologists lock 
horns over how this gap might be bridged’ (p.397). Kristjánsson acknowledges the 
useful contribution of Blasi to this contentious debate but adds a critique of what he  
calls the limited conception of education as an existential quest. As he says here: 
 
For Kohlbergians, moral education was primarily a rational 
quest, best attained via the training of critical faculties of 
judgement. For the moral-self theorists, moral education is 
primarily an existential quest in which role-model education 
(the emulation of moral exemplars) and focus on the 
existential ‘what-kind-of-person-do-I-want-to-be’ questions of 
adolescence play a fundamental role. For moral-emotions 
theorists, moral education is primarily a  conditioning 
process of emotional sensitisation in which children are  
made to internalise proper reactions to diverse situations 
through early parent-child inter- action, subsequent service 
learning and other guided activities (Kristjánsson, 2010, 
p.407) 
 
 
Arguably the normative proposal for progressive patriotic education offered here 
involves some aspects of what, Kristjánsson has described as the rational, existential 
and conditioning processes. Moral education is a constant work in progress, clearly. 
More needs to be done (see below in sub-section ‘Further research’). However, the 
normative proposals here offer a version of progressive patriotic education that aims to 
instil feelings of national affection and care that a motivate young people to engage with 
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their evolving plural nation in constructive and efficacious ways,"The proposals also 
suggest that young people develop a greater sense of efficacy and worth and finally, that 
these issues and feelings are subjected to some rational inquiry and objective scrutiny. 
Critics may argue that the ‘conditioning’ element of the project and the ‘instilling of 
feelings’ in the young cannot be done in an educationally defensible way. These same 
critics may worry, therefore, about indoctrination. As argued extensively in Chapter 
Five, these worries can be met in a number of ways. As Callan argued for example, 
(1997, p.118), ‘one can subject one’s love to critical interrogation if one loves well’. As 
such there is no chance for ‘blind love’ to thrive and, equally, this critical scrutiny does 
not have to lead to a kind of critical detachment either. The version of progressive 
patriotic education offered here, which sets itself firmly within a concept of liberal 
education, argues for significant safeguards to be in place to guard  against 
indoctrination and subjects moral, emotional and civic education to the high standards  
of rigour akin to those within academic disciplines. These safeguards include providing 
children with objective, public criteria by which to make judgements, requiring children 
to provide good justifications for their beliefs and feelings, encouraging critical inquiry, 
providing alternative world views and so forth. Risks against love instilling what might 
be called ‘clouded judgement’ have been addressed too. We argued above, in Chapter 
Five, that moralised love might involve the kind of devotion and self-sacrifice to 
someone or something that continues through challenging times and despite a variety of 
similar and potentially lovable alternatives. Declaring love for something requires more 
than fleeting feeling and therefore a certain level of steadfastness involved. This  
requires us to teach patriotic education in a way that involves teaching what it means to 
love a country well and this involves a certain amount of what Callan describes as 
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emotional generosity but it also means that one has to maintain a truthful perception of 
it. 
 
 
Patriotic education as a practice 
 
Patriotic education in practice will have its challenges. Nothing about the normative 
proposals here are easy or without challenges. What is certain, however, is that 
participation and open-endedness in the concept of progressive patriotic education 
offered here needs to mirror its intended outcomes for a flourishing liberal democratic 
society. It is essentially liberal in that it requires exacting standards of critical acuity and 
respect for fundamental liberal principles including a high bar of rationality, 
reasonableness, independence and impartiality. But it does this alongside the idea of a 
collective practice that requires citizens to be open, critical, emotionally generous, and 
deliberative as well as to develop affective affiliation to the nation. It has some echoes 
of the MacIntyrean idea of a practice in that, as MacIntyre (2002, p.53) says: 
 
What the patriot is committed to is a particular way of 
linking the past which has conferred a distinctive moral 
and political identity upon him or her with a future for 
the project which is his or her nation which it is his or 
her responsibility to bring into being. 
 
However, whereas MacIntyre suggests that this national allegiance should be 
unconditional (ibid.), it is suggested here that it is not that any national tradition should 
be exempted from criticism – or is in some way beyond rational criticism as MacIntyre 
suggests. Rather it is suggested that, as Soutphommasane does, that it is ‘one’s 
attachment to the national tradition must enjoy a certain immunity’ - not the national 
culture itself (2012, p.131). There should be commitment to the endeavour of nation 
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building, it is proposed here, and this collective enterprise should engender feelings of 
care and affective affiliation both to the project itself and to others engaging in the 
project. The liberal character of this suggested practice is retained in many ways; for 
example, there is no attempt to ‘seal certain determinate values into a future society’ as 
Bernard Williams warns against in any truly liberal education project. And it also aims, 
as he advocates, to promote self-understanding through deliberation, analysis, reflection 
and so on rather than more illiberal tendencies of persuasion (1985, p.183). 
 
 
The demands of this kind of patriotic education are not to be underestimated and several 
commentators have suggested that this kind of educational endeavour requires less 
traditional educational approaches. Seyla Benhabib, for example, suggests that this kind 
of democratic discourse in a diverse society requires a capacity for ‘enlarged thought’ 
(1988). This is a concept describing the ways in which knowledge emerges from 
collective, deliberative reflection in groups that comprise many differing views. As she 
says here: ‘The more human perspectives we can bring to bear upon an understanding of 
the situation, the more likely are we to recognise its moral relevance or salience’ (cited 
in Ben-Porath, 2006, p.121). Ben-Porath argues in a similar vein that a concept of 
‘expanded education’ is necessary to capture the complexities and demands of a 
collective, patriotic, educational dialogue. As she argues, expansive education requires 
patience and intellectual effort and ‘repeated exercise of emotional and cognitive 
capacity’ (p.128). And, both these ideas are echoed and exemplified by Callan’s 
proposition that this approach to citizenship education combines an ‘exacting 
commitment to reason with a generous susceptibility to those public emotions that bind 
us to the body politic’ (1997, p.122).  He argues that we need to teach future citizens in 
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ways that can be both civically engaged and uplifting while remaining genuinely critical 
 
– and suggests that this is no easy task (op. cit. p.221). 
 
 
Critical and emotionally generous 
 
The kind of patriotic education being proposed here, then, requires what Callan 
describes as the melding of powerful emotion and critical acuity and that this depends 
on a certain way of looking at the past that is both generous and imaginative. As he puts 
it (1997, p.119-120): 
 
At first glance, the idea that we could learn to look at 
the past of a political community with emotional 
generosity might seem to be a euphemistic way of 
recommending sentimental political education. But that 
is not so. Emotional generosity and sentimentality are 
not the same thing. […] Looking to the past without the 
easy consolations of sentimentality means confronting 
the story in which evil may loom larger than good, and 
the good that is perceptible is not instantiated in  
anyone or any thing in pristine radiance. Readiness to 
be effectively engaged by the good in that setting 
requires a certain interpretive generosity, and 
corresponding resistance to the meanness of spirit that 
goes with insisting that the good must be perfection if it 
is to be good at all. 
 
Callan suggests that we interpret historical events by asking what might be the best in a 
tradition rather than what might be the most powerful forces at work within it. This 
requires some imaginative ability but it allows a deeper scrutiny of historical narratives 
and allows us to hold, simultaneously, a critical perspective alongside exerting the effort 
to find something of worth within it too. And he further suggests that literature may 
serve this purpose rather better than some kinds of traditional history teaching given that 
literature invites us to experience issues, to empathise and to imagine. He cites the 
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example of the story by Eudora Welty (1980) about the murder of a civil rights activist 
in the 1960s. And whilst he acknowledges that ‘a story such as this is no substitute for 
dispassionate social analysis’, he also suggests that: 
 
Becoming adept and knowledgeable at scholarly 
analysis is not the same as coming to see and feel about 
racism in the way that Welty asks us to, and in the 
context of political education, the latter may be of 
greater moment (p.123). 
 
This seems an appropriate approach to teaching about the past in any nation building 
patriotic endeavour – and does not preclude teaching historical scholarship in its own 
right too. This ‘generous and imaginative’ approach does not restrict us to either 
glorifying or vilifying a national past and allows for a respect for historical truth with a 
capacity to retrieve the best from the historical narrative for the purpose of building the 
future. As Callan says, the way in which Picasso paid great tribute to the artist 
Velazquez whilst utterly transforming his artistic form is one way of exemplifying this 
point. There is evidence of both homage to the past and transformation for the future in 
this approach – and having just visited an exhibition of Picasso’s interest in, and debt to, 
Velazquez in Barcelona I can attest to the power of this analogy. And, neither is truth 
sacrificed for this purpose. Honest analysis and reflection is a necessary ingredient of 
this process. As Levine suggests in his study of the future of democracy in the USA, 
‘Truth and patriotism may have a complex and contingent relationship, but they are not 
enemies’ (2007, p.149). 
Using this approach, and especially in the context of patriotic education viewed as an 
interpretive, collective project towards unknown ends, love for a national historical 
culture is not at odds with the idea that the national culture can be further shaped to 
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even greater ends. As Ben-Porath argues, too, nation-building education of this kind can 
be respectful of the present context and the past whilst looking to the future. As she says 
here (2006, p.115): 
 
At heart, the public education system is an institution 
that needs to continuously balance the present and the 
future - to respond, in its vision and the sum of its 
actions, both to the demands of the socio-political 
context in which it functions and to the broader 
forward-looking commitment to the basic values of 
society’s political traditions and visions. 
 
Combining critical acuity with a capacity for empathy, generosity and a degree of 
imagination, in analysing the past is also required in deliberation about contested views 
of what a current good life may comprise. The incommensurability of values is at the 
heart of democracy and therefore many of the structures and processes of democracy are 
about an acknowledgement that controversy exists and finding reasonable and fair ways 
of managing this. Good citizenship is defined as much by negotiating differences as by 
conforming to common, shared values. And, further, the survival and flourishing of 
many liberal institutions depend on an acknowledgement of competing values and a  
trust that democratic processes have ways of negotiating fairly, deliberating hard and 
arriving at fair conclusions. Any patriotic educational endeavour needs to develop both 
an appreciation of the importance of this as well as the capacity to carry out its practices. 
This too requires a capacity to empathise without sacrificing truth. 
 
 
We must be careful to strike the right balance between truth-telling and empathic 
identification with others in any deliberative educational project, especially one where 
different values and beliefs can be passionately held. Our capacity to identify with and 
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care for a person with whom we are debating should not suppress what Callan describes 
as ‘the authority of truth as a dialogical norm’ (op. cit. p.203). Callan takes issue with 
Nell Noddings here, who advocates a norm of care for the person engaging in the 
debates in any interpersonal reasoning. As she says here: ‘Perhaps most significantly of 
all, in ordinary conversation, we are aware that our partners in conversation are more 
important than the topic’ (1994, p.115). But as Fullinwider, (1993, p.109) warns: 
 
Intellectual charity should not be confused with 
tactfulness, politeness or mildness. Charity requires 
giving our opponent the benefit of the doubt; it does not 
mean downplaying his real and specific errors. 
Intellectual charity does not foreclose sharp and pointed 
dissent. It does not block vigorous and robust argument. 
We do not have to be nice to one another’. 
 
And, whilst Callan suggests that teaching children to act with intellectual charity may 
require a good deal of niceness (op. cit. p.243) the point is well made, that is, that 
confusing intellectual charity with intellectual evasiveness is a bad mistake. 
 
 
A capacity for robust but charitable deliberation about divisive issues is a key 
component of the patriotic education project outlined here and is also an important 
means of promoting independence of thought and therefore autonomy. A commitment  
to the shared, collective nation-building project above is needs to be accompanied with 
an important respect of liberal autonomy and a capacity for individuals to pursue a self 
directed life.  As Soutphommasane argues (2012, p.172): 
 
Civic education should nurture among the future 
citizens qualities that are consistent with individual 
autonomy. The capacity to consider the views of others, 
to weigh evidence, to respect difference and to reflect 
upon one’s own beliefs - these are the same capacity is 
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required for individual self-rule out of the participation 
in deliberative democracy. Civic education should not 
involve moulding citizens without an accompanying 
attention to autonomy. 
 
If we are advocating a truly liberal education then, as was argued in Chapter Five, the 
outcomes for each individual cannot be dictated. However, where individual citizens 
choose autonomously to opt out of their civic responsibilities, Meira Levinson suggests 
that the stability and perpetuation of the liberal state is a public good and as such, ‘it 
cannot violate children’s developing autonomy to teach them not to free-ride’ (1999, 
p.106) and leave them to draw their own conclusions from this. 
 
 
It is important to stress, as indeed Levinson does (ibid.), that not all children and young 
people participating in this patriotic education will become - or indeed should become – 
political activists. What is being proposed is that by locating national identity in a sense 
of shared fate rather than common identity formation, and by cultivating, harnessing and 
directing patriotic love expressed as affective affiliations towards a plural, liberal, 
democratic nation building project, the chances of greater personal and political efficacy 
will increase. This in turn will serve to shore up precious liberal democratic institutions 
and processes, which are essential for human flourishing. 
 
 
The desired outcomes and broad scope of patriotic education 
 
The kind of patriotic education advocated here proposes that children are educated to 
understand the importance of their national community and to value and care about it – 
to learn to love it well. This education would also ensure that children see their 
compatriots as sharing a common fate and as partners in a collaborative project. It is 
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argued that this form of education serves to better underpin liberal democratic values  
and processes and, further, that children who are taught in the way proposed here will 
have a richer educational experience than those who currently experience civic  
education in many established liberal democracies. This education requires providing 
children and young people with opportunities for exercising ‘enlarged thought’, for 
participating in demanding collaborative projects, for conducting rational inquiries, for 
exercising empathy alongside generous as well as critical interpretations of history and 
cultural differences, for maintaining high standards of integrity and truth telling. It aims 
to develop cognitive and emotional capacities in new and demanding  ways  which 
should lead to children and young people towards developing a strong understanding of 
- and genuine commitment to preserving and enhancing - their country’s liberal 
democratic values, institutions and processes. It should also encourage and nurture care 
and concern for one’s own country and compatriots, whilst developing capacities for 
debating difference within a context of mutual respect. It should lead to young people 
participating in genuinely open deliberation about aspect of the country’s renewal and 
identity. And it should enhance individuals’ sense of autonomy and efficacy in 
preserving and shaping their own national community. This will mean that it should  
also accommodate multiple expressions of love of country within the context of a  
shared affective affiliation to the enterprise of liberal democratic nation building itself. 
 
 
As such lessons or learning opportunities would have explicit outcomes of ensuring, for 
example, that: 
 
 
• Children understand -  and  care  deeply  about  (love  well)  –  the origins and 
current nature of their shared liberal democratic national context 
!'&" 
• Children understand that any liberal democratic community, including the very 
important national one, requires citizens to participate (in some way) within it – 
liberal societies cannot survive if rule is not collective self-rule in an important 
and fundamental way by the many – not a few 
• Individual freedoms are critical to the health of any liberal democracy and we 
are free to contribute and deliberate over the future of our shared nation 
• Children understand that we are all persons of equal worth with others globally 
but we have special responsibilities to compatriots because we share space and 
responsibilities with them 
• The identity of the nation is an on-going project and that politicians alone do not 
dictate the outcome of patriotic education. 
Given these desired outcomes of patriotic education, the curriculum would need to instil 
certain knowledge, understanding, skills and dispositions, alongside a capacity to learn 
about what loving well means, subjecting it to some scrutiny and putting it into practice. 
 
 
What knowledge, skills and dispositions should patriotic education instil? 
 
It would, for example, be important that children know about some key aspects of 
national history - as well as global history. As discussed above through Callan’s 
persuasive proposition it would be important that this, necessarily selective, history is 
not distorted and is approached with truth as well as generous imagination. Billy Bragg, 
in his book The Progressive Patriot (2006), provides a useful example of what this kind 
of history teaching might comprise. He cites the myth that the UK was ‘all alone’ in 
1940 fighting the might of the fascism and that this sense of British defiance has, to 
some degree, been captured as a defining sense of ‘who we are’ (p.249). He cites the 
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example of a political cartoon by David Low from the London Evening Standard that 
came out in June of 1940 aiming to capture the essence of Churchill’s ‘finest hour’ 
speech. He describes it here (op. cit. p.250): 
 
A lone British Tommy stands on a wave-swept out-crop, 
defiantly waving his fist at oncoming Luftwaffe 
bombers. The caption reads ‘Very well, alone’. 
 
Bragg then goes on to describe how, a month later, Punch published a cartoon by Cyril 
Bird, which ‘wryly sought to offer a truer perspective on Britain’s lone stance against 
Nazism’ and depicted, 
 
Two Tommies sit on a cliff top, one reading the paper, 
the other smoking a pipe gazing across the Channel 
towards France. One says to the other, ‘So, our poor old 
Empire is alone in all the world.’ ‘Aye, we are,’ the other 
replies. ‘The whole five hundred million of us’ (ibid.). 
 
Knowledge of the many nationalities of the pilots who took part of the Battle of Britain  
is another aspect of this period of history that might serves to illuminate and expand 
national understanding. There were 141 Polish pilots, of whom 29 were killed in combat, 
86 Czechs, 29 Belgians, as well as 103 New Zealanders, 90 Canadians and 29 
Australians as well as 25 South Africans (7 of whom were killed in action) (op. cit. 
p.251). An expansive, patriotic education approach to this history might involve  
children in finding out about how Britain had drawn on manpower and resources form 
her Empire since the beginning of the war. This would not be with the intention of 
diminishing or even demeaning the national effort but about expanding it - truthfully. 
The reasons behind the creation of the political cartoons and a generous, imaginative 
and  critical  interpretation  of  this  may  also  serve  children  well.  And,  as  Callan 
!'(" 
recommends, it may be quite possible to give fuller historical analyses of less glorious  
or downright immoral aspects of a nation’s past without inculcating disrespect for a 
nation’s history as a whole. It should be quite possible to tackle history in a critical way 
whilst inculcating appreciation for the complexity of the situation or the challenges 
facing people in the past. And furthermore, children could be encouraged to study more 
redeeming aspects of national history through which critical comparisons could be made 
with the less than glorious aspects of national history. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this discussion to provide a patriotic education curriculum as 
such - or indeed any indicative history curriculum. The Second World War example 
above is just one possible focus. However, it may be worthwhile setting out some 
further suggestions that align to the desired outcomes of good patriotic education. 
Clearly, it would be important to instil knowledge and understanding of democratic 
political institutions and the processes, as well as some foundational knowledge and 
understanding of national law, alongside knowledge, understanding and appreciation of 
national history. It would also be important that children acquire key skills and 
dispositions, including for example, the following: the ability to deliberate, debate, 
reflect, assume some critical distance, be assertive, compromise and so on. Children 
should be able to inquire critically, weigh evidence, interpret data and assess validity of 
information. Formal traits, like a capacity for ‘determination’, can be developed but so 
too more substantive morally substantive traits like ‘compassion’. Other dispositions 
and values that should be instilled could include a capacity for openness, generosity, 
empathy, critical distance, care for each other within a diverse but common national 
context, the capacity to develop a sort of ‘tough love’ towards one’s country and 
compatriots  and  themselves,  kindness  and  honesty.  Cultural  literacy  would  also be 
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important. This would equip children in knowing how to ‘read’ the culture and would  
be especially helpful for children from minority groups. As Soutphommasane puts it 
(2012, p.188): 
 
This is the kind of literacy that allows an Australian to 
appreciate that Waltzing Matilda has nothing to do 
with a girl called Matilda, an American to understand a 
reference to ‘Four score and seven years ago’ as being 
from Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, an Englishman to 
know immediately the provenance of ‘And did those 
feet’, and so forth. 
 
An understanding of and a capacity for ethical deliberation would also be important 
priorities for any expression of patriotic education. An understanding that there are 
different moral perspectives would be crucial, as would an appreciation and valuing of 
these differences. 
 
 
Any patriotic education curriculum would also need to provide the justifications for the 
inclusion of many of its aspects in order to provide children with good rationales for 
aspects of the curriculum as well as some critical faculties to examine them. So, for 
example, it would be imperative that children understand the importance of 
interpretation, critical inquiry, controversy, differing moral perspectives and the role of 
emotions in rational choices as well as being able to enact this understanding. As such 
patriotic education should have all the elements of any good traditional liberal education 
but with additional explicit understanding that key values, skills and dispositions are 
required for committing to this kind of nation building project. The underlying  
rationales and justifications would need to be explicitly shared and subjected to critical 
scrutiny too. Furthermore, this kind of patriotic education would support children in 
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developing a responsibility to understand the importance of - as well as to shape - 
national solidarity as a foundation for liberal democracy. And what finally differentiates 
this curriculum from traditional civic education is the fact that knowledge, 
understanding, skills and values are instilled within a context of appreciation towards 
the national project. This does not amount to uncritical inculcation of love for the nation 
as it is. It does however foster love towards the national project itself as well as 
appreciation of national history and institutions alongside a sense of personal and 
collective efficacy in further shaping these institutions. It also fosters a respect and care 
for a diverse range of compatriots in the context of the shared fate. 
 
 
How should patriotic education be taught? 
 
The pedagogical approach to this patriotic education is important. It would need to be 
essentially dialogic and would involve children and young people participating in, for 
example, debates, research projects, inquiries, role plays, presentations, storytelling, 
story writing, problem solving, modelled dialogue, group dialogue, interrogating 
sources, interpreting evidence and so on. Pedagogical approaches to developing 
affective affiliation would need to be handled with a degree of care and sophistication. 
What is not being proposed here is the kind of patriotic education that encourages daily 
pledges of allegiance or patriotic songs and so on. What is being proposed is that 
children and young people are encouraged to understand what it means to love well; 
why a national project is worth caring deeply about; the importance of loving well and 
not badly. The deep care and affection for country may - and the contention here is that 
is much more likely to - come through engagement with these ideas and practices. It 
cannot be imposed. 
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Some interesting examples of developing affect and virtuous practices in children and 
young people have been developed and tried out by the work of researchers at The 
Jubilee Centre at Birmingham University. The Centre takes an Aristotelian approach to 
teaching character and the development of affect and emotional education form part of 
the suggested curriculum. It offers some very useful approaches to cultivating affective 
states and feeling in children through legitimate and defensible practices. Before 
exploring the valuable contribution the Centre makes to educational practice in the field 
it is perhaps worth articulating a reservation. The Centre has focused much of its initial 
work since 2012 on the virtue of gratitude. This has involved students and teachers 
engaging with virtue of gratitude conceptually as well as practically in the attempt to 
instil good practices (for example, writing thank you letters and reading them out to 
recipients). The ‘gratitude’ resources include a film entitled ‘Gratitude in Britain’ (Hark 
Pictures, 2015) which explores attitudes and practices in relation to gratitude in parts of 
the UK. One might worry that a focus on the concept of gratitude, in such a structurally 
unequal society as Britain, was not the best place to start in terms of empowering young 
people and their moral characters. One might also speculate how the concept of 
gratitude may be explored in the context of a dialogic progressive patriotic education 
curriculum, where for example, the concept of gratitude in relation to structural 
inequalities (zero hour contracts, for example) might be examined, along with ways in 
which young people could understand the history of these practices as well as explore 
ways of influencing policy at a national level. Whilst the Jubilee Centre’s teaching 
resources, associated with gratitude, do encourage some critique of the concept and its 
relative worthiness as a virtue, and explore the notion of the grateful slave, for example, 
one might still wonder at the choice of gratitude  - given all the other possible virtues - 
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as the starting point of the research. However, with this reservation to one side, as stated 
above, the Centre work has advanced practice in the field  of  moral  education  and 
tackled tough issues in relation to what this involves – defensibly – in practice. One unit, 
(Wright at al, 2015) for example, explores how to develop virtuous practice, including 
affective and emotional dimensions, in young people and proposes that young learners: 
Recognise that we are in a moral situation; recognise the 
emotions, desires and feelings triggered by the situation; 
identify the virtue which educates the mention; perceive the 
morally relevant features of the situation; Practise acting out 
the virtue; Examine how it went; Plan what we need to do to 
get better at the virtue (p.14) 
 
The Centre has developed an approach and some useful practical ideas to get children to 
acquire new, desirable feelings without falling prey to manipulation. This approach 
offers some useful templates for consideration for the conceptual progressive patriotic 
education proposals offered here. 
 
 
A further thought, now, on how patriotic education might be organised or timetabled 
within an existing curriculum. Empirical evidence from a number of citizenship 
education reports (see for example; DfE 2003, 2005, 2009) suggests that impact on 
students of a curriculum such as the one proposed in this thesis is likely to be greater if 
taught through discrete timetabled lessons that are assessed formally. It may make sense 
to teach patriotic citizenship as a ‘subject’ in this way. However, the precise form and 
delivery of patriotic education remains debatable. What is important however is that its 
purpose is not distinct from the rest of the curricular aims. It would make no sense, for 
example, to teach a belligerent form of history in one lesson, followed by patriotic 
education  conceived  of  as  this  open,  deliberative  project  in  the  next  lesson. There 
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should at least be some coherent curriculum planning at policy levels alongside whole 
school coordination in relation to its delivery. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has reiterated the limited responses to civic education thus far and argued 
that, give these limitations and growing threats to liberal democracy, there needs to be a 
suitable educational response. Various justifications for progressive patriotic education 
have been examined. The centripetal identify-forming agenda proposed by Tamir and 
Callan has things to commend it - as has John White’s proposal that a remodelled sense 
of British identity could become part of a patriotic education agenda in schools. 
However, the potential for a shared identity- forming dimension to constrain and limit 
diversity was found to be a less desirable aspect of this conception of patriotic education. 
The arguments put forward by Ben-Porath and Soutphommasane, for rejecting this 
identity-forming aspect of patriotic education and replacing it with a more fluid and 
continuous approach to democratic nation building and renewal, were found to be more 
convincing. Patriotic education that teaches children a form of tough love  of  their 
country and engages them emotionally, intellectually and practically in shaping its 
national culture, is recommended. As such patriotic education is conceived of as an  
open ended, interpretive dialogue – not as a bonus to mainstream education but as an 
essential feature of it. The chapter has explored what this might involve in practice and 
concluded that the broad outcomes of a progressive patriotic education should ensure 
that children and young people understand - and care about – the origins and current 
nature of their shared liberal democratic national context. Patriotic education outcomes 
should also ensure that it is understood that individual freedoms are critical to the health 
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of any liberal democracy and that we are free to contribute and deliberate over the  
future of our shared nation. It is also important that -hildren understand that we are all 
persons of equal worth with others globally but we have special responsibilities to 
compatriots because we share space and responsibilities with them. This kind of 
patriotic education will enhance a sense of individual and collective efficacy, which it is 
suggested here, will strengthen liberal democratic institutions and practices. These 
outcomes, it is proposed, can be achieved through a variety of curriculum and 
pedagogical means. History is deemed to be crucially important and a truthful, 
expansive, critical and generous teaching of the national story is recommended. Liberal 
democratic, civic knowledge, skills and dispositions are seen to be part of this patriotic 
education agenda. Ethical deliberation is a central part of it too. 
 
 
The kind of patriotic education needed in established liberal democracies has been 
outlined and recommendations for its form and content as well as the best pedagogical 
approach for its delivery have been made. The contention is that it is possible to educate 
children about their nation as well as teaching them to love their own nation well, 
construed as a collective geographical historical cultural political entity and as a 
continuous project. This requires the development of some specific affective as well as 
cognitive capacities as outlined above. Within this collective nation-building project, 
each individual has an autonomous role to play in this renewal. Self-rule and collective 
self-rule are still vitally important. Objective and critical reasoning are still of 
paramount importance. By teaching for the development of this kind of patriotic virtue 
the ends of liberal education become more secure. 
 
 
Further research 
!(#" 
This is by no means an easy or straightforward enterprise. This thesis has set out a 
normative case for progressive patriotic education. This is just the beginning. Clearly 
extensive empirical work would need to be done in terms of trying it out. This would 
certainly include exploring questions about how we get children to work on real 
national, democratic issues and whether the dialogic approach does in fact instil a sense 
of efficacy and, importantly, affection. Work from the field of educational psychology 
will be useful here in exploring how one gets a child to acquire a feeling that they 
currently do not have. Ways of creating new and desirable progressive patriotic feelings 
in children and young people would have to be explored and trialled – and of course 
evaluated for their effectiveness. Effectiveness, of course, is only one part of the story. 
The educational value of the practices will also have to be judged. As such evaluation 
may involve further normative research. Once workable practices have been identified it 
will be important to judge their educational worth and whether they are defensible. 
!(&" 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis has set out to justify the inclusion of patriotic education in state schooling in 
liberal democracies. The kind of patriotic education that has been advocated aims to 
ensure that young people learn to love their essentially multicultural liberal democratic 
nation and are motivated and equipped to participate in its continuous national renewal 
through an open, interpretive, national dialogue. Citizens will see themselves as sharing 
a common fate rather than a shared national identity. Minority groups within our 
increasingly diverse and unequal liberal societies will be motivated to contribute to 
national renewal through participation in this project, given that their contributions will 
have the potential of shaping the national community. They will no longer see 
themselves as being merely assimilated or integrated within a fixed national culture but 
will see themselves as equal citizens in a liberal, collective interpretive project. The core 
liberal values of the culture will be the non-negotiables and will include a high level of 
critical reasoning and a high bar for individual autonomy. Through this education, all 
members of the nation will be taught to value the nation as a collective enterprise. The 
genuine open-endedness of the project, along with a sense of urgency about creating a 
truly effective national democratic culture that animates democratic institutions that 
affect us all and can be affected by us all, will contribute to affective affiliation for the 
nation. 
 
 
It has been argued that affective affiliation at the national level is what has been absent 
from many efforts to provide good citizenship education, particularly in the UK. 
Previous efforts to develop strong citizenship education in the UK have fallen short in 
particular ways. The Ajegbo Report 2007 came closest to characterising citizenship 
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education in the UK as an interpretive project and was explicit about cultivating a sense 
of belonging for all members. But it, along with other curricular attempts, lacked any 
sense of genuine equality for newcomers and failed to adopt enough of a critical stance 
on race or multiculturalism. It was not clear why citizens from minority groups would 
be sufficiently motivated to participate in, or contribute to, liberal democratic processes. 
The current mandatory promotion of British values, along with citizenship education 
that aims to encourage political literacy, falls short in even more significant ways. 
British values are conceived of in an arguably charged political fashion and, by 
conceding of them as British values rather than values themselves, only serve to 
entrench certain minority views that do not obviously cohere with a somewhat narrow 
conception of ‘Englishness’. 
 
 
It has also been the aim of this thesis to assess why traditional civic education 
programmes that aim to create civic bonds but stop short of promoting patriotic civic 
bonds will not suffice in the current context of modern liberal democracies. Why the 
need for national affective affiliation? Why won’t knowledge, understanding, skills and 
some broad liberal dispositions like neighbourliness, civic friendship and so on suffice? 
The following contextual observations have been made throughout this thesis to support 
the claim that what is needed, more than ever before, is some form of patriotic 
education. 
 
 
An important starting point is to acknowledge that national governments and liberal 
democratic institutions remain very important and yet strong levels of informed 
critically engaged political participation are low and faith in national politicians and 
institutions are low too. Alienation caused by deep inequalities, globalisation, the rise of 
!((" 
neo-liberalism, the impact of immigration and the rise of populism threaten national 
liberal democracies. It seems important to remedy this situation sooner rather than later. 
 
 
The second observation is to grant that, given the nature of our highly diverse modern 
liberal democracies, it requires a feat of imagination to understand the  nature  and 
purpose of a shared democratic national community. Is it not immediately obvious how 
many young people would understand the core values of a national community or what 
elements of it are open to renewal or change or how local decisions affect national  
policy and so on. Currently an education system that conveys knowledge, understanding 
and skills and tries to nurture democratic dispositions through either an attempt to 
increase political literacy and/or by exhorting pupils to respect common national values 
does not adequately address the need for citizens to be more fully engaged in finding   
out about it, renewing, preserving and developing aspects of liberal democratic tradition. 
The feat of imagination needed requires some support and furthermore requires young 
citizens to be sufficiently motivated to make this imaginative leap. It is unlikely to 
happen spontaneously and in its absence there may be further retreat into more local or 
sub national cultural affiliations and/or dominant groups asserting their superior claims 
to defining of national community. 
 
The third observation is that modern liberal democracies are under certain kinds of  
fairly serious threat and in these circumstances feelings can run high, such as feeling of 
alienation, powerless, loss, frustration. Interestingly, the BBC reported on November 
16th 2016 that ‘Oxford Dictionaries has declared "post-truth" as its 2016 international 
word of the year, reflecting what it called a "highly-charged" political 12 months. It is 
defined  as  an  adjective  relating  to  circumstances  in  which  objective  facts  are less 
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influential in shaping public opinion than emotional appeals’. Which leads to the fourth 
point: channelling generous emotion towards a national community is not easy given its 
complexity and the extent of the imagination required to conceive of it fully. However, 
it is also safe to conclude that, in general, harnessing affective affiliation and emotional 
attachment can motivate people to contribute to collective projects or institutional goals 
and as such liberal democratic citizens who deeply care about their nation are more 
likely to participate in political life. If the sense of alienation or apathy runs too deep, as 
Callan argues (1997), liberal democracy shall be in a serious crisis. 
 
 
There are important questions that arise from these contextual observations and the 
thesis has aimed to tackle these questions and arrive at some normative principles for 
addressing the non-ideal reality confronting us. First: What kind of education would 
help citizens understand, appreciate and contribute to the national community  and 
ensure that it is properly accountable, representative, and so on, given the deep sense of 
alienation and powerlessness experienced by many citizens? A further question asks: 
How might harnessing emotional attachments and affective affiliation to the nation be 
generated given the difficulties in imagining the increasingly diverse national 
community? And, how might harnessing emotional attachment towards a national 
community avoid the pitfalls of distortion or manipulation that may result in bad faith 
and other illiberal consequences? And finally, how might an education aimed at 
generating affection for the nation, in order to enhance democratic commitment and 
participation maintain minority cultural affiliations, remain cosmopolitan and meet 
standards of global justice? 
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This thesis has addressed these questions and proposed a version of citizenship  
education that provides reason to participate by harnessing and nurturing affective 
feeling towards the national community and its practices. The kind of patriotic  
education recommended here mirrors its intended outcomes for a flourishing liberal 
democratic society. It is essentially liberal in that it requires exacting standards of 
critical acuity and respect for fundamental liberal principles including a high bar of 
rationality, reasonableness, independence and impartiality. But it does this alongside the 
idea of a collective practice that requires citizens to be open, critical, emotionally 
generous, and deliberative as well as to develop affective affiliation to the nation. 
 
 
The thesis concludes that is that it is possible to educate children about their nation as 
well as teaching them to care deeply about their own nation construed as a collective 
geographical historical cultural political entity and as a continuous project. This requires 
the development of some specific affective as well as cognitive capacities. Within this 
collective nation-building project, each individual has an autonomous role to play in this 
renewal. Self-rule and collective self-rule are still vitally important. The outcomes of 
this national project are not fixed. By teaching for the development of this kind of 
patriotic virtue the ends of liberal education become more secure. This is not an easy 
task. It is however an urgent one. 
!)+" 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Ackerman, B. (1980) Social Justice in the Liberal State, New Haven: Yale University Press 
 
Acton, Lord. (1972) “Nationality,” Essays on Freedom and Power, Gloucester: Peter Smith, 
141–70 
 
Adams, R. (2014) ‘Schools ‘must actively promote British Values’, The Guardian, DfE 
Ajegbo, K., Kiwan, D. and Sharma, S. (2007) Diversity and Citizenship, Nottingham: DfES 
Aldington, R. (1987) The colonel’s daughter, Hogarth Press (first published 1950) 
Anderson, B. (1991) Imagined Communities, London: Verso 
Annette, J. (2007) ‘Civic, Public and Employer Engagement and the Scholarship of 
Engagement’ Presentation at The Scholarship of Engagement FDTL/HEFCE Conference 
 
Appiah, K. (2006) Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a world of strangers, USA: WW Norton and 
company 
 
Appiah, K. (2016) Reith Lecture, Glasgow University (October 2016) 
 
Archard, D. (1999) ‘Should we teach patriotism?’, in Studies in Philosophy and Education 18, 
pp.157-173 
 
Arthur, J., Kristjánsson, K., Walker, D., Sanderse, W. and Jones, C. (2015) Character 
education in UK schools: research report. Project Report. Jubilee Centre for Character 
and Virtues, Birmingham. 
 
Ascherson, N. (2010) ‘On with the Pooling and Merging’ in London Review of Books, Vol 22 
No 4 
 
Badsy, S., Hawes, R. and Grove, M. (eds.) (2005) The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years On: 
Lessons for the Future, New York: Frank Cass 
 
Ball, S. (2007) Education plc: Understanding private sector participation in public sector 
education, UK: Routledge 
 
Bar-Tal, D. (ed.) (1996) How children understand war, San Francisco: Jossey Bass 
 
Baron, M. (2002) ‘Patriotism and ‘Liberal’ Morality’ in Primoratz (ed.) Patriotism Amherst: 
Prometheus Books 
 
Bednarz, S., Clinton C., Hartoonian, M. and Hernendez, A. (2003) Build Our Nation. Boston: 
Houghton Miffin 
 
Ben-Porath, S. (2006) Citizenship Under Fire, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 
!)$" 
Benhabib, S. (1992) Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in 
Contemporary Ethics, NY: Routledge 
 
Benton, T., Cleaver, E., Featherstone, G., Kerr, D., Lopes, J. and Whitby, K. (2008) 
Citizenship Education Longitudinal Study (CELS): Sixth Annual Report. Young People’s 
Civic Participation In and Beyond School: Attitudes, Intentions and Influences (DCSF 
Research Report 052). London: DCSF 
 
Berlin, I. (1958) ‘Two concepts of liberty’ Inaugural lecture at University of Oxford, 31st 
October 
 
Bhopal, K. (2012) ‘Islam, education and inclusion: towards a social justice agenda?’ in British 
Journal Sociology of Education (33) Issue 5 
 
Blair, T. (1998) The Third Way, UK: Fabian Society 
 
Blake, W., ‘How to know Love from Deceit;, in Erdman, D.V. (ed.) (1988) The Complete 
Poetry and Prose of William Blake, New York: Anchor Doubleday 
 
Blasi, A. (1980) Bridging Moral Cognition and Moral Action: A critical review of the 
literature, Psychological Bulletin, 88:1, pp. 1–45. 
 
Blasi, A. (1999) Emotions and Moral Motivation, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 
29:1, pp. 1–19. 
 
Blunkett, D. (2002), ‘What Does Citizenship Mean?’ The Observer (15th September) 
 
Blunkett, D. (2003), Active Citizens, Strong Communities: Progressing Civil Renewal, Home 
Office: London 
 
Bonnett, A. (1993) Radicalism, Anti-Racism and Representation, Taylor and Francis: UK 
Bragg, B. (2006) Progressive Patriotism, UK: Bantam Press 
Brighouse, H. (2006) ‘Should schools teach patriotism?’, in Brighouse, H., (ed.) On 
Education, London: Routledge 
 
Brown, G. (2006) ‘The future of Britishness’ (speech given to the Fabian Society of Great 
Britain New Year Conference, 2006) [last accessed Oct 2016: 
http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=316] 
 
Bruter, M. et al (2016) Youth Participation in Democratic Life: Stories of Hope and 
Disillusion, UK: Palagrave Macmillan 
 
Burtonwood, N. (2006) Cultural Diversity and Pluralism in Schools, UK: Routledge 
Callan, E. (1997) Creating Citizens, Oxford: Clarendon Press 
!)!" 
Callan, E. (2006) ‘Love, idolatry and patriotism’, in Social Theory and Practice 32 (4), 
pp.525-546. 
 
Carr, D., Halstead M. and Pring, R. (2008) Liberalism, Education and Schooling: Essays by 
T.H. McLaughlin St Andrew’s Studies in Philosophy and Public Affairs: Imprint Academic 
 
Cavallar G. (1999) Kant and the Theory of International Right UK: University of Wales 
Press 
 
Citizenship Foundation and Birkbeck (2010) ‘A brief history of Citizenship Education as an 
aim of mass education’, in National CPD Distance Learning Programme, Unit 2a [Available 
online: Last accessed November 2016] 
 
Clare, John. D. (2010) ‘History in Education Project’ (interview with Dr Nicola Sheldon), 
Institute of Historical Research (unpublished interviews) 
 
Clarke, P. (2014) Report into allegations concerning Birmingham schools arising from the 
‘Trojan Horse’ letter, HMSO 
 
Clayton, M. (2002) Liberal Equality and Ethics in Ethics 113 (October 8th-22nd) 
 
Cohen, T (2014) ‘Basic principle of Enoch Powell’s Rivers fo Blood speech was right says 
Nogel Farage’ in the Daily Mail Online [http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article- 
2534353/Basic-principle-Enochs-Rivers-Blood-speech-right-says-Nigel-Farage.html] 
 
Constantine, N. (2010) ‘Pluralism and education in Lebanon’, PhD Thesis (forthcoming 
publication) 
 
Crick, B. (2000), Essays on Citizenship. London: Continuum 
criterion’, in Educational Theory 58 (2), pp.213-28 
 
Crick, B. and Lockyer (2010) Active Citizenship: what could it achieve and how Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press 
 
Cunningham, S. and Lavalette, M.(2004) ‘Active citizens’ or ‘irresponsible truants? School 
student strikes against the war, in Critical Social Policy, 24 (2), pp.255 –269 
 
Davies, L. (1999): ‘Comparing definitions of democracy in education’ in Compare, 29 (2), 
pp.127-40 
 
Davis, K. (1967) The politics of honor: A biography of Adlai E. Stevenson, USA: Porter 
McKeever 
 
DCSF (2007) Guidance on the duty to promote community cohesion 
http://publications.everychildmatters.gov.uk/default.aspx?PageFunction=productdetails&Pag 
eMode=publications&ProductId=DCSF-00598-2007& 
 
Dearden, R. (1981) ‘Controversial issues and the curriculum’, in Dearden, R.F., Theory and 
Practice in Education, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
!)%" 
democratic education stand in relation to each?’, in Macedo, S. and Tamir, Y. (eds) Moral 
and Political Education, Nomos XLIII, pp.23-57, New York: New York University Press 
 
Deedes, W. (1968) ‘Written answers’, Fifth Series, Volume 756, Columns: 651-682 House of 
Commons Hansard: UK 
 
DEMOS (1995) ‘Freedom’s Children: work, relationships and politics for 18–34 year olds in 
Britain today’, A DEMOS pamphlet 
 
Department for Education and Employment / QCA (2007), Citizenship. The National 
Curriculum for England. London, DFEE/QCA 
 
Department for Education and Skills (2007), The Ajegbo Review) Diversity and Citizenship. 
DfES: London 
 
Departmental advice for maintained schools, November 2014, DfE 
 
DfE (2010) Citizenship education in England 2001-2010: young people's practices and 
prospects for the future: the eighth and final report from the Citizenship Education 
Longitudinal Study (CELS), HMSO 
 
DfE (2013) Citizenship: Programme of Study HSMO 
 
DfE (2013) Improving the spiritual, moral, social and cultural (SMSC) development of pupils: 
Departmental advice for independent schools, academies and free schools, November 
DfE (2014) Promoting fundamental British values as part of SMSC in schools 
Dietz, M. (2002) ‘Patriotism: A Brief History of the Term’ , in Primoratz (2002, pp.201–16) 
Dryzek, J. (2000) Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations, 
Oxford: OUP 
 
Easton, M. (2014) ‘Should teachers teach British Values?’ BBC news website [Accessed 
November 2016: http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-27784747] 
 
Electoral Commission (2005). Election 2005 Turnout: How many, who and why? London: 
Electoral Commission 
 
Early Intervention Foundation (EIF), (2014) ‘We’re all agreed – ‘Character’ matters. Now, 
what can schools do about it?’ [http://www.eif.org.uk/were-all-agreed-character-matters-now- 
what-can-schools-do-about-it/] 
 
ESI (European Stability Initiative) (2015) ‘Teaching War. How Croatian schoolbooks 
changed and why it matters’, ESI 
[http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document_ID=167] 
 
 
Fattah H (2007) ‘A Nation with a Long Memory but a truncated History’ New York Times 
January 2007 
!)#" 
Feinberg, J. (1990) Harmless Wrongdoing, New York: OUP 
 
Ferry, J. (1992) ‘Une “philosophie” de la communaute !’, in J. M. Ferry and Paul Thibaud, 
Discussion sur l’Europe (Paris: Calmann-Le !vy), p.174 
 
Fisk, R. (2001) Pity the nation: Lebanon at War London: OUP 
 
Forster, K. (2016) ‘Hate crimes soared by 41% after Brexit vote, official figures reveal’, The 
Independent, 13 October. [last accessed October 2016: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/brexit-hate-crimes-racism-eu-referendum-vote- 
attacks-increase-police-figures-official-a7358866.html] 
 
Frankfurt, H.G. (2004) The Reasons of Love, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
 
Frayha N. (2003) The Education Centre for Research and Development. Beirut: Dar Al Ibdaa 
 
Fullenwinder, R. (1993) ‘ “With Malice Toward None”: Some Reflections on the Ethics of 
Argument’ in Journal of Education, 175: 99-113 
 
Galston, W. (1991) Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues and Diversity in the Liberal State, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Gellner, E. (2006) Nations and Nationalism, UK: Blackwell 
 
Gereluk, D. (2006) Education and Community Bloomsbury: Continuum 
Giddens, A. (1998) The Third Way, UK: Polity Press 
Goldsmith, P. (2008) Citizenship: Our Common Bond, London: Ministry of Justice. 
Gove, M. (2009) Conservative Party Conference Speech (7th October 2009) 
Gove, M. (2010) ‘All pupils will learn our island story’, Speech to Conservative Party, 
October 5th 2010 [last accessed: November 2016: http://conservative- 
speeches.sayit.mysociety.org/speech/601441] 
 
Gray, J. (2016) ‘The closing of the liberal mind’ in The New Statesmen (4th-10th November 
2016) 
 
Greenspan, P. (1988) Emotions and Reasons, New York: Routledge 
 
Gunness, C. (2016) Personal interview conducted by Clare Bunti# in Barcelona, Spain April 
2016 
 
Gutmann, A. (1987) Democratic Education  USA: Princeton Press 
 
Gutmann, A. (2002) ‘Civic minimalism, cosmopolitanism and patriotism: where does 
!)&" 
Habermas, J. (1989) The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians’ debate, 
MA: MIT Press 
 
Habermas, J. (1998) Between facts and norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law 
and Democracy, Cambridge: MIT Press 
 
Hall, S., Massey, D. and Rustin, M (eds.) (2013) After Neoliberalism? The Kilburn Manifesto, 
UK: Lawrence and Wishart 
 
Hamlyn, D.W. (1978) ‘The phenomena of love and hate’, in Soble, A. (ed.) (1989) Eros 
Agape and Philia, St. Paul: Paragon House, pp.218-34 
 
Hand, M. (2014) ‘On the idea of non-confessional faith-based education’ Hand, M. (2014) in 
Chapman, J.D., McNamara, S., Reiss, M.J. and Waghid, Y. (eds.) International Handbook of 
Learning, Teaching and Leading in Faith-Based Schools, Dordrecht: Springer, pp.193-205. 
 
Hand, M. (2008) ‘What should we teach as controversial? A defence of the epistemic criterion 
in Educational Theory 58 (2) , pp. 213-228 
 
Hand, M. (2011), ‘Should We Promote Patriotism in Schools?’ in Political Studies, (59) pp. 
328–347 
 
Hansard Society/Electoral Commission (2009) Audit of Political Engagement 6 
http://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/blogs/publications/ 
 
Hark Pictures (2015) ‘Gratitude in Britain’ a film produced for the Jubilee Centre, University 
of Birmingham [http://www.jubileecentre.ac.uk/media/news/article/4242/Film-Showcasing- 
Gratitude-in-Britain 
 
Harris, W. (2012), Lebanon: A History 600 – 2011 UK: OUP 
 
Heater, D. (1999) What is Citizenship? Cambridge, Oxford & Malden: Polity Press 
 
Heater, D. (2000), The History of Citizenship Education in England. The Curriculum Journal, 
(12) No. 1, pp.103-123 
 
Heater, D. (2004) A brief history of citizenship, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 
 
Helleiner, E. (2014) The Status Quo Crisis: Global Financial Governance After the 2008 
Meltdown, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Hirst, P.H. and Peters, R.S. (1970) The Logic of Education London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul 
 
Hirst, P.H. (1974) Knowledge and the Curriculum. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 
!)'" 
Hitchens, P. (2016) ‘Forget the EU vote – all Britain really needs is patriotic leaders’ in the 
Daily Mail Online [http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-3909314/PETER-HITCHENS- 
Forget-EU-vote-Britain-really-needs-patriotic-leaders.html] 
 
HM Government (2010) An Agenda for Youth Engagement: Government response to the 
recommendations of the Youth Citizenship Commission 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/333826/youthengagement.pdf 
 
HM Government (2015) Counter Extremism 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470088/51859 
_Cm9148_Accessible.pdf 
 
Howe, D. (2008) ‘Citizens don’t need Goldsmith’s Report’ in The New Statesman (March 19th 
2008) 
 
Hromadzi#, A. (2008) ‘Discourses of Integration and Practices of Reunification at the Mostar 
Gymnasium’ in Comparative Education Review, Special Issue Education and Conflict/Post 
conflict Societies 52 (4): pp.541-63. 
 
Hunt, T. (2014) ‘Character can and should be taught in school’ in online BBC news article 
[http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-26140607] 
 
Lord Ashcroft (2016) ‘How the UK voted and why’ in website: 
http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-voted-and-why/ 
 
Husbands, C. (2014) (cited in) ‘Trojan Horse” Gove’s ‘British values’ in schools as a ‘knee 
jerk’ response critics warn’ in the Times Educational Supplement, 10th June 2014 
 
Ignatieff, M. (1994) Blood and Belonging, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux 
 
Jenkins, S (2012) ‘Falklands War 30 years on and how it turned Thatcher into a celebrity’ The 
Guardian [Accessed: https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/apr/01/falklands-war-thatcher- 
30-years] 
 
Jenkins, S. (2013) ‘How Thatcher’s Falklands Gamble paid off’ in The Guardian [accessed: 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/apr/09/margaret-thatcher-falklands-gamble] 
 
Jones, O. (2016) ‘A win for Trump is a win for bigotry. Here’s how we resist him’ in The 
Guardian, November 16th 2016. [Accessed Nov 16th 2016: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/15/trump-win-bigotry-authoritarian- 
america] 
 
Jubilee Centre for Character Education (2013) A Framework for Character Education in 
Schools’, The Jubilee Centre, University of Birmingham: UK 
 
Kant, I. (1785) Groundwork 4 412 in Allen W. Wood, (2002) Groundwork for the 
metaphysics of morals, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Kateb, G. (2000) “Is Patriotism a Mistake?” Social Research, 67: 901–24. Reprinted in Kateb, 
!)(" 
Patriotism and Other Mistakes, Ithaca: Yale University Press, (2006) 
Kateb, G. (2006) Patriotism and Other Mistakes, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 
 
Kauffmann, S. (2016) ‘For Le Pen, the Impossible Now Seems Possible’ in New York Times, 
November 13th 2016 [Accessed: November 15th 2016] : 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/14/opinion/for-le-pen-the-impossible-now-seems- 
possible.html 
 
Keating et al, (2010) Citizenship in England 2001 – 2010: Young people’s practices and 
prospects for the future: the eight and final report from the Citizenship Education 
Longitudinal Study (CELS)  Slough: NFER 
 
Kedourie, E. (1993) Nationalism in Asia and Africa London: Frank Cass 
Keller, S. (2005) ‘Patriotism as Bad Faith’, in Ethics, 115 (3), pp.563–92 
Kenny, A. (1963) Action, Emotion and Will UK: Psychology Press 
Kerr, D. (1999): Re-examining citizenship education in England. In: Torney-Purta, Judith; 
Schwille, John; Amadeo, Jo-Ann. eds. Civic Education Across Countries: Twenty-four Case 
Studies from the Civic Education Project. Amsterdam: Eburon Publishers for the International 
Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA). 
 
Kerr, D., Blenkinsop, S., Dartnall, L. (2000): Mapping Citizenship Education Resources. 
Unpublished report. Slough: NFER. 
 
Kerr, D., Lines, A., Blenkinsop and S., Schagen, I. (2002): What Citizenship and Education 
Means to 14 year olds: England's Results from the IEA Citizenship Education Study: the 
Views of Students, Teachers and Schools. London: DfES. 
 
Kerr, D. (2003) ‘Citizenship Education in England: The Making of a New Subject’ in Journal 
of Social Science Education [Last accessed: October 2016 
http://www.jsse.org/index.php/jsse/article/viewFile/472/388] 
 
Kerr, D., Sturman, L., Schulz, W. and Burge, B. (2010) ICCS 2009 European Report: Civic 
knowledge, attitudes and engagement among lower secondary pupils in 24 European 
countries. Amsterdam: IEA. 
 
Kinsman, J. (2016) ‘A Brexit Post mortem: 17 takeaways for David Cameron’ in Open 
Canada [https://www.opencanada.org/features/brexit-post-mortem-17-takeaways-fallen- 
david-cameron/] 
 
Kiwan, D. (2006) ‘Uneasy relationships? Conceptions of ‘citizenship’, ‘democracy’ and 
‘diversity’ in the English citizenship education policymaking process’ in Education, 
Citizenship and Social Justice, 2 (3) pp.223-235 
 
Kleingeld, P.  (2003) ‘Kant’s Cosmopolitan Patriotism’ in Kant-Studien (94) pp.299-316 
!))" 
Kleinig, J., Keller, S. and Primoratz, I. (eds.) (2015) The Ethics of Patriotism: A Debate, USA: 
John Wiley and Sons Inc 
 
Kristjánsson, K. (2010) ‘Educating Moral Emotions or Moral Selves: A false dichotomy?’, in 
Educational Philosophy and Theory, 42:4, pp. 397-409 
 
Krupa, J (2016) ‘The killing of a Polish man exposes the reality of post-referendum racism’ in 
The Guardian [Last accessed November 2016: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/sep/05/death-arkadiusz-jozwik-post- 
referendum-racism-xenophobes-brexit-vote 
 
Kymlicka, W. (1989) Liberalism, Community and Culture, Oxford: Clarendon Press 
Kymlicka, W. (1995): Multicultural Citizenship, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Kymlicka, W. and Opalski, M. (eds.) (2001) Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported?, Oxford: 
OUP 
 
Laborde, C. (2002) 'On Republican Toleration Constellations’ in A Journal of Critical and 
Democratic Theory. (9), No 2, 167-83, (June) 
 
Lagarde, C. (2015) ‘Lifting the small boats’ Speech in role of managing director of 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the Grandes Conferences Catholiques on June 17th 
2015. [Last accessed November 2016: 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2015/061715.htm] 
 
Lee, P. (1992) The Aims of School History, UK: Tufnell Press 
 
Leighton, S. (1996) ‘Aristotle and the emotions’, in Rorty, A.O. (ed.) Essays on Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp.206-37 
 
Levinson, M. (1999) The Demands of Liberal Education, UK: OUP 
Lewis, C.S. (1960) The Four Loves, UK: Geoffrey Bles 
Littlejohn, R. (2014) ‘The way patriotism is sneered at makes you ashamed to be British!’ in 
Daily Mail Online [http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2604789/RICHARD- 
LITTLEJOHN-Makes-ashamed-British.html 
 
Lord Chancellor (1998) Presentation to the Law Society 27th January 1998 
 
Macedo, S. (1995) ‘Liberal civic education and religious fundamentalism: the case of God vs. 
John Rawls? in Ethics, 105(3) pp.468-496 
 
Machiavelli, N. (1518) The Discourses, B. Crick (ed.), L.J. Walker (trans.), Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, (1998) 
 
MacIntyre A. (1981) After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, London: Bloomsbury 
!)*" 
MacIntyre, A. (1984) ‘Is patriotism a virtue?’, The Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas, 
March 26th, 1984 University of Kansas: Department of Philosophy 
 
Macleod, D. (2002) ‘Ex-Ofsted chief attacks ‘perversion of education’’ The Guardian, (11 
September) 
 
Mason, A. (1997) ‘Special Obligations to Compatriots’ in Ethics, (107): pp.427–47 
May, T. (2016) Speech at the Conservative Party Conference, October 2016 
Maxwell, J (2016) ‘The Big Interview: Tom Nairn’ in The Sunday Herald (October 2016) 
[accessed September 2017: 
http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/14818711.The_big_interview   Tom_Nairn/] 
 
McLaughlin, T. (1992 ) ‘Citizenship, Diversity and Education: A Philosophical Perspective’ 
Journal Of Moral Education, 21(3) pp.235-250 
 
McLaughlin, T. (2000), Citizenship Education in England: The Crick Report and Beyond. 
Journal of Philosophy of Education, (34) No. 4, pp.541-570 
 
McLaughlin, T. and Juceviciene, P (1997) ‘Education, Democracy and the Formation of 
National Identity’ in Bridges, D. (ed.) Education, Autonomy, and Democratic Citizenship: 
Philosophy in a Changing World London: Routledge 
 
Merry, M. (2009) ‘Patriotism, history and the legitimate aims of American education’, in 
Educational Philosophy and Theory 41 (4) 
 
Miller, D. (1995) On Nationality, Oxford: Clarendon Press 
 
Miller, D. (2016) Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration, Boston: 
Harvard University Press 
 
Miller, R. (2007) ‘Unlearning American patriotism’, in Theory and Research in Education 5 
(1), pp.7-21 
 
Ministry of Science, Education and Sports, (2010) Croatian National Curriculum Framework , 
Zagreb, Hrvatska 
 
Mogra, I. (2016) ‘The “Trojan Horse” affair and radicalisation: an analysis of Ofsted reports’, 
in Educational Review, 68:4: pp.444-465 
 
Monbiot, G. (2016) ‘Neoliberalism – the ideology at the root of all our problems, in The 
Guardian, 15th April, 2016 [https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/apr/15/neoliberalism- 
ideology-problem-george-monbiot] 
 
Morgan, J. (2006) ‘Children’s Rights and Parental Authority to Instil a Specific Value System’ 
in Essays in Philosophy, (7), No. 1: Pacific University Library 
 
Morgan, N (2016) Character Symposium (Speech at Floreat School) 
!*+" 
[https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/nicky-morgan-opens-character-symposium-at- 
floreat-school] 
 
Muir, H. (2014), ‘The Trojan horse inquiry’s draft report shows Michael Gove had to go’, The 
Guardian, July 2014 [Last accessed October 2016: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/18/trojan-horse-inquiry-draft-report- 
michael-gove-blob-birmingham-schools] 
 
Mulchahy, D.G. (2009) ‘Liberal Education and the Ideal of the Educated Person’, Paper 
presentation at the annual conference of the American Educational Studies Association, 
Pittsburgh, November 4th-8th 
 
Muller, J-W. (2000) Another country: German Intellectuals, Unification and National Identity, 
USA: Yale University Press 
 
Nairn, T. (2001) ‘Farewell Britannia’ in New Left Review, Vol 7, 55. 
 
Nathanson, S. (1989) ‘In Defence of ‘Moderate Patriotism’, in Ethics, 99: pp. 535–552. 
Nathanson, S. (1993) Patriotism, Morality, and Peace, Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Nayak, A. (2003) Race, place and globalisation: youth cultures in a changing world, London: 
Berg Publishing 
 
Nussbaum, M. (1996) ‘Patriotism and cosmopolitanism’, in Cohen, J. (ed.) For Love of 
Country, Boston: Beacon Press 
 
Nussbaum, M. (1997) Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal 
Education. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 
 
Nussbaum, M. (2001). Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
 
OfSTED (2010) Citizenship Established: Citizenship in Schools 2006-2009 OfSTED: London 
 
Orwell, G. (1968) ‘Notes on Nationalism’ in Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters, Sonia 
Orwell and Ian Angus (eds.), London: Secker & Warburg, (3), 361–80 
 
Osler, A. and Starkey, H. (2006) ‘Education for democratic citizenship: a review of research, 
policy and practice 1995-2005 in Research Papers in Education (21) Issue 4 
 
Osler, A. and Starkey, H. (2015) Education for cosmopolitan citizenship: A framework for 
language learning. Argentinian Journal of Applied Linguistics, 3(2), 30-39 
 
Osler. A. (2008) ‘Citizenship education and the Ajegbo report: re-imaging a cosmopolitan 
nation’ in London Review of Education (6), No 1, March 2008, pp.11-25 
 
Oxford English Dictionary (OED) (2016) www.oed.com 
!*$" 
Parker, C. (2009) ‘Symbolic versus Blind Patriotism: Distinction without Difference?’ in 
Political Research Quarterly, 63 (1) pp.97-114 
Paxman, J. (1999) The English, UK: Penguin 
Peters, R.S. (1966) Ethics and Education, London: George Allen & Unwin 
 
Peterson, A. (2011) Civic Republicanism and Civic Education: The Education of Citizens, 
London: Palgrave MacMillan 
 
Philips, M. (2007) ‘Teach History and good Citizenship will follow’, Daily Telegraph (26th 
January, 2007) 
 
Phillips, T. (2004) ‘Multiculturalism’s legacy is ‘have a nice day racism’ in The Guardian, 28 
May 2004 Accessed November 2016: 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2004/may/28/equality.raceintheuk] 
 
Plut et al (2002) cited in Luescher-Mamashela , T. (ed.) The University in Africa and 
Democratic Citizenship: Hothouse or Training Ground  South Africa: CHET 
 
Powell, E. (1968) ‘Rivers of Blood’ , Speech at meeting of the Conservative Political Centre 
in Birmingham, UK, 1968 
 
Primoratz, I. (2004) ‘Patriotism: Mundane and Ethical’ in Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 
(IV, No 10) 
 
Primoratz, I. (2007) ‘Patriotism and Morality: Mapping the Terrain’ in Primoratz, I and 
Pavkovi#, A (eds.) Patriotism. England: Ashgate 
 
Primoratz, I. (ed.) (2002) Patriotism Amherst, NY: Humanity Books 
 
Primoratz, I. 2006, “Patriotism: Worldly and Ethical,” in Igor Primoratz and Aleksandar 
Pavkovi# (eds.), Identity, Self-Determination and Secession, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 
91–106 
 
QCA (1988) History from 5 to 16 HMSO 
 
QCA (1998) Advisory Group on Education and Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy 
in Schools: Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy in Schools (Crick 
Report). London: QCA. 
 
QCA (1999). Citizenship: the National Curriculum for England Key Stages 3-4. London: 
DfES and QCA. 
 
QCA (2007) The National Curriculum statutory requirements for key stages 3 and 4 from 
September 2008. London: QCA. Also published online: http://curriculum.qcda.gov.uk 
 
Quaynor, L. (2012) ‘Citizenship in post conflict contexts: a review of the literature’, in 
Education, Citizenship and Social Justice, pp.7-33 
!*!" 
Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice, Cambridge: Massachusetts 
 
Rich, P. (1990) ‘A review of Patriotism by Raphael Samuel’ in History Today 
Salami, I. (2014) The government and politics of Lebanon, London: Routledge 
Salibi, K. (1988) The History of Lebanon Reconsidered, London: Tauris 
Samuel, R. (ed.) (1989) Patriotism: The Making and Unmaking of British Identity (3 volumes), 
Routledge: UK 
 
Sartre, J-P. (1948) The Emotions: Outline of a Theory, New York: Philosophical Library 
 
Schulz, W, Ainley, J., Fraillon, J., Kerr, D. and Losito, B. (2010) Initial Findings from the 
IEA International Civic and Citizenship. Amsterdam: IEA. 
http://www.iea.nl/fileadmin/user_upload/ICCS/ICCS_2010_Initial_Findings.pdf 
 
Schulz, W, Ainley, J., Fraillon, J., Kerr, D. and Losito, B. (2010). ICCS 2009 International 
Report: Civic knowledge, attitudes and engagement among lower secondary school students 
in thirty-eight countries. Amsterdam: IEA. 
 
Schulz, W., Fraillon, J., Ainley, J., Losito, B. and Kerr, D. (2008). International Civic and 
Citizenship Education Study. Assessment Framework. Amsterdam: IEA. 
 
Scruton, R. (2017) ‘The Case for Nations’ in The Wall St Journal 
[https://www.wsj.com/article_email/the-need-for-nations-1496421583-lMy QjA xMTE3Nj 
AxMzEwMjMxWj/] 
 
Sharma, R. (2016) The Rise and Fall of Nations, London: WW Norton 
 
Sheldon, N. (2010) ‘History in Education Project’, Institute of Historical Research 
(unpublished interview) 
 
Sherman, A. (1979) ‘Britain is not Asia’s Fiancée’ in The Daily Telegraph, 9th November, 
1979 
Slater, J. (1989) The Politics of History Teaching: A Humanity dehumanised? London: IEUL 
Smith, R. (2003) Stories of peoplehood: The politics and morals of political membership, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Sontag, S. (2003) Regarding the Pain of Others, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux 
Soutphommasane, T. (2009) Reclaiming Patriotism UK: Cambridge University Press 
Soutphommasane, T. (2012) The Virtuous Citizen, UK: Cambridge University Press 
Spajic-Vrkas, V. (2003) Peace Education in Europe: Visions and Experiences Munster: 
Waxmann 
!*%" 
Sparrow, R (2007) ‘For the Union Makes Us Strong: Anarchism and Patriotism’ in Primoratz 
and Pavkovi# (eds.) Patriotism: Philosophical and Political Perspectives,  Aldershot: Ashgate 
 
Staeheli, L.A. & Hammett, D. (2009) 'For the future of the nation': Citizenship, nation, and 
education in South Africa. Edinburgh University Press; 2009:95-112 
 
Steger, M. and Roy, R. (2010) Neoliberalism: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: OUP 
 
Stevens, D. (1999) ‘The case of the Chingford Skinhead: John White on education and special 
obligations between fellow nationals’, in Journal of Philosophy of Education 33 (3), pp.353- 
70 
 
Tamir, Y. (1993) Liberal Nationalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
 
Tan, C. (2004) Justice without borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism and Patriotism, UK: 
CUP 
 
Taylor, C. (1989) Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity, UK: Cambridge 
University Press 
 
Taylor, C. (1994) ‘Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition’ USA: Princeton 
University Press 
 
Taylor, C. (2002) ‘Why Democracy Needs Patriotism’ in Joshua Cohen (ed.) For Love of 
Country, Boston: Beacon Press 
 
Taylor, E and Low, N. (2010) 2008-09 Citizenship Survey: Empowered Communities Topic 
Report. Department for Communities and Local Government 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/statistics/pdf/1547220.pdf 
 
Thatcher, M. (1987) ‘There is no such thing as society’ in Woman’s Own interview 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106689 
 
The Guardian (April 22, 2010) General election 2010: Surge in voter registration makes 
election outcome more volatile http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/apr/22/surge-voter- 
registration-election-volatile 
 
The Guardian, (2016) July 13th (May’s speech: ‘What she said and what she meant’ Brexit) 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/ng-interactive/2016/jul/13/theresa-mays-speech-what- 
she-said-and-what-she-meant 
 
Thatcher, M. (1982a) Speech to Conservative Rally at Cheltenham 
[https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104989] 
 
Thatcher, M (1982b) Speech to Conservative Party Conference 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/105032 
!*#" 
Thornton, A. (2014) ‘British Values? It’s time to give students future not a catch phrase’ in 
The Constitution Unit (website) Accessed November 2016: https://constitution- 
unit.com/2014/08/11/british-values-its-time-for-schools-to-give-students-a-future-not-a-catch- 
phrase/] 
 
Tonkin, B. (2016) ‘Refugee Week: The Huguenots count among the most successful of 
Britain’s immigrants’ in The Independent [Last accessed November 2016: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/refugee-week-the-huguenots-count- 
among-the-most-successful-of-britains-immigrants-10330066.html 
Traboulsi F. (2012) A History of Modern Lebanon UK: Pluto Press 
UN, (1994) UN Decade of Human Rights Education 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Education/Training/Pages/Decade.aspx 
 
Upham, P. (2002) Philosophers in Conversation: Interviews for the Harvard Review of 
Philosophy in The Philosophical Review 3 (4) pp. 625-632 
 
Van Ommering E. (2015) Schooling in Conflict: an ethnographic study from Lebanon, 
International Journal of Sociology and Social policy 31 (9/10), 543-554 
 
Velleman, J.D. (1999) ‘Love as a moral emotion’, in Velleman, J.D. (ed.) (2006) Self to Self: 
Selected Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Viroli, M. (1995) For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism Oxford: 
OUP 
 
Volk, L (2008)  ‘When memory repeats itself: politics of heritage civil war in Lebanon’ in 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 40, pp. 291-314 
 
Warnock, M. (1986) ‘The education of the emotions’, in Cooper, D.E. (ed) Education, Values 
and Mind: Essays for R.S. Peters, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp.172-87 
 
Wayne, N. (2006) Negotiating Nationalism: Nation-Building, Federalism, and Secession in 
the Multinational State, Oxford: OUP 
 
White, J. (1996) ‘Education and Nationality’, in Journal of Philosophy of Education 30 (3), 
pp.327-343 
 
White, J. (2001) ‘Patriotism without obligation’, in Journal of Philosophy of Education 35 (1), 
pp.141-51 
 
Whiteley, P. (2005) Citizenship Education Longitudinal Study - Second Literature Review 
Citizenship Education: The Political Science Perspective. Slough: NFER. 
 
Williams, B. (1985) Ethics and The Limits of Philosophy, UK: Routledge 
!*&" 
Williams, M. (2003) ‘Citizenship as Identity: Citizenship as Shared Fate’, in K. McDonough 
and W. Feinberg (eds.) Citizenship and education in liberal democratic society: teaching for 
Cosmopolitanism and the Values and collective identities Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Wilson, J. (1995) Love Between Equals, London: Macmillan 
 
Wilson, J., Williams, N. and Sugarman, B. (1967) Introduction to Moral Education, 
 
Wingo, A. (2007) ‘To love your country as your mother: patriotism after 9/11’, in Theory and 
Research in Education 5 (1), pp.23-40 
 
Wolmuth, A. (2009) ‘Are the aims of citizenship education in conflict with the promotion of 
an ‘employability’ agenda within secondary schools?’ [Last accessed October 2016: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237771139_Are_the_aims_of_citizenship_educatio 
n_in_conflict_with_the_promotion_of_an_'employability'_agenda_within_secondary_schools] 
 
Wood, A. (1999) Kant, USA: Willey 
 
Wright et al (2014) Teacher’s Guide for Primary Character Education, accessed from the 
Jubilee Centre website 
[http://jubileecentre.ac.uk/userfiles/jubileecentre/pdf/Primary%20Programme%20of%20Stud 
y/Primary_Teacher's_Guide.pdf] 
 
YCC (Youth Citizenship Commission) (2009) Making the connection: Building youth 
citizenship in the UK - Final report of the Youth Citizenship Commission June 2009. London: 
YCC 
 
Yeung, P. (2016) ‘Brexit campaign was ‘criminally irresponsible’ says legal academic’, The 
Independent, July 2016. [Last accessed October 2016: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/brexit-eu-referendum-michael-dougan- 
leave-campaign-latest-a7115316.html] 
 
Young, I. (2000) Inclusion and Democracy, Oxford: OUP 
 
Zaleskene, I. (2011) ‘Citizenship Education: Lithuanian Mapping’ Journal of Social Science 
Education 10 (3)  pp. 74–80 
